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“Community in Solitude”: The Solitary Self, Social Critique, and Utopian Longing 
by 
Colin S. Macdonald 
Advisor: Richard McCoy 
This dissertation argues that the discourse of solitude in early modern English literature 
was used to construct a fantasy of resistance to political and social corruption and 
internecine conflict. Furthermore, the rhetoric of solitude and the positioning of oneself as 
an outsider, as “uniquely separate from society,” in Andrew Bennett’s terms, led to the 
development of an early modern authorial identity in opposition to the world, opening a 
space that allowed social critique and utopian desire to flourish. The notion of disengaged 
resistance, or what we might call disengaged engagement, is the key component of the 
rhetoric and practice of authorial solitude in the early modern period, derived via Petrarch 
and Montaigne. I apply these Petrarchan and Montaignean templates of solitary withdrawal 
to early modern England, attempting to move beyond the critical conversation on the 
“active life–contemplative life debates.” In English Renaissance literature, the depiction of 
a solitary character often acts as a warning against the breaking of traditional bonds, 
hierarchies, and social commitments in favor of a rapacious individualism or an emphasis 
on distinction. But this alienation is not always portrayed in purely negative terms: indeed, 
there is a real attraction and interest in solitariness that tests the limits of obedience and 
conformity, opens the possibility of social critique, and posits the construction of an 
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“That is why I go into solitude—so as not to drink out of everybody’s cistern. When I am 
among the many I live as the many do, and I do not think as I really think; after a time it 
always seems as though they want to banish me from myself and rob me of my soul.”  
Friedrich Nietzsche, Daybreak 
 
Chapter 1. Introduction: Solitude, Privacy, and Social Critique 
 
Francesco Petrarch and Michel Montaigne, two intellectual and literary Renaissance giants, 
were both deeply preoccupied with the issue of solitude: Petrarch in his De vita solitaria, 
De otio religioso, and the Secretum, Montaigne in “On Idleness” and “On Solitude,” among 
the other Essais that broach the topic. In addition to writing extensively about the subject, 
both practiced a form of solitude in their own lives. Petrarch’s solitude was at Vaucluse: 
“At mid-career [Petrarch] swore off romantic attachments and became a self-declared 
celibate, initially pursuing a reclusive existence at Vaucluse subsequent to a hypothetical 
mid-life ‘crisis.’ The years at Vaucluse remained a powerful memory for him throughout 
the remainder of his life, a period of contemplative, scholarly activity that he wished to 
recreate in different venues even when called to perform other functions as a public 
servant.”1 Montaigne’s retreat was in the Dordogne; inscribed on the wall of Montaigne’s 
study, in Latin, was the following: “In the year of Christ 1571, at the age of thirty-eight, on 
the last day of February, his birthday, Michel de Montaigne, long weary of the service of 
the court and public employments, while still entire, retired to the bosom of the learned 
virgins, where in calm and freedom from all cares he will spend what little remains of his 
                                                     
1 W. Scott Blanchard, “Petrarch and the Genealogy of Asceticism,” 403. 
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life, now more than half run out. If the fates permit, he will complete this abode, this sweet 
ancestral retreat; and he has consecrated to it his freedom, tranquility, and leisure.”2  
 In their wake, solitude, often conflated with privacy, has been regarded as an 
essential component of early modern subjectivity: from architectural developments that 
furnished homes with closets or private studies (the so-called Great Rebuilding3), to 
Philippe Ariès’s assertion that early modern England was the “birthplace of privacy” and 
that in the Middle Ages “nobody was ever left alone,” to Burckhardt-influenced theories 
of the rise of individualism and a break from medieval modes of subjectivity concomitant 
with mercantile capitalism and centralized power.4 While these theories have been 
successfully challenged or revised, especially through studies of material culture,5 the 
question of the ambivalent moral status of solitude in the period, and the motivation behind 
praising or invoking it despite the risk of moral censure, remains.  
This dissertation will examine the rhetoric of solitude in Tudor-Stuart English 
literature, specifically in works by Sidney, Shakespeare, and the Scottish lawyer, novelist, 
essayist, and politician George Mackenzie, tracking both Petrarchan and Montaignean 
strands of influence as well as the social and intellectual factors that precipitated solitude’s 
reemergence as an anxiously debated concept. I will focus on the development of authorial 
                                                     
2 See Stephen Greenblatt’s introduction to Shakespeare’s Montaigne, ed. Greenblatt and 
Platt, x–xi. 
3 The term is from W. G. Hoskins’s 1953 article “The Rebuilding of Rural England, 1570–
1640.”  
4 Philippe Ariès, “Introduction,” in Roger Chartier (ed.), A History of Private Life, 5; Ariès, 
Centuries of Childhood, 398; Jacob Burckhardt, The Civilization of the Renaissance in 
Italy; Hugh Grady, Shakespeare and Modernity, 2. 
5 See, for example, Lena Orlin, Locating Privacy in Tudor London; Alan Stewart, “The 




identity, and the appropriation of solitude as a fantasy of resistance to political and social 
corruption and internecine conflict. This latter iteration of solitude functions paradoxically: 
the solitary, even if misanthropic, can represent a communal, utopian impulse, or, through 
a depiction of a group of exiles, a community of solitaries forms.  
While solitude could, conditionally and with great attenuation, be incorporated into 
a humanist framework, fundamentally it represented a direct refutation of the Ciceronian 
ethos, derived from De officiis, that dominated elite English culture in the period. Given its 
connections to satire and world-weary discontent with politics, reflections on solitude—if 
not the actual practice of it—are linked with both political critique and ethical self-conflict 
and self-division, with increasingly psychologized depictions that complicate and subvert 
the period’s myriad warnings against aloneness (e.g., Burton’s Anatomy and Donne’s 
Devotions),6 where the solitary is diseased, in some cases even nonhuman. The rhetorical 
rehabilitation of solitude, however tentative, paradoxical, and ultimately unsuccessful in 
the early modern period, opens up new avenues in literary explorations of identity and the 
conflicts between social participation and withdrawal; interestingly, in contemporary 
society the issue is once again at the forefront, where notions of solitude or privacy seem 
increasingly obsolete. While solitude can function as a potential escape from mass culture 
and “technoconsumerism,” it also presents dangers in the despair, disconnectedness, or 
egoism of existential solitude. Further, has the experience of solitude been lost or is it, 
rather, pervasive, due to the atomization that results from virtual connectedness? 
 
                                                     
6 For Burton, in Anatomy of Melancholy, isolation leads to extreme inactivity and, 
ultimately, to death: “Be not solitary, be not idle,” Burton writes. Quoted in Brian Vickers 
(ed.), Public and Private Life in the Seventeenth Century, xviii. 
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Architecture, Material Culture, and the Performance of Privacy 
One of the foundational studies positing an increased sense of privacy in the early modern 
period, which has driven narratives of a widespread acceptance and even celebration of 
solitude and individualism in the Renaissance, is W. G. Hoskins’s “The Rebuilding of 
Rural England, 1570–1640.” Hoskins argues that  
 
we must look for the cause of the Great Rebuilding in the filtering down to the mass 
of the population … of a sense of privacy that had formerly been enjoyed only by 
the upper classes. Privacy demands more rooms, devoted to specialised uses: so we 
get in the Elizabethan yeoman’s house the kitchen, the buttery, the best parlour, two 
or three separate bedrooms, the servants’ chamber, besides the truncated medieval 
hall shorn of many of its functions…. Lewis Mumford is right when he says that 
“the first radical change, which was to destroy the form of the medieval dwelling 
house, was the development of a sense of privacy,” and hence the notion that … 
there should be more rooms: smaller rooms perhaps, but each devoted to a 
specialised use, representing a withdrawal from the common life.7 
 
Lena Orlin tries to complicate this narrative of progressive acceptance of privacy/solitude 
in the early modern period, and a big part of this lies in addressing the Great Rebuilding—
“the transformation of domestic interiors that were to have their most celebrated expression 
                                                     
7 Hoskins, “The Rebuilding of Rural England,” 54. For Mark Girouard, “The idea that there 
was no privacy in a mediaeval house is based on a total misreading of the mediaeval plan. 
There was little privacy from personal servants, but a great deal of privacy from everyone 
else.” Girouard, Life in the English Country House, 54. 
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in the closet or study.”8 Orlin thinks the account is told in a too linear way and too much 
“as a story of steady and deliberate progress.”9 Furthermore, she disagrees that the desire 
for privacy was the dominant motivation for changes in architecture that facilitated a move 
away from the great hall and added more rooms, especially closets. Rather, she offers a 
material explanation—closets replaced chests as a means of storage of materials and 
commodities, and weren’t necessarily locations of solitude, withdrawal, or isolation. Orlin 
also argues that “the pursuit of privacy was inherently suspicious” in early modern 
England, not something that was celebrated, as it was tied in with issues of secrecy and 
surveillance.10 
 Her compelling argument that closets replaced chests and thus were for securing 
possessions and not for romanticized isolation doesn’t entirely militate against the closet 
as a space of solitude and withdrawal, even if she tries to minimize this interpretation: Orlin 
writes of “accidental privacy,” when someone had a closet for the original purpose of 
storing materials, but, through an examination of a household inventory, we see that writing 
instruments were among the possessions in a closet: “In this room meant for objects … an 
early occupant had perhaps discovered the subjectivity that we associate with 
authorship.”11 So while the building of such rooms might not have been motivated solely 
by privacy/solitude, withdrawal from others and the development of a new kind of literary 
self may have emerged, in part, through them. 
                                                     
8 Orlin, Locating Privacy, 3. 
9 Ibid., 4. 
10 Ibid., 7. 
11 Ibid., 8. 
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Privacy, as with solitude, remains both sought after and suspicious, elevated and 
degraded: “Privacy inspired an uneasy mixture of desire and distrust. There are countless 
instances of individuals actively seeking privacy,” but also communal resistance to that 
privacy.12 Society tried to organize itself around preventing privacy, Orlin argues, and thus 
the story is more equivocal than many recognize, and less the linear development of a 
cherished “modern” value. Orlin echoes Katharine Eisaman Maus in arguing for the 
necessity in England at this time for some kind of interior space and privacy due to the 
trauma and conflicts of rapid religious changes—at certain points, every person had to have 
a “private conscience.”13 
For Orlin, privacy and solitude were not widespread objects of desire, even after 
the vogue for closets and other supposedly private rooms: “To test the prevailing 
associations of space and solitude is to revisit the Great Rebuilding a last time … and to 
argue that the Tudor closet had its genesis in the accumulation of valuable goods rather 
than an aspiration for personal privacy.”14 However, what emerges throughout her well-
documented argument is that the evidence shows that closets had the latter effect 
(“aspiration for personal privacy”) even as she insists their design had other, unrelated 
motivations. The closet was for “safe storage,” even if was referred to as a “study,” and 
“its nature was betrayed by the first of its names: it was a room that was closed (and 
secured), even during daylight hours…. The medieval practice had been to stow valuables 
in chests” but the “impact of early modern goods” meant more space was needed.15 Orlin 
                                                     
12 Ibid., 10. 
13 Ibid. See Maus, Inwardness and Theater in the English Renaissance. 
14 Orlin, Locating Privacy, 299. 
15 Ibid., 301. 
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cites Dora Thornton’s point “that even the Italian studiolo was ‘social’ as well as 
private”16—the key here being “as well as”: even as she expands the definition and function 
of small rooms in this period, there is still a solitary, private function, and one explicitly 
tied to literary production and letters. For example, she looks at inventories of closets at 
Boughton Monchelsea Place: books such as Foxe and Chaucer are listed in these 
inventories, and they don’t seem to be places of commodity storage only (though Orlin 
claims that “by tradition, inventories did not include fixtures and fittings”).17 She notes a 
“standish … an implement containing ink, pens, and other scribal accoutrements.” And so, 
this “privacy could have been the kind history has always valued highly: that which 
manifests itself in a subjectivity made accessible to us through its articulation in 
authorship.”18 
In closing, Orlin’s argument seems to have reoriented itself toward affirming the 
closet as a solitary space, even if only rhetorically or as a fantasy: solitude and secrecy 
could carry “the stigma of sinister intent,” but “the closet achieved a focused meaning in 
common culture as a space of solitude.”19 But then, she concludes, solitude was less a 
reality than a rhetorical strategy, and privacy more of a mental life than a material one.20 
Ronald Huebert, in his recent Privacy in the Age of Shakespeare, has pushed back against 
Orlin’s argument to a certain degree, via a remark he attributes to John Harington in the 
Prayse of Private Life (ca. 1605), a devotional work based largely on Petrarch’s De vita 
solitaria: “Whereunto he addeth, in howe great pleasure and securitie are they that live a 
                                                     
16 Ibid., 316. See Dora Thornton, The Scholar in His Study, 175. 
17 Orlin, Locating Privacy, 320. 
18 Ibid., 321. 
19 Ibid., 324. 
20 Ibid., 325. 
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private life.”21 For Huebert, this comment demonstrates “the coming into positivity of the 
idea of privacy”: “The word ‘private’ is doing work for Harington that it was not called 
upon to do in his source material. Indeed, there is a sense in which Harington has 
deliberately replaced Petrarch’s ‘solitaria’ with the partly overlapping but not entirely 
synonymous ‘private.’”22 
Huebert wants to challenge what he calls the “prevailing critical orthodoxy” that 
there was “no such thing as the private in early modern culture” or that “privacy did not 
matter to Shakespeare’s contemporaries.”23 Further, he directly challenges Orlin’s 
argument: “The virtues of Orlin’s book are ample, but her treatment of the question of 
privacy is not one of them. She has no coherent position on privacy, except a desire to deny 
that it really made much of a difference in the sixteenth century, and an eagerness to refute 
claims that privacy was an emergent and growing concern for the inhabitants of London 
during this period.”24 While Orlin’s work is subject to a certain slippage—denying the use 
of the closet as a private, authorial space even while discovering evidence for just that, for 
example—Huebert overstates the case, as well as exaggerating the “critical orthodoxy,” 
which is more nuanced than stating there was “no such thing” as privacy in the early 
modern period. But his works helps to reform a narrative in which solitude/privacy25 gains 
                                                     
21 Huebert, Privacy in the Age of Shakespeare, 4. The Prayse was for a long time thought 
to be by Sir John Harington, but it now seems more likely that Samuel Daniel was the 
author: see John Pitcher, “Margaret, Countess of Cumberland’s The Prayse of Private Life, 
Presented by Samuel Daniel,” in In the Prayse of Writing, ed. Cerasano and May, 114–44. 
Huebert does not mention Daniel, treating Harington as the author and even using 
biographical details from Harington’s life to interpret the work. 
22 Huebert, Privacy in the Age of Shakespeare, 5. 
23 Ibid., 6–7. 
24 Ibid., 7. 
25 Huebert attempts, with mixed success, to distinguish between privacy and solitude; for 
example, he speaks of “being alone together” as a form of privacy, and states that “privacy 
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cultural and intellectual acceptance, without the overly teleological arguments implied in 
the Great Rebuilding narratives, though sometimes his language falls into that mode: 
“Generally speaking, there is a progression from suspicion of or hostility to privacy in the 
earlier texts to acceptance and even a cherishing of privacy in the later ones.”26 
Alan Stewart has made an important argument in his “The Early Modern Closet 
Discovered” that complicates Huebert’s narrative, as well as Mark Girouard’s contention 
that the closet was “perhaps the only room in which its occupant could be entirely on his 
own.”27 For Stewart, drawing from a 1623 treatise by Bishop Joseph Hall and from a 1990 
book by Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet, the closet is an 
intersubjective space: “In this paper,” Stewart writes, “I shall argue that the crisis of the 
epistemology of the closet in the early 1990s is inherent to and prefigured in the closet as 
architectural reality … in sixteenth-century England…. The early modern closet … is often 
associated with the construction of a new modern subjectivity. Yet I shall show that the 
epistemology of the Early Modern closet—and by extension, our contemporary closets—
demands an analysis that rejects the search for the secret subject in favor of an interrogation 
of secret spaces and relationships.”28 Stewart does not accept the notion of the private self 
or the private closet. After quoting extensively from fifteenth-century Italian texts 
testifying to the development of the closet or studiolo, Stewart claims these are “topos” or 
                                                     
[unlike solitude] can be shared with other persons”: see ibid., 13, 16. However, as will be 
seen below in my discussion of Petrarch’s De vita solitaria, solitude is something that, 
paradoxically, can be shared, and does not always require absolute physical isolation. 
26 Ibid., 23. 
27 Girouard, Life in the English Country House, 56. 
28 Stewart, “The Early Modern Closet,” 77. 
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“social myth[s] functioning in a particular way,” not “absolute truth” or “unmediated 
account[s] of household practice.”29  
Alice T. Friedman, Stewart writes, “has indicated [in House and Household in 
Elizabethan England] a number of architectural innovations over the century that affected 
the lives of the inhabitants…. Small rooms known as closets appeared all over large 
houses—or indeed did not appear: they could often be secreted within massive interior 
walls, in ‘false’ chimney stacks, in the center of the house, or in high basements.”30 As 
mentioned, Stewart takes issue with Girouard’s account of the closet’s “utter privacy”: 
“This insistence on the closet as a private space—the notion that still obtains in its lesbian 
and gay appropriations—effectively collapses the ‘private’ nature of what went on in the 
closet with a supposed nonsocial, individual inhabitant.”31 Stewart draws on Patricia 
Fumerton’s work, arguing that “Elizabethans habitually represented ‘private experience as 
inescapably public.’ The subject lived in ‘public view but always withheld for itself a 
“secret” room, cabinet, case, or other recess locked away (in full view) in one corner of the 
house.32’” Thus, Elizabethan privacy was public, or “privacy exhibited in public”—in other 
words, performative. For example, consider the ambivalence of Margaret Hoby’s privacy 
from her “so-called ‘diary’”: it is not only that sometimes her bedchamber and closet serve 
similar functions, but also “Stewart … emphasizes an entry for February 1600: ‘To my 
closet, where I prayed and writ some thing for mine own private conscience.’ The thing 
she recorded was too private for the journal that has survived.”33 Ultimately, “The closet 
                                                     
29 Ibid., 79. 
30 Ibid., 80. 
31 Ibid., 81. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Orlin, Locating Privacy, 314. 
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is thus constructed as a place of utter privacy, of total withdrawal from the public sphere 
of the household—but it simultaneously functions as a very public gesture of withdrawal, 
a very public sign of privacy.”34 The closet becomes a figure of speech: it is not a site of 
“individual withdrawal, but … a secret nonpublic transactive space.”35 It is, however, 
important to keep in mind here that solitude in early modern England was not only a state 
of literal physical isolation or aloneness. Furthermore, the term most often used was 
solitariness; Janette Dillon, trying to convey the nuances and flexibility of the definition 
of solitariness in Elizabethan England, writes: “Self-love, detachment, a contemplative 
bent, a sense of individual superiority, a cultivation of distinctiveness, any anti-social or 
even simply asocial behavior, might be seen by the Elizabethans as a form of solitude.”36 
There is something inherently performative about solitariness—whether a literal isolation, 
a public display of solitude, a solitude a deux, an exiled community, an emphasis on 
distinction, or a purely rhetorical tool.  
 
Equivocal Solitude: Major Scholarly Narratives on the 
Cultural Acceptance of Solitariness 
There are two competing scholarly frameworks relating to solitariness and its perception 
in elite culture of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The first narrative, the most 
sustained account of which is found in Janette Dillon’s Shakespeare and the Solitary Man, 
posits a progression in the early modern period from outright rejection of solitude to 
uncritical, even fashionable, embrace of solitude (or retirement), following a transitional 
                                                     
34 Stewart, “The Early Modern Closet,” 81 (italics in original). 
35 Ibid., 83. 
36 Dillon, Shakespeare and the Solitary Man, xi. 
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period of high uncertainty, ambivalence, and moral stigma. The Renaissance development 
of attitudes toward solitariness follows the Greek and Roman paradigm “from idealisation 
of the state and the individual’s duty to the common good to the expression of a desire for 
solitude and an emphasis on the private, inner world of the individual.”37 As Jacob Zeitlin, 
an early twentieth-century Petrarch scholar, has argued, the Aristotelian legacy on the 
contemplative life is highly contradictory: Aristotle, who famously defined man as a social 
animal, seems to agree with Plato that the good of the state and service to the state comes 
before the individual, and thus discourages periods of solitary contemplation. However, 
Aristotle “uses language which sounds as though he were placing the supreme happiness 
of the individual in detachment from ordinary affairs. Since reason, he argues, is the highest 
part of man, contemplation is his highest activity … ‘and it is admitted that there is no 
virtuous activity so pleasant as the activity of wisdom or philosophic reflection.’”38 Stoic 
thought eventually reacted against the ostensible Athenian ideal of the public life, with 
Seneca an especially important figure for early modern England: “Participation in the state, 
an ideal which united pleasure with duty for Aristotle, became more clearly a duty alone 
in Seneca, one which conflicted with the personal desire for solitude in which to cultivate 
the inner life,” and thus Seneca foreshadows Petrarch and early modern English writers.39  
In this narrative, the subsequent medieval framing of solitude makes only religious 
solitariness permissible. The medieval individual is not defined from within, but in relation 
to society, thus secular isolation is a state to be decried or pitied. It is in the later sixteenth-
century in England (and here Petrarch is a couple hundred years ahead of the game) that 
                                                     
37 Ibid., 3. 
38 Zeitlin (ed.), The Life of Solitude, 28. 
39 Dillon, Shakespeare and the Solitary Man, 4. 
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the perceived turn inward allows for new consideration of secular solitariness and 
introspection. Dillon posits a transitional period between 1570 and 1630 and uses 
Shakespeare’s corpus to track part of that period: Hamlet emerges as a crucial figure, 
someone whose profound solitariness, unlike Richard III, for example, is not a sign of 
villainy. In Shakespeare’s sonnets, the frequent repetition of the word “self” demonstrates 
the new role of this word as an “autonomous noun,” not merely “an element of reflexive 
pronoun.”40 Here, again, solitariness is inextricably linked to a narrative of modern 
subjectivity, of inwardness, located in literary terms in Petrarch, Montaigne, and 
Shakespeare. The attitudes are still equivocal during this period, but progressing toward a 
cult of solitude that at first challenges traditional notions but eventually becomes 
normalized in the mid-seventeenth-century lyrics of Marvell and others, often depicting a 
“mower” or rustic.41 No longer fraught with anxiety over amorality, leisurely 
contemplation in solitude becomes a mark of a gentleman or scholar.  
Brian Vickers rejects the paradigm articulated above and argues that the negative 
connotations of solitariness (included in Vickers’s account under the rubric otium) remain 
predominant throughout the early modern period. Vickers seeks to act as a corrective to 
modern accounts that give the impression that otium “was an unqualified good,” especially 
in seventeenth-century poetry.42 For example, in “The Garden” (ca. 1650–52), the speaker 
of Marvell’s poem rejects the public, political world in favor of solitary pleasures in a green 
world, claiming that Adam’s state before Eve was the truly enviable one: “But ‘twas 
beyond a mortal’s share / To wander solitary there: / Two paradises ‘twere in one / To live 
                                                     
40 Ibid., 77. 
41 Ibid., 24. 
42 Vickers, “Leisure and Idleness in the Renaissance,” 1. 
14 
 
in paradise alone” (lines 61–64). Many twentieth-century critics, conflating Marvell with 
the poem’s speaker, have viewed the poem as a traditional expression of Horatian leisure 
and retirement, an endorsement of the contemplative life. Some, however, like Vickers, 
argue that this reading misses the severe negative implications of solitude/retirement in 
seventeenth-century poetry: “The persona in ‘The Garden’ … is guilty of hedonism, 
selfishness and the arrogant rejection of God’s will. His otium is anything but admirable.”43 
Moral censure of solitude continues to be the dominant ideological mode of early modern 
culture and literature, with occasional voices sounding discordant notes by thinking about 
solitude in less didactic or moralizing terms. 
Vickers then reinterprets the Petrarchan legacy of solitude. Vickers sees the 
negative implications of otium present even in Petrarch, who is usually accepted as a 
champion of the contemplative life. The life of intellectual seclusion could easily be drawn 
in contrast to a life of virtuous action, leading to charges of “idleness” or “luxury”; and a 
distinction is made between otium negotiosum, “leisure with a satisfying occupation,” and 
otium otiosum, “unoccupied and pointless leisure.”44 And for Petrarch himself there were 
two distinct forms of otium: “One is busy, which even in very rest is doing somewhat, and 
busie about honest affayres, and this is very sweete: The other is slouthful and idle, and 
geven onely to sluggyhnes, than which there is nothyng more loathsome, or more lyke to 
the grave.”45 In the mock dialogue with Augustine, Petrarch scolds himself for the mistakes 
he made as a result of loving Laura. He confesses to having not, as a young man, pursued 
                                                     
43 Ibid., 1–3, quotation on 3. Cf. Dillon, Shakespeare and the Solitary Man, 23, who argues 
that the trope of rural retreat in the mid- and late seventeenth century represents a “growing 
fashion for solitude,” or a “changing morality.” 
44 Vickers, “Leisure and Idleness in the Renaissance,” 5–6. 
45 Ibid., 115. 
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the difficult path to virtue, opting for “sensual desires” instead; and he suffered a 
“melancholy love for being alone, avoiding all our fellow-men,” as Augustine implores 
him to “avoid solitude.”46 However, we shouldn’t neglect Petrarch’s actual practice of 
solitude, mentioned above. Dillon is certainly right to trace an increased interest in solitude 
and privacy from the late Elizabethan period, culminating in a faddish, reified, and 
“monied” form of “leisure” in the Restoration;47 though Vickers’s skepticism toward the 
actual cultural acceptance of solitude is a helpful corrective against the tendency to see 
unabashed celebration of the individual in isolation. 
 
Petrarch and Montaigne 
De vita solitaria asks whether an individual has the right “to absolve himself from all social 
claims.”48 Of course, Petrarch voluminously described his desire for solitude while at the 
same time being “the most politically connected intellectual of his century.”49 He did 
cultivate a solitary life at Vaucluse during personal crisis in the 1340s, but his task of 
praising and defending that solitude had to surmount notable classical authorities arguing 
against it, including Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero.50 Nor, in Petrarch’s ongoing attempt to 
reconcile the Christian and the pagan, did the early church fathers present him with a more 
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49 W. Scott Blanchard, “Petrarch and the Genealogy of Asceticism,” 401. 
50 Seneca is an oft-cited exception: see Seneca, “On Leisure,” where he defends 
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favorable precedent in glorifying solitude: while there is importance in a life leading to 
God through contemplation, there are also works and duties to be performed.51  
Petrarch’s De vita has a strong satirical element to it, relying on a conventional 
dichotomy of contrasting city and rural life: he views city life as one of corruption and 
venality and lechery—ironically, an alienated, solitary existence, despite being surrounded 
by crowds; the “retired” man, on the other hand, is not weighed down by the bondage of 
business, money, the need to connive or scheme, and so forth. The liberation from these 
concerns is explicitly tied to nature, specifically the image of entering the woods. In the 
city, the emphasis is on needless decadence, which doesn’t breed happiness, but rather 
surfeit and anxiety. Petrarch claims to be appalled at seeing servants who shiver in their 
nakedness while their masters eat from silver vessels wrought with gold (112–13). This is 
contrasted to the solitary man who at most will have one servant, and who finds beauty in 
nature. This is a picture of a solitude of tranquility and contentment, not the tortured 
solitude of the unrequited love of the Canzoniere. Happiness comes from the “inward 
possession of truth” (128). 
Petrarch differs from Cicero (a difference that produces a deep sense of anxiety): 
the more noble character, Cicero contends, prefers the life of service to solitude. But, 
Petrarch says (and this is a point that Montaigne strongly echoes), service is simply a veil 
for ambition, and is fruitful only in theory (125–26). Petrarch is also forced to disagree 
with Seneca: unlike the Stoics, Petrarch believes that place matters in pursuit of solitude—
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in other words, solitude is not just a state of mind, but physical retirement to a rural setting 
or at least a private room or closet is necessary. 
 Petrarch establishes an inherent and vital connection between solitude and 
literature: “For there are some for whom the life of solitude is more grievous than death … 
and this will happen particularly with persons who have no acquaintance with literature…. 
And indeed isolation without literature is exile, prison, and torture: supply literature and it 
becomes your country, freedom, and delight. ‘What is sweeter than lettered ease?’ is a well 
known saying of Cicero. Not less familiar is Seneca’s sentence, ‘Leisure without study is 
death’” (131). Over and over, solitude is expressly linked with books, writing, and 
literature. 
 This point, as so many others do as well, puts Petrarch on the defensive: “I am not 
unaware that I shall be violently attacked at this point by those who think solitude is 
unfavorable to literature and the virtuous life” (154). Again, this anxiety is dealt with by 
trying to reconcile his views with the classical masters: while discussing Quintilian, 
Petrarch notes that although he agrees “with me in saying that a private and secluded spot 
and the deepest silence are particularly suitable for writers and declares that no one disputes 
it,” he does not think that groves and woods are proper places for study. For Quintilian, 
such solitude seems more suited to pleasure than rigorous literary exertion. Petrarch then 
evokes the importance of solitude in a private chamber, or closet (what Petrarch calls “the 
secret chamber” [157]): both nature and the closet are solitary, and “I do not require that 
students should write their books in the woods or mountains, but I permit them to withdraw 




 A crucial aspect of Petrarch’s definition of solitude, however, paradoxically 
involves sociality, and Petrarch evokes the idea of a communal solitude of those who have 
chosen an exile of sorts from the public world. In discussing Seneca’s promotion of 
solitude, Petrarch notes that it is rather extreme, since Petrarch advocates fleeing from 
crowds, not necessarily from friends. For Seneca, “avoid even the individual”: “I confess 
Seneca, you have me there and weigh me down with your authority,” he writes. But then 
he pivots to Cicero and his views on the importance, almost the transcendent importance, 
of friendship (163). Despite Cicero’s firmly anti-solitude position, Petrarch is able to use 
Cicero on friendship to defend this vein of communal solitude. Petrarch concludes that 
nature is averse to complete solitariness: “It will never be my view that solitude is disturbed 
by the presence of a friend, but that it is enriched…. And so in embracing solitude I do not 
reject friendship, and I do not fly from any individual unless he be of the sort whose 
character I should shun in cities also…. The whole matter then comes to this, that I would 
share my solitude like everything else with my friends, believing that Seneca spoke with 
true humanity when he said that ‘no good thing is pleasant to possess without friends to 
share it,’ and being assured that solitude is a great and sweet possession” (165). 
 Despite the flexibility and even sociability in Petrarch’s solitude, he articulates a 
form of lay asceticism that is textually based and can be conceived as an act of political 
and cultural resistance: solitude as a paradoxical form of ethical engagement, critique, and 
resistance is a key thread that runs through all the texts examined in this dissertation. W. 
Scott Blanchard has made this point regarding Petrarch’s form of asceticism in the De vita, 




Conceived in this manner, asceticism becomes a withdrawal not so much away 
from the world … as a flight into the text. Indeed, flight into the text, or into one’s 
contemplative study, becomes for writers and intellectuals like Petrarch an act of 
resistance; literacy’s capacity for empowerment (in the world) is thus paradoxically 
linked to a movement away from the world and its competing interests, a movement 
by which the practicing ascetic/intellectual withdraws from close affiliation with 
worldly formations of power, much in the manner that the traditional ascetic 
withdraws from “the world” in its material manifestations…. Contemplative 
withdrawal, as an act of disaffiliation, can thus amount to an act of political 
resistance rather than a stance of quietism, since its flight away from worldly 
activity may increase the propensity for textual activity and for the kind of 
intellectual concentration, argumentation, and research necessary for challenging 
the legitimacy of orthodox structures of authority.52 
 
Demetrio Yocum makes a similar argument for Petrarch’s other major work on solitude, 
the De otio religioso, where ascesis, “far from representing an idealized withdrawal from 
engagement in the world … is a technique employed by Petrarch to construct his own ideal 
of the public intellectual, disengaged and resistant to structures of coercive authority and 
power.”53 This notion of disengaged resistance, or what we might call disengaged 
engagement, is the key component of the rhetoric and practice of authorial solitude in the 
early modern period, consistent despite the shifting political, religious, and cultural forces 
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being engaged and critiqued across time and place. As Blanchard writes, “In Petrarch the 
desire for autonomy is experienced as a centripetal pull inwards that does not enforce a 
political quietism upon him, but rather enables a persistent critique of the contaminating 
powers of the world.”54 
 Petrarch’s treatises on solitude stumble when he tries to justify them in terms of 
conventional morality: in De otio religioso he attempts to define an active leisure by which 
withdrawal is not rendered idle or inefficacious, but morally purposeful;55 however, it is 
his own self-reported failure to live up to this ideal that undermines his entire moral 
argument in favor of solitude. How does his all-consuming, solitary, and tortured love for 
Laura, enacted in the Canzoniere, conform to otium negotiosum, “leisure with a satisfying 
occupation,” or the commonplace that literature should “support moral values in 
society”?56 In Petrarch’s Secretum, he is upbraided for his solitary life, as Augustine 
implores him to “avoid solitude.”57 And so even the supposed champion of secular solitude 
becomes ensnared in its contradictions.  
It is, of course, anachronistic to refer to the solitude that Petrarch articulates as 
secular, as it appropriates elements of medieval monasticism. But it also departs from the 
monastic-ascetic framework in its Epicurean drift and its articulation of at least a secular 
possibility. The first sentence of De vita solitaria embodies this tension: “I believe that a 
noble spirit will never find repose save in God …  or in himself and his private thoughts.”58 
The “or” opens up a new realm in the articulation of solitude. For Montaigne, as recounted 
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in “On Idleness,” his entire project of the Essais was essentially an attempt to structure his 
neurotic solitude:  
 
Recently I retired to my estates, determined to devote myself as far as I could to 
spending what little life I have left quietly and privately; it seemed to me then that 
the greatest favour I could do for my mind was to leave it in total idleness, caring 
for itself, concerned only with itself, calmly thinking of itself…. But I find … that 
on the contrary it bolted off like a runaway horse, taking far more trouble over itself 
than it ever did over anyone else; it gives birth to so many chimeras and fantastic 
monstrosities, one after another, without order or fitness, that, so as to contemplate 
at my ease their oddness and their strangeness, I began to keep a record of them, 
hoping in time to make my mind ashamed of itself.59  
 
Before his retirement, which was enabled by his being independently wealthy and was 
motivated in part by the death of his friend La Boétie, Montaigne had been very active in 
public life as France was “in the grip of profound tensions between Catholics and 
Protestants that would eventually erupt into full-scale massacre and civil war.”60 But it is 
important to note, as with Petrarch, that he continued to be engaged even while in supposed 
solitude or a state of retired withdrawal: “He tried unsuccessfully, after the Saint 
Bartholomew’s Day massacre in 1572, to mediate between the Catholic Henri de Guise 
and the Protestant Henri de Navarre; he served two two-year terms as the mayor of 
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Bordeaux; he acted as an informal, confidential adviser to successive kings and to 
important men and women in the court. He took part in the siege by Catholic forces of the 
Protestant stronghold of La Fère; he was arrested in Paris in 1588 on order of the Catholic 
League and then quickly released; constantly attempting to moderate murderous religious 
passions, he was distrusted and attacked by zealots on both sides. And in the midst of these 
public affairs, he continued to manage his large, complex estate.”61 So what was the 
importance of solitude for Montaigne? 
In “On Solitude,” he writes that Man should “set aside a room, just for ourselves, 
at the back of the shop, keeping it entirely free and establishing there our true liberty, our 
principal solitude and asylum. Within it our normal conversation should be of ourselves, 
with ourselves, so privy that no commerce or communication with the outside world should 
find a place there…. We have a soul able to turn in on herself; she can keep herself 
company; she has the wherewithal to attack, to defend, to receive and to give. Let us not 
fear that in such a solitude as that we shall be crouching in painful idleness.”62 Montaigne’s 
injunction to “withdraw into yourself” in his essay “On Solitude” becomes an emblem for 
his life’s work: if the world is a “deceptive theater,” then “Montaigne feels the need to 
create a private place for himself at a distance from the world…. To have secured the 
possibility of occupying his own private territory … of withdrawing at any moment into 
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absolute solitude,” a “choice of identity in conscious opposition to the world.”63  
As Montaigne repeatedly makes clear, his ideal solitude, which necessitates not 
merely physical apartness but a mindset that puts aside things outside the self, is in direct 
opposition to a Ciceronian approach—which he associates with glory, fame, and greed—
and even to Ciceronian solitude, which he labels “a ridiculous contradiction.”64 Yet 
Cicero’s ideal of the orator forms “the ideal of the English gentleman … as the cultivated 
man of affairs,” the ideological basis of the humanist-educated governing class.65 In his 
letter to Edward Denny recommending the books an educated man should read, Philip 
Sidney—the “Scipio, Cicero and Petrarch of our time,” according to Sir Walter Ralegh66—
placed Cicero second only to the Bible. And yet Sidney, writing to his mentor, the 
Protestant humanist Hubert Languet, echoes Montaigne’s sentiment of a turn inward when 
replying to one of Languet’s many exhortations to avoid solitude: “For while the mind is 
thus, as it were, drawn out of itself, it cannot turn its keen sight inward to examine itself 
thoroughly, a task to which no other that men can undertake may be compared.”67  
Whether “detached from explicitly religious content”68 or imbued with a Protestant 
ethos, why the Montaignean inheritance of a self-conscious turn inward and its necessary 
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solitude was so conflicted in Elizabethan and Jacobean England is one question this 
dissertation will address. But while solitude is intimately connected to the discussion of 
inwardness, it can also be focused on outwardness, on a performative or affected display. 
The solitary character is often parodied for his excesses, for “fashioning” solitude, but also 
often endowed with superior critical thinking, which is deployed to critique the other 
characters and the society they inhabit. 
 
In English Renaissance literature, the depiction of a solitary character often acts as a 
warning against the breaking of traditional bonds, hierarchies, and social commitments in 
favor of a rapacious individualism or an emphasis on distinction. When his mother pleads 
with Coriolanus to spare his birthplace and he responds, “out, affection! / All bond and 
privilege of nature break” (5.3.24–25), he refers to the bond that differentiates man from 
beast, famously formulated by Aristotle: “He who is unable to live in society, or who has 
no need because he is sufficient in himself, must be either a beast or a god.”69 But the fears 
of social breakdown that solitude represents coexist in some cases with exciting 
possibilities: the possibility of a new self that is not determined by preexisting social 
strictures or commitments, an ambivalent fantasy of liberation and self-determination 
through the cultivation of an inner life. The change from the medieval, then, is not the 
Renaissance inauguration of a modern self, the development of inwardness, or an 
awakening of autonomous individuality in lieu of communal, corporate identity; it is, 
rather, an attempt at refashioning and re-appropriating solitude, which in previous literature 
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functions largely as a “tragic predicament.”70 In this space of actual or conceptual solitude, 
we find satirical, experimental, and increasingly psychological explorations of self and 
society, explorations that “subject humanism to … irony and critique” and “interrogate 
cultural commonplaces and affirm alternative identities.”71  
The term prevalent in England from 1575–1700, as noted above, was solitariness, 
not solitude; solitariness had a range of meanings and implications and could connote “self-
enclosed inwardness” as well as “physical isolation.”72 Despite critical narratives to the 
contrary, the concept of solitude remains fraught with anxiety and moral dubiousness 
throughout the period, only achieving valorization with Rousseau and the Romantics.73 
While Hamlet may stand as a turning point, an inauguration of a Montaignean 
subjectivity,74 its depiction of the prince’s solitude, while not as a mark of villainy, is still 
ambivalent. The same ambivalence can be found in Shakespeare’s Elizabethan 
predecessors—particularly in Sidney’s Arcadia and other prodigal-son prose romances75—
and in his Jacobean contemporaries, such as Webster’s solitary villain-satirists. Solitary 
characters in the period tend to be contemplative (anti)heroes, lovers, monsters, satirists, 
or misanthropes, who dissect social foibles and contradictions in often scathing terms, who 
win reader/audience affection through daring rhetorical flights or by allowing access to 
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their inward musings, but who remain, at best, liminal figures, not integrated into the 
society depicted. But this alienation is not always portrayed in purely negative terms. 
Whether it’s the solitariness that Pyrocles (Arcadia) seeks away from court in love and 
pastoral adventure, or the tortured, metaphysical solitariness of Hamlet struggling against 
political obligations, there is a real attraction and interest in solitariness that tests the limits 
of obedience and conformity, opens the possibility of social critique, and posits the 
construction of an alternative identity and, consequently, an alternative society. 
 
Solitude as Social Critique and Utopian Yearning 
One of the arguments of this dissertation is that solitude fosters and enables social critique, 
particularly of customs that otherwise seem ingrained and natural, such as hierarchy or 
sovereignty, and that such critique, even coming through misanthropic characters, reflects 
a desire, sometimes naïve, sometimes nuanced and complex, for alternative forms of social 
organization and human relations that we can broadly call utopian. I will illustrate this point 
now through a reading of Hamlet as a reaction to political and social corruption. 
Political corruption was a pervasive fear and anxiety in late Elizabethan and 
Jacobean England.76 While the prevailing elite ethos remained the vita activa, supposedly 
virtuous participation in the business of the state, many “believed that the world they 
inhabited was in decline, that it had abandoned virtue and given itself over to the 
treacherous politics of the court. The wars of religion had eroded the notion of a common 
good; Europeans increasingly abandoned humanist teaching that emphasised virtuous 
action undertaken for the common good and they sought the wisdom of Tacitus and Seneca 
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and their recent interpreters, including Lipsius and Montaigne, as guides to how to survive 
in a world abandoned by virtue.”77 The most salient and radical form of critique of 
corruption was to embrace supposedly amoral solitude—to refuse participation in a 
diseased and debauched state. Solitude is thus often specifically tied not only to critiques 
of the court, but of sovereignty itself.  
Turning to Hamlet, we see a prime example of solitariness as a response to political 
and social corruption: corruption makes solitude a virtue, an ethical position, though 
Hamlet’s problem is the realization of how tied his self-understanding is to his public role, 
to the workings of institutions. Furthermore, what begins as a critique of the Danish court 
becomes a much more fundamental critique of social relations and hierarchy, emphasizing 
why the solitary/private self was seen with such suspicion: it encouraged this kind of 
deconstruction of custom, of the norms of the social order. Solitude involves more than 
abstention—it involves a difficult renegotiating of one’s identity. As Andrew Fitzmaurice 
has written in “The Corruption of Hamlet,” while criticism of Hamlet has focused on 
notions of emergent subjectivity, it is very much a play about responding to political 
corruption, with Claudius’s Denmark standing in for post-republican Rome: “The audience 
could only draw the conclusion that this play is a chronicle of a kingdom that has passed 
from a state of republican-like virtue to imperial corruption.”78 Shakespeare’s audiences 
“would have seen Hamlet not as a modern subject but as man who withdraws from the 
corruption of political life.”79 
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Indeed, the first thing audiences generally note about Hamlet is his solitariness, and 
in the centuries since the play was performed at the Globe (ca. 1600) Hamlet has come to 
represent various forms of solitude and alienation in myriad cultural, historical, and 
intellectual contexts.80 The first scene in which the prince appears (1.2) emphasizes his 
apartness via his supposedly excessive mourning, which is deemed an offense against 
social norms and mores. His first line—“A little more than kin, and less than kind” 
(1.2.65)81—is a sarcastic pun that highlights the difference or ontological gap he perceives 
between himself and Claudius, and soon he is embarking on his famous exposition 
(“Seems, madam?...” [1.2.76–86]) of the impossibility of denoting his inner self, hinting at 
vast and ineffable reservoirs of interiority. Hamlet is the pivotal marker for Dillon, as it 
was for M. C. Bradbrook, whom she quotes: “Hamlet, the solitary muser, was an 
innovation; it is on the whole not till the seventeenth century that praise of solitude becomes 
a general thing.”82 As opposed to Richard III, whose solitariness marked him as a villain, 
Hamlet initiates the moment when the outsider becomes the hero. Ultimately, Dillon sees 
Shakespeare as divided in the play “between admiration for the inward solitude which 
Hamlet so proudly defends in a false society, and condemnation of the individualism to 
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which the disintegration of social values is linked in the first place.”83 
The haunting question “Who’s there?” greets the viewer/reader right away; several 
lines later, when asked, “is Horatio there?”, Horatio responds, “A piece of him” (1.1.23): 
the play is replete from the outset with questions of identity, and particularly the relation 
of individual subjectivity to the structures and customs of the state. Startlingly, the play 
ends, after the bloodbath that leaves Hamlet, Laertes, Claudius, and Gertrude dead, with 
the dissolution of the state of Denmark: Hamlet’s legacy, his dying voice, speaks to the end 
of the state to which he is heir, as Denmark becomes annexed under the auspices of the key 
theatrical double to Hamlet, young Fortinbras. Hamlet’s endurance, its achievement of 
mythic status, has largely derived from the enigmas that seemingly lie at its core, paradoxes 
that relate profoundly to a political reading of the play: A revenge drama whose focus 
occupies the space between mandate and revenge; a play of political inheritance in which 
the king’s son does not succeed him to the throne, and eventually dissolves the very state 
which his father ruled, a father whom he purports to have adored; a play about a prince 
who constantly undercuts the notion of privilege, royalty, court life, all of which constitute 
a world in which he is profoundly enmeshed; and a play that ends in annihilation with 
ambivalent prospects for the future, but that simultaneously contemplates a more distant 
future far different than that which the characters or ourselves can fully imagine.  
 Despite the prevalence of productions of the play that rely on extensive editing and 
often emphasize the family drama, or family romance, over the political considerations of 
the text, the machinations of state power and politics are never far away in Hamlet; and 
often, as in the first scene, discourse concerning state matters forms an incongruous and 
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dissonant relationship with the more lyrical and personal discourse of the characters—see, 
for an example of the latter, Francisco’s haunting line in the play’s opening exchange, “For 
this relief much thanks. ‘Tis bitter cold, / And I am sick at heart” (1.1.8–9). Shortly after 
encountering King Hamlet’s ghost, Horatio, prompted by Marcellus’s questions about the 
purpose of the night watch and the military acceleration he notices underway, recounts the 
story of King Hamlet and old Fortinbras, as well as the current actions of young Fortinbras. 
Old Fortinbras lost lands to King Hamlet, who killed him in combat, and the son, young 
Fortinbras—like Hamlet, a prince who did not ascend to power upon his father’s death, but 
rather watched his uncle do so—seeks to reclaim those lost lands: 
   
Now, sir, young Fortinbras, 
  Of unimprovèd mettle hot and full, 
  Hath in the skirts of Norway here and there 
  Sharked up a list of lawless resolutes 
  For food and diet to some enterprise 
  … to recover of us, by strong hand 
  And terms compulsatory, those foresaid lands 
  So by his father lost (1.1.99–108). 
 
Our introduction to the militarized, action-oriented Fortinbras (whose name, of course, 
means “strong in arms”), in a passage rife with concerns of property, inheritance, and state 
power, exemplifies the generation-spanning entanglements, violence, and maneuvering 
that nation-states foster, and also offers a profound and stark contrast to our introduction 
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to Hamlet. And, in a certain way, the first scene serves as a microcosm of the play at large, 
most importantly in its depiction of characters whose very existences, and even the idea of 
human substance itself, raise fundamental questions—after all, they are witness to the 
presence of a ghost. This world of fragmented consciousness (“A piece of him”) and 
tenuous identity leads to an ingrained yearning and “sickness” of the heart, all of which is 
beautifully depicted alongside business of state, generational disputes over land, and 
impending violence. When Marcellus asks Horatio of the ghost, “Is it not like the King?”, 
Horatio responds, “As thou art to thyself” (1.1.62–63). While the literal sense is clear 
enough, there is a sense in which this is a strange reply, for the king’s ghostly self is not 
his actual self, but an apparition, a spectral representation, the ghostlike image of a 
person—in Denmark, identity is once removed, the image of a self. 
 After Claudius’s opening speech (1.2.1–39), which compared to the sublime of 
scene 1 seems like empty administrative language, and after the ritualistic, mannered 
courtly language that forms Laertes’s and Polonius’s request that Laertes be allowed to 
return to France, Hamlet shatters the formal etiquette and artificial discourse with his first 
line, the aforementioned “A little more than kin, and less than kind” (1.2.65). Hamlet’s 
insult shows him as unwilling to play the courtly games of custom in the wake of his 
father’s death. At the other end of the play, Hamlet mocks Osric’s ridiculously mannered 
courtly speech (5.2.112–20), and comments to Horatio about Osric: 
   
He hath much land, and fertile. Let a beast  
  be lord of beasts, and his crib shall stand at the King’s 
  mess. ‘Tis a chuff, but, as I say, spacious in the 
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  possession of dirt (5.2.86–89). 
 
As Fitzmaurice points out, it is through Polonius and Osric, even in largely comic scenes, 
that Shakespeare demonstrates the depth of corruption of the Danish court;84 this 
demonstration is often achieved via an attack on hierarchy and custom. In the final 
observation, “the possession of dirt,” Hamlet characteristically demonstrates the absurdity 
of rules of hierarchy and wealth when laid bare and described in their most basic terms. 
This leveling motif we will see at its strongest in the graveyard scene. 
Among the sixteenth-century meanings of custom were “A habitual or usual 
practice; common way of acting; usage, fashion, habit (either of an individual or of a 
community)” and “an established usage which by long continuance has acquired the force 
of a law or right.”85 The word applies to both individual habits as well as group or even 
national ones, and also implies the transformation of something unnatural (i.e., socially 
constructed) or arbitrary into something that becomes unconscious, habitual, seemingly 
natural. In these senses the term functions much like ideology in its Althusserean 
formulation: Althusser famously moved beyond the “false consciousness” paradigm of 
ideology as articulated by Marx to define ideology as “not the system of the real relations 
which govern the existence of individuals, but the imaginary relation of those individuals 
to the real relations in which they live.”86 For Hamlet, “custom” is usually something to be 
                                                     
84 Fitzmaurice, “The Corruption of Hamlet,” 147. 
85 OED, s.v. “custom,” n. 1a, 2. 
86 Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” 1499–1500. In an essay on The 
Tempest, Howard Felperin, writing about Althusser and Frederic Jameson moving the 
definition of ideology from “false consciousness” to “consciousness itself,” argues that 
ideology “is not something like a bad dream or a state of hypnosis from which we can wake 
up or snap out of on being told the truth…. In so far as we must always live within material 
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discarded and overcome: it is “damned custom” (3.4.38), “that monster, custom” (3.4.168), 
“a custom / More honored in the breach than the observance” (1.4.15–16); in the case of 
his mother, he thinks it is custom that allows her to effortlessly act in a way he considers 
inhuman. The concept of “habitus”—“the inculcation in men and women of a set of durable 
dispositions which generate particular practices”—was crucial to Pierre Bourdieu’s 
formulation of how ideology “takes hold in everyday life.”87 For Bourdieu, “through these 
structured dispositions, human actions may be lent a unity and consistency without any 
reference to some conscious intention. In the very ‘spontaneity’ of our habitual behavior, 
then, we reproduce certain deeply tacit norms and values; and habitus is thus the relay or 
transmission mechanism by which mental and social structures become incarnate in daily 
social activity.”88  
Polonius is the epitome of court ideology and custom in Hamlet, and thus Hamlet’s 
seemingly deep hatred of him is unsurprising. Polonius tells Ophelia, after imploring 
Laertes “to thine own self be true” (1.3.78)—a deeply ironic line, despite its out-of-context 
appropriations as signifying a fundamental nugget of wisdom imparted by the play—that 
“You do not understand yourself so clearly” (1.3.98), coming from a man who seems to 
understand very little, least of all himself. Much like Lear in King Lear’s opening scene, 
Polonius seamlessly equates love with financial transaction, exemplifying the process of 
                                                     
conditions … there can be no escape or awakening from ideology…. The direct knowledge 
of our real condition … would simply be too painful to bear…. Hence the psychological 
necessity of ideology.” Felperin does concede that literature can exist “partly outside the 
ideological complex … by offering a certain distance from it,” though this requires 
focusing on the “gaps” and “fissures” in a text to reveal the “‘marks’ of the social and 
historical formations it incompletely conceals.” Felperin, “Political Criticism at the 
Crossroads: The Utopian Historicism of The Tempest,” 35–36. 




reification that has gripped the court world: “Think yourself a baby / That you have ta’en 
these tenders for true pay / Which are not sterling. Tender yourself more dearly” (1.3.106–
8); and, “Set your entreatments at a higher rate / Than a command to parle” (1.3.123–24). 
The Player Queen in “The Murder of Gonzago” is careful to differentiate between love and 
materiality: “The instances that second marriage move / Are base respects of thrift, but 
none of love” (3.2.180–81).89 Ophelia, as a woman and as an object of erotic negotiation, 
is a perfect example of an individual whose freedom and potential is constrained by rules 
of custom and ideology, until ultimately her only outlet is madness, and then death. 
Polonius’s concern for his daughter is mediated through anxiety over his own position: 
“You’ll tender me a fool” (1.3.110), he remarks to Ophelia while warning her against 
contact with Hamlet, whom Polonius sees strictly as “a prince out of thy star” (2.2.141). 
Polonius makes clear throughout the play that his status as fully ingratiated to the king 
trumps familial empathy. Hamlet’s loathing of Polonius, and his treatment of Rosencrantz 
and Guildenstern, who, had they lived, might very well have ended up as versions of 
Polonius, is part of his revulsion to the court world and its prevailing customs and norms. 
One level of his solitariness, then, is his outsider’s critique (ironically from the position of 
the ultimate insider) of that world, his intellectual separation from it, and his unwillingness 
to participate. But his break from custom/ideology becomes much more radical when he 
deconstructs not merely the behaviors of the corrupt Danish court but the basic, naturalized 
                                                     
89 This is a strong and consistent theme in much of Shakespeare’s work. See specifically 
France in King Lear: “Love’s not love / When it is mingled with regards that stands / Aloof 
from th’entire point” (1.1.233–35); and Antony in Antony and Cleopatra: “There’s beggary 
in the love that can be reckoned” (1.1.15).  
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hierarchical systems that sustain it. Rather than retreating back to the world he knows to 
be corrupt and arbitrary, Hamlet delves further into alienation. 
 For a prince, Hamlet’s pervasive tendency of leveling, of blurring and mocking 
hierarchical distinctions, is striking and ostensibly counterintuitive. It also goes beyond the 
position of the satirist who points out social flaws and hypocrisy: Hamlet speaks from a 
radically detached, solitary perspective that seems almost out of time and place, and in 
doing so assumes his mantle of the hero of alienation. Commenting on Hamlet’s musings 
on “the noble dust of Alexander” and “Imperial Caesar, dead and turned to clay” (5.1.203–
13), and Hamlet’s ideas of sovereignty more generally, Kiernan Ryan writes, “That such 
contemptuous disenchantment with sovereignty and the baseless awe in which it expects 
to be held by the world should be placed in the mouth of a prince makes it all the more 
potent. It also confirms Hamlet’s possession at this point of a vision as declutched from 
what passes for normality as the vision of the tragedy whose protagonist he is doomed to 
play… The last line quoted, ‘But soft, but soft; aside. Here comes the King,’ encapsulates 
the speaker’s alienation from the entire regime incarnate in Claudius … and through 
Hamlet’s use of the term ‘aside’ … it glances at the key role played by staging … in framing 
a virtual time and space that power cannot police.”90 In the process, Hamlet demonstrates 
that subjectivity does not mean that people are “merely containers of disciplinary 
discourses and … ideology,” but “in addition” subjects are “repositories, or potential 
repositories, for psychic and social impulses resistant to the homogenizing, commodifying 
dynamics of … instrumental reason.”91  
                                                     
90 Ryan, Shakespeare’s Universality, 32. 
91 Grady, Shakespeare, Machiavelli, and Montaigne, 16. 
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In the argument with Rosencrantz and Guildenstern over ambition, Hamlet 
stretches out the conventional logic to conclude: “Then are our beggars bodies, and our 
monarchs and outstretched heroes the beggars’ shadows’ (2.2.264–65), a statement which 
posits beggars as real, and monarchs merely as shadows of beggars. Later, in conversation 
with Claudius, Hamlet again enacts a radical leveling between beggar and king: 
   
Hamlet: Your fat king and your lean beggar is but 
   variable service—two dishes, but to one table. That’s 
   the end. 
  King: Alas, Alas! 
  Hamlet: A man may eat fish with the worm that hath eat 
   of a king, and eat of the fish that hath fed of that 
   worm. 
  King: What dost thou mean by this? 
  Hamlet: Nothing but to show you how a king may go 
   a progress through the guts of a beggar (4.3.23–32). 
 
Such discourse leads others to perceive Hamlet as mad, and interestingly his incisiveness, 
his acute ability to transcend conventional rationality depends on his “antic disposition,” 
his feigned madness, which places him in an even more solitary position than he initially 
(at the outset of the play) occupies. He becomes like the riddling Fool in King Lear, who 
speaks in cryptic logical puzzles, revealing profound insights into forbidden matters of 
class and hierarchy, exposing the inherent artificiality of such distinctions. As Edgar 
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comments about one of Lear’s leveling, anti-hierarchical speeches, “Reason in madness!” 
(4.5.167): the paradigm applies to Hamlet as well. Furthermore, Hamlet at times embodies 
an authorial persona (common for satirists), a key site of privacy/solitude, as we will see 
in the next chapter. After encountering the Ghost, Hamlet famously calls for his “tables,” 
in which to write:  
 
 O villain, villain, smiling, damned villain! 
 My tables—meet it is I set it down 
 That one may smile, and smile, and be a villain; 
 At least I am sure it may be so in Denmark. [Writes] (1.5107–10) 
 
And of course Hamlet also writes “a speech of some dozen or sixteen lines” (2.2.541) for 
the First Player to recite in the Murder of Gonzago. 
 When Hamlet questions Fortinbras’s captain about the Norwegian military venture 
in Poland, the captain replies with surprising honesty to Hamlet: 
   
Captain: Truly to speak, and with no addition, 
   We go to gain a little patch of ground 
   That hath in it no profit but the name. 
   To pay five ducats, five, I would not farm it… 
  Hamlet: Why, then the Polack never will defend it. 
  Captain: Yes, it is already garrisoned. 
  Hamlet: Two thousand souls and twenty thousand ducats 
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   Will not debate the question of this straw. 
   This is th’impostume of much wealth and peace, 
   That inward breaks, and shows no cause without 
   Why the man dies. I humbly thank you, sir (4.4.18–30). 
 
The captain articulates an entirely pointless military operation: all these deadly maneuvers 
and wasted lives for the “possession of dirt.” Hamlet clearly recognizes the absurdity of 
the moment, the irrationality of nationalism, but he uses the motives for irrational violence 
as a means to inscribe himself back into the role of revenger. For Fortinbras and Laertes, 
adopting the role of revenger is an effortless, unreflective process, but for Hamlet it has 
been one of conscious and unconscious rebellion: 
   
Examples gross as earth exhort me: 
  Witness this army of such mass and charge, 
  Led by a delicate and tender prince, 
  Whose spirit with divine ambition puffed 
  Makes mouths at the invisible event, 
  Exposing what is mortal and unsure  
  To all that fortune, death, and danger dare, 
  Even for an eggshell…. I see 
  The imminent death of twenty thousand men 
  That for a fantasy and trick of fame 
  Go to their graves like beds, fight for a plot 
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  Whereon the numbers cannot try the cause, 
  Which is not tomb enough and continent 
  To hide the slain? Oh, from this time forth 
  My thoughts be bloody or be nothing worth! (4.4.47–67). 
 
Again, we see Hamlet’s definitive recognition of the absurdity and futility of the moment, 
all this senseless slaughter for the vain triumph of “a fantasy and trick of fame.” Yet he 
ends his speech with “My thoughts be bloody or be nothing worth!”, demonstrating the 
conflict of resistance and complicity, autonomy and interpellation. As the solitary figure, 
he sees through the web of ideology, but also eventually acquiesces to his role as revenger, 
finding in the immoral military action of Fortinbras a moral compass for his own violent 
task. Hamlet resists his “assigned role” through alienation, but is still “forced to participate” 
in the generic outcome of a revenge tragedy, despite his early radical resistance to genre: 
“Almost as soon as he is interpellated by the Ghost as a revenge hero, Hamlet begins a kind 
of unarticulated resistance to this interpellation. Singularly, he is a revenge hero who never 
really formulates a plan for his revenge.”92 For Grady, Hamlet is “a demonic hero in 
Lukács’s sense … a problematic figure unable to transcend the reified world in which he 
is trapped, but equally unable to accept or ratify it.”93 
 Grady and Eagleton read the graveyard scene via Lacan, and specifically Hamlet’s 
exclamation “This is I, / Hamlet the Dane” (5.1.257–58) as Hamlet’s reassertion of his 
symbolic identity: “Hamlet has now ‘taken in’ the reality of his own death, has asserted 
                                                     
92 Grady, Shakespeare, Machiavelli, and Montaigne, 25. 
93 Ibid., 255. 
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himself in his claim to be ‘the Dane’ as his father’s successor and the enemy of his usurping 
uncle, and has become the restored lover of a young woman he had previously seemed to 
dismiss and denigrate. His actions, in short, in this light, are … based on a renewed sense 
of his inherited place in the Symbolic Order of his society.”94 In his prior resistance to 
symbolic identification, whereas Lacan himself saw this as reflective of Hamlet’s 
narcissism, Eagleton sees ideological resistance: “Hamlet’s reluctance or inability to enter 
the symbolic order, and his revulsion from the sexuality which reproduces it, are in one 
sense regressive states of being…. But this psychological regression is also, paradoxically, 
a kind of social progressiveness.”95 Hamlet reaffirms his symbolic mandate and enacts his 
revenge on Claudius; but of course the play ends littered with corpses, including his own; 
and in his final moments the tension between his symbolic identity and his inchoate desire 
for a free, autonomous self resurfaces as he both annihilates the state of Denmark by 
handing the reins of government over to Fortinbras, but also perpetuates it, his duty as son 
and prince. 
In the escape from corruption to preserve his own soul from taint, as in the epigraph 
from Nietzsche at the outset of the chapter, Hamlet discovers not a liberating Dasein, as in 
Sydney Mendel’s formulation in “The Descent into Solitude”: “The hero in his loneliness 
discovers that he exists, that he possesses existence (Dasein), an existence real, certain, and 
incurable … an existence prior to the Cartesian cogito, prior to all verbal formulations…. 
In short, through the descent into solitude the hero regains that pristine, subjective 
knowledge of himself that he possessed prior to the emergence of the self with its 
                                                     
94 Grady, Impure Aesthetics, 183. 
95 Eagleton, William Shakespeare, 74. 
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concomitant dependence on other people.”96 Rather, he encounters a reminder of being 
unable to fully escape the symbolic mandates that structure reality: he reassumes his role—
Hamlet the Dane, a divinity shaping his ends—and enacts the revenge demanded of him, 
though ambivalence and tension remain even in the end. Shakespeare does not offer an 
escapist version of solitude, but rather a darker confrontation that leads Harold Bloom to 
label the play as “pragmatically nihilist.”97 Still, the escape from custom is fundamentally 
an ethical move: Hamlet’s solitude enables not just a critique of the Danish court, but what 
becomes a more fundamental critique of society and human relations. No wonder the 
solitary outsider, the desire for privacy, was a dubious or threatening idea if it could 
engender such thoughts and observations. 
Nor does solitary alienation merely conjure up a hopeless, nihilistic vision. Rather, 
as Robert Sayre has written, the seventeenth-century theme of retreat/solitude is in part a 
“revolt against the conditions of a new social order,” a withdrawal, rhetorical or literal, 
“from a society based on competition, antagonism, self-interest.” It is, in other words, a 
“search for lost community.” However, since “the new community is not exterior … but 
the interior ‘crowd’ within oneself,” then “the solitary is himself a community; he 
communes with his ideas and his readings.”98 But, paradoxically, this community in the 
solitary self speaks to a longing for a genuine, and genuinely humane, community. This is 
what Kiernan Ryan labels “utopian realism,” which “‘has recognized what is and what 
could be, within and beyond social condition.’”99 Solitude—whether literal, rhetorical, 
                                                     
96 Mendel, “The Descent into Solitude,” 24. 
97 Bloom, “Hamlet”: Poem Unlimited, 119. 
98 Sayre, Solitude in Society, 45. 
99 Ryan, Shakespeare’s Universality, 25, quoting Marcuse. 
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imaginative, performative—is cast as immoral in the early modern period but it functions 
as a form of ethical engagement and critique, and within that critique, however seemingly 
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Chapter 2. “A mazefull solitarinesse”: Sidney and Solitude 
 
“Our showy errors”: Sidney’s Uneasy Desire for Solitude 
On March 1, 1578, Philip Sidney (1554–86) wrote from London to his friend and mentor, 
the Protestant Burgundian humanist Hubert Languet (1518–81): 
 
My very dear Hubert. . . . You sharply accuse me with the term “laziness” [pigritia] 
and meanwhile fall into the same fault yourself—or rather a greater one, in that I 
become a better man through your letters, while mine must merely be empty noise 
to you. And as is perfectly obvious, I am out of practice when it comes to style; and 
my mind itself, if it was ever any good at anything, is now, through our cowardly 
inactivity, beginning both to lose its powers without noticing and to be quite content 
to give them up. For what is the point of stirring our thoughts to all kinds of 
knowledge, if we are given nowhere to put it into practice to contribute to the 
common good—which in a corrupt age we may not hope for? Who learns music if 
not for delight? Architecture if not to construct buildings?1 
 
                                                     
1 Roger Kuin, ed., The Correspondence of Sir Philip Sidney, 2:816. The Sidney-Languet 
correspondence, written in Latin, was originally printed in Heidelberg in 1633 by William 
Fitzer: The most famous Hubert Languet’s political and historical epistles, formerly written 
to the illustrious and noble Sir Philip Sidney … of the greatest use … to all students of 
matters political and historical, and also to counsellors of princes and to those at the helm 
of state. The letters survive only from this printed edition.  
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This passage, ostensibly demonstrating the young courtier’s traditionally humanist concept 
of the vita activa and his desire for more fruitful employment at court, is filled with the 
playful erudition, the self-confidence juxtaposed with self-deprecation, and the intellectual 
expansiveness that make Sidney’s correspondence so rich. It also exemplifies a thread that 
runs through the Sidney-Languet letters that relates to a classically derived tradition of 
debate but that also clearly has deep personal significance for Sidney: the conflict between 
solitude and withdrawal, on the one hand, and social and political participation, on the 
other.   
Fittingly, given the tension between the personal and the political in the letters, 
there is a discrepancy in the translation of this letter between Roger Kuin’s edition and 
John Buxton’s translation that centers around “my” and “our.” Buxton renders what 
corresponds to lines 4–6 above as: “and my mind itself, even if it was ever of any worth, 
is beginning, through my wretched idleness, to lose strength without my noticing it.”2 He 
emphasizes the personal, whereas Kuin highlights the possible public-political meaning: 
Buxton’s “through my wretched idleness” is corrected to “through our cowardly inactivity” 
in Kuin, with a corresponding footnote that reads: “The Queen’s reluctance to commit 
herself to actual aid to either the Huguenots or the Dutch is a constant irritant to Sidney.”3 
Embedded within these dual translations is the very public-private conflict with which 
Sidney grapples: should his energies be directed outward or inward?  
                                                     
2 In Katherine Duncan-Jones, ed., Sir Philip Sidney: The Major Works, 282. 
3 Kuin, ed., Correspondence, 2:816n3. Kuin’s translation is the more literally faithful: “et 
ipse animus si forsan unquam aliqua in re ualuit, incipit iam pro ignavo nostro otio, uires 
suas et sine sensu amittere et non illibenter remittere.” 
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But regardless of the translation, it is indisputable that the correspondence is 
dominated by an interest in governance, career, and current affairs—informational, as 
opposed to literary letters, in Kuin’s terms.4 And so the brief moments over a span from 
1573 to Languet’s death in 1581 when the discourse turns to the seemingly personal (still 
always in the context of career), and to questions of withdrawal in particular, become even 
more noteworthy and revealing, especially considering that such issues strongly animate 
Sidney in fiction writing as well. In the correspondence and in the Arcadia, Sidney attempts 
to transcend the commonplaces of the generic and derivative active life–contemplative life 
debates, and to rearticulate solitude in fresh terms; but Languet’s rhetoric, which becomes 
a reproachful persona that hovers over Sidney’s works, emphasizing the moral 
incompatibility of solitude with the construction of the young Sidney’s identity, stalls this 
articulation. By the time of Astrophil and Stella, solitude has become a near-tragic 
situation. The partial, incomplete, and ultimately unsuccessful defense of solitude that 
Sidney undertakes in the correspondence and the Arcadia cannot fully reach beyond the 
moral and rhetorical landscape of the otium debates, but the very attempt hints at crucial 
developments in the conception of solitude: the emphasis on authorial self-consciousness 
and space—the creation of an authorial identity at a remove from the world and its ethical 
shortcomings. 
The perceived accusation of laziness (pigritia), referred to in the passage above, 
runs throughout the Sidney-Languet letters, often lightheartedly, but tinged with anxiety; 
it stems both from Languet’s lamenting the lack of letters from the much-younger Sidney 
in contradistinction to Languet’s own diligence in writing, and also from the older man’s 
                                                     
4 Ibid., 1:xiii. 
50 
 
chiding of Sidney, in the quasi-paternal tone that Languet often adopts,5 for his periods 
away from court and perceived tendency toward seclusion. As a result, Sidney is often 
preemptively on the alert for the laziness trope: “But good God, who can now dare to 
accuse me of laziness, when I write such a long letter?”; or, “I have recently written to 
Lobbet, Banos, Andreas, Anselmus, and Matal. Lazy, me?”6 In the passage from March 1, 
1578, quoted above, Sidney ironically acquiesces to the charge of laziness and idleness. He 
then pivots to the rhetoric of functionality (“For what is the point of stirring our thoughts 
to all kinds of knowledge, if we are given nowhere to put it into practice”), a key component 
of the Ciceronian ethos derived from the ubiquitous De Officiis: private study must emerge 
into public action, thus, as in the example Sidney gives, the study of architecture should 
lead to the erection of buildings.7 As Cicero wrote: “If wisdom is the most important of the 
virtues, as it certainly is, it necessarily follows that that duty which is connected with the 
social obligation is the most important duty. And … service is better than mere theoretical 
knowledge, for the study and knowledge of the universe would somehow be lame and 
defective, were no practical results to follow.”8 In this same passage, Cicero advises that 
solitude—often linked via otium to sloth and idleness, or pigritia—will lead to death.  
The importance of Cicero cannot be overemphasized: Cicero’s ideal of the orator 
forms “the ideal of the English gentleman … as the cultivated man of affairs,” the 
                                                     
5 In a letter from December 24, 1573, Languet calls Sidney “son” for the first time: “My 
dearest son (for now I like to call you by that name)”: Kuin, ed., Correspondence, 1:69. 
See Edward Berry, “Hubert Languet and the ‘Making’ of Philip Sidney,” 310. 
6 Kuin, Correspondence, 2:782 (Sidney to Languet, October 10, 1577); 2:818 (Sidney to 
Languet, March 1, 1578). 
7 De Officiis was part of the school curricula and a key text in the tradition of debating the 
active and contemplative lives: see Brian Vickers, “Public and Private Life in Seventeenth-
Century England: The Mackenzie-Evelyn Debate,” 257, 276n2. 
8 Cicero, De Officiis, 157 (I.xliii.153). 
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ideological basis of the humanist-educated English governing class.9 The Sidney library at 
Penshurst Place carried two copies of De Officiis, with a note in the catalogue manuscript 
that Philip, while a student at Shrewsbury, purchased “a written booke being an abstract of 
Mr Astons doinge of Tullies Offices.”10 In his 1580 letter to Edward Denny recommending 
the books an educated man should read, Sidney—the “Scipio, Cicero and Petrarch of our 
time,” as Sir Walter Ralegh had it11—placed Cicero second only to the Bible: Sidney first 
refers to “Tullys offices,” or De Officiis, and then writes, “let Tully be for that mater your 
foundation, next to the foundation of foundations, and wisdome of wisdomes, I mean the 
Holy scripture.”12 Furthermore, Cicero’s Familiar Letters and Letters to Atticus were 
thematically important to Sidney’s own correspondence.13  
One can clearly detect Sidney’s own evocation of the commitment to practical 
virtue from the Defence of Poesy (ca. 1579), where he sounds every bit the devoted 
Ciceronian: “But when by the balance of experience it was found that the astronomer, 
looking to the stars, might fall in a ditch … did proof … make manifest that all these are 
but serving sciences, which, as they have each a private end in themselves, so yet are they 
                                                     
9 Dominic Baker-Smith, “Renaissance and Reformation,” 6. 
10 Germaine Warkentin, Joseph L. Black, and William R. Bowen, eds., The Library of the 
Sidneys of Penshurst Place circa 1665, 114 (33v20). The editors note that “written booke” 
means manuscript, and that “Mr Aston” might be Thomas Ashton, the headmaster. The 
note is dated January 15, 1565. “Tully” or “Tullie,” of course, is Cicero: Marcus Tullius 
Cicero. 
11 Ralegh, “An Epitaph upon the Right Honourable Sir Philip Sidney Knight, Lord 
Governor of Flushing,” in Edmund Spenser, Colin Clouts Come Home Againe ([London], 
1595), sig. K3. 
12 Kuin, ed., Correspondence, 2:982 (Sidney to Edward Denny, May 22, 1580; italics in 
original). Sidney mentions translations of classical works in the letter: De Officiis was 
available in an English and Latin edition, translation by Nicholas Grimald, in 1556, 
published by Tottel. 
13 Kuin, ed., Correspondence, 1:xiii. 
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all directed to the highest end of the mistress-knowledge … which stands … in the 
knowledge of a man’s self, in the ethic and politic consideration, with the end of well-doing 
and not of well-knowing only…. So that, the ending end of all earthly learning being 
virtuous action.”14 The sentiment of these lines corresponds closely to Sidney’s articulation 
in the March 1, 1578 letter to Languet. And yet, in that same letter, Sidney quickly turns 
from the traditional Ciceronian invocation to another, more skeptical register: “Yet, let us 
see if we are not endowing our showy errors with a lovely yet painted face. For while the 
mind is thus as it were drawn out of itself, it cannot turn its keenness upon itself, inwardly 
to contemplate itself—a work with which nothing men can be energetically busy at can 
compare. Can you not see me elegantly playing the Stoic? yea, I will be a Cynic if you do 
not call me back.”15  
First, the suggestiveness of the language stands out: the “showy errors” (“nobis 
splendidis erroribus”) referring to the Ciceronian precept just alluded to in the letter, that 
of acquiring knowledge solely for its functional result and use to the state, with splendidis 
also carrying the meaning of glittering, which links it to the “lovely yet painted face” 
(“pulchram sed fucatam speciem”), which seems attractive by artificial construction 
(rhetoric), but if looked deeper into, if mined in terms of is and not seems, is exposed as 
false.16 In contrast to this glittering falsity, which is deemed in the dominant thinking as 
exemplary, stands inward contemplation without concern for utility or reputation or career, 
                                                     
14 Sidney, The Defence of Poesy, in Duncan-Jones, ed., The Major Works, 219–20. 
15 Kuin, ed., Correspondence, 2:817. 
16 The trope of cosmetics, “paint” or “painting,” carries largely negative connotations in 
the period, denoting deceit, artificiality, and vanity: most famously, recall Hamlet’s railing 
to Ophelia that “I have heard of your paintings, too, well enough. God have given you one 
face, and you make yourself another” (Hamlet 3.1.142–43). 
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which emerges from Sidney’s letter as more valuable than the “energetically busy” 
activities apart from such inwardness. For Neil Rudenstine, in his examination of leisure 
in the Sidney-Languet correspondence, “the indolence and inactivity of mind [Sidney] 
mentioned … scarcely suggest that he is engaged in very strenuous meditation or vigorous 
self-scrutiny…. By the end of the passage, he all but admits that he has mainly been looking 
for ways of rationalizing his idleness.”17 However, as will be discussed further below, if 
literary activity was a significant part of Sidney’s withdrawal, the rhetoric of idleness and 
frivolity in that regard was conventional—e.g., Sidney refers to his Arcadia as “this idle 
work of mine” and “my toyfull Booke”18—and belies the authorial seriousness and 
ambition clearly present in Arcadia, the Defence, and Astrophil and Stella. As Richard 
McCoy writes of the Apology, Sidney “brings the same enthusiasm, intelligence, and 
energy to this new undertaking that he brings to his political career. He also retains many 
of the same concerns, for the problematic issues of his life emerge as central themes in his 
writings.”19 Thus Sidney’s solitariness can be seen not as an indulgence in idleness, as 
pigritia, or as the turning away from hard choices, but rather a potentially ethical and 
literary commitment, but one almost impossible to justify or commit to fully, hence the 
oblique, ironic treatment of the topic in the Arcadia. 
In extolling the virtues of allowing the mind to turn “its keenness upon itself,” 
Sidney articulates the turn inward toward desired self-contemplation and self-knowledge 
that is so inextricably linked, via Montaigne, to solitude: “We have a soul able to turn in 
                                                     
17 Neil Rudenstine, Sidney’s Poetic Development, 8. 
18 Sidney, The Countess of Pembroke’s Arcadia, ed. Maurice Evans, 57 (dedicatory 
epistle); Kuin, ed., Correspondence, 2:1009 (Sidney to Robert Sidney, October 18, 1580). 
19 McCoy, Sir Philip Sidney: Rebellion in Arcadia, 20. 
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on herself,” Montaigne writes in “On Solitude,”20 or, in Florio’s 1603 translation (“Of 
Solitariness”), “we have a mind moving and turning in itself; it may keep itself company.”21 
Montaigne’s essay is imbued with a strong anti-Ciceronianism—a term often used in 
another context and which requires a brief explanation. In discussions of fifteenth- and 
sixteenth-century humanism, “anti-Ciceronian” is usually used in the context of debates 
about imitation and Latin style; Sidney himself could be included in this camp: “So yow 
can speake and write Latine not barbarously I neuer require great study in Ciceronianisme 
the cheafe abuse of Oxford,” he writes to his brother.22 Languet warns Sidney as early as 
1574 to “beware of falling into the school of thought of those who believe that the greatest 
good lies in the imitation of Cicero, and waste their whole lives on it.”23 In this dissertation, 
however, “(anti-)Ciceronian” refers to the ethos or ideology derived from Cicero and 
appropriated and adapted in early modern culture. And it is this Ciceronianism to which 
Montaigne objects: his ideal solitude, which necessitates not merely physical apartness but 
a mindset that puts aside things outside the self, is in direct opposition to a Ciceronian 
ethos—which he associates with glory, fame, and greed—and even to Ciceronian solitude, 
which he labels “a ridiculous contradiction”: “He [Pliny the Younger] means [acquiring] a 
good reputation, his humour being similar to Cicero’s who said he wanted to use his 
withdrawal … from the affairs of State to gain life everlasting through his writings! … It 
                                                     
20 Michel de Montaigne, “On Solitude,” in The Complete Essays, ed. M. A. Screech, 270. 
Sidney’s letter was composed two years before the first publication of Montaigne’s Essais 
in 1580. 
21 Florio, trans., “Of Solitariness,” in Essays, ed. Percival Chubb, 114. 
22 Kuin, ed., Correspondence, 2:1008–09 (Sidney to Robert Sidney, October 18, 1580). 
23 Ibid., 1:78 (Languet to Sidney, January 1, 1574). For a discussion of this issue and the 
“great controversie” around the cult of Cicero, see Howard Jones, Master Tully: Cicero in 
Tudor England, 247–79. 
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seems logical that when you talk about withdrawing from the world you should be 
contemplating things outside it.”24  
But even absent the Montaignean rejection and mocking of Cicero, if one admires 
the ethics of De Officiis, as Brian Vickers, for example, does, one still sees that its 
ideological manipulation in early modern England cast withdrawal/solitude, or “inwardly 
to contemplate” oneself, or really any form of intellectual deviation, as highly suspect and 
problematic: “So much of this book [De Officiis] breathes such an atmosphere of charity 
and mutuality that one understands why Erasmus and others could give it the highest 
accolade…. Yet when this ideology of civic altruism was taken into social thinking, was 
interiorized, became a norm, it sometimes resulted in violent disapproval of what was then 
seen as socially deviant behaviour. Cicero had condemned the life of solitude as being 
certain to lead to death, and Renaissance proponents of the active life vented their scorn on 
those who tried to live outside society.”25  
By “playing the Stoic” with Languet, in fact by going beyond the conventional 
Stoic position in arguing for a turn inward for its own sake,26 Sidney endorses an 
intellectual position that was simply not viable for the life both he and Languet imagined 
for himself. Hence the guarded, playful tone and the quip about the Cynics, before leaving 
the topic and returning to Languet’s injunctions that Sidney get married. But at various 
times and in numerous asides, the topic comes up over and over again in the 
                                                     
24 Montaigne, “On Solitude,” 274–75. 
25 Vickers, introduction to Arbeit, Musse, Meditation: Betrachtungen zur Vita active und 
Vita contemplativa, ed. Vickers, 6–7. 
26 Seneca is an oft-cited exception to the classical anti-solitary position; however, while he 
defends solitude/withdrawal on Stoic grounds, he insists that it can only be justified if it 
promotes the greater good: see Seneca, “On Leisure,” 187. 
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correspondence, and cannot be explained away merely by pointing to a classical trope or a 
tradition of humanist debate. In fact, such debates on the active versus contemplative lives 
became in the Renaissance “exclusive and mutually incomprehending.”27 Montaigne 
understood this and immediately sought to do away with the tradition in his opening 
sentence of “On Solitude”: “Let us leave aside those long comparisons between the solitary 
life and the active one.”28 These comparisons tend to be conventional rhetorical exercises, 
either highly didactic or mock-polemic, and often with authors, such as Roger Baynes in 
his Praise of Solitarinesse (1577), taking both positions, drawing rather unimaginatively 
from Petrarch and Seneca, and with the sole goal of achieving a kind of pious and timid 
“balance.” In his Defence, Sidney, like Montaigne, understands the pointlessness of such 
debates: he mocks philosophers for neither delighting nor moving readers, but rather 
“wrangling whether virtus be the chief or the only good, whether the contemplative or the 
active life do excel.”29 Some of the vocabulary of these “wranglings,” of course, can be 
found in Sidney’s letters and fiction; but Sidney attempts, in fits and starts, and in the face 
of harsh moral condemnation, to move past the conventional, rhetorical debates and 
articulate an authorial and ethical solitariness, distinct from otium, idleness, or religious 
contemplative devotion. 
Without implying that Sidney’s passionate interest in governance, a meaningful 
political role at court, intervention in foreign affairs, etc., were any less than central to him 
and his identity, we can take seriously his anxious interest in solitariness. As Rudenstine 
writes, “if part of the Languet correspondence seems to reveal Sidney as a complex and 
                                                     
27 Vickers, introduction to Arbeit, Musse, Meditation, 6. 
28 Montaigne, “On Solitude,” 266. 
29 Sidney, The Defence of Poesy, in Duncan-Jones, ed., The Major Works, 227. 
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divided personality, an equal portion sustains the traditional view of him as the ideal 
courtier.”30 It is in that self-division that solitude emerges. And what the allure of 
solitariness represents, in Sidney’s letters and fiction, is an alternative identity and a 
necessary contradiction: the possibility of a self that is not determined by social strictures 
or political commitments, an ambivalent fantasy of self-determination linked to an 
authorial self-consciousness. But the allure of solitude or isolation is also a dilemma: 
solitude can be a balm, what Melville referred to as “the silent grass-growing mood in 
which a man ought always to compose,”31 or a torment, as it was for Montaigne before he 
undertook his Essais as a way to structure and engage his neurotic isolation. These 
questions don’t have the same moral baggage today that they did for Sidney, but they 
remain relevant and especially so to conceptions of authorship—particularly a conception 
of an authorial self that does not necessarily demand widespread publication. Philip Roth’s 
Nathan Zuckerman, in prolonged retreat in the Berkshires, mirroring Roth’s own self-
imposed writerly isolation in New England, writes: “I had ceased to inhabit not just the 
great world but the present moment…. I’d been alone these past eleven years in a small 
house on a dirt road in the deep country…. I see few people…. I don’t go to dinner parties, 
I don’t go to movies, I don’t watch television, I don’t own a cell phone … or a computer. 
I continue in the Age of the Typewriter…. I write for most of the day and often into the 
night…. I write every day of the week—otherwise I’m silent. I am tempted by the thought 
of not publishing at all—isn’t the work all I need, the work and the working?”32 
 
                                                     
30 Rudenstine, Sidney’s Poetic Development, 9. 
31 Letter to Nathaniel Hawthorne, June 1851: http://www.melville.org/letter3.htm. 
32 Philip Roth, Exit Ghost, 1–5. 
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The Authorial Self 
Sidney saw none of his works in print, nor did he seemingly intend for any to eventually 
be printed. There are two possible exceptions: first, two sonnets in Henry Goldwell’s A 
briefe declaratio[n] of the shews, deuices, speeches, and inuentions, done & performed 
before the Queenes Maiestie… (1581) are attributed to Sidney.33 Second, Sidney 
presumably intended for his Defence of the Earl of Leicester to reach a wider audience, 
and his challenge at the conclusion of this defense—“And from the date of this writing, 
imprinted and published, I will three months expect thine answer”—indicates, according 
to H. R. Woudhuysen, that “it would be wrong … to give the impression that while he lived 
Sidney was quite detached from the world of print.”34  
Scant interest in print publication might seem to militate against viewing Sidney as 
a forerunner of a modern authorial identity, but, in fact, an examination of Sidney’s writing 
practices, such as in Woudhuysen’s Sir Philip Sidney and the Circulation of Manuscripts, 
demonstrates Sidney as a possessive author par excellence. Woudhuysen sees Sidney as 
the crucial figure in the resurgence of manuscript copying and circulation that occurs in 
Elizabethan England, and particularly in its changing role from private to public: “[Sidney] 
may have changed the private character of manuscript production, altering and reviving it 
while at the same time seeking to preserve its origins, which he saw as primarily literary. 
Sidney’s role in this process of changing manuscript culture can be related to his self-
consciousness as an author…. He might be said to have begun the creation of a literary, 
reading public…. The writer, in his works, became a fictional character, became, up to a 
                                                     
33 See Ringler, ed., The Poems of Sir Philip Sidney, 345–46, 518–19. 
34 See Woudhuysen, Sir Philip Sidney and the Circulation of Manuscripts 1558–1640, 210 
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point, a hero in his own right.”35 All of this makes Sidney an “unrepresentative” figure, 
especially when compared to the next generation of writers; while Sidney’s works were 
solicited in part due to the fame and identity of the author, this was unusual: “it may matter 
to modern readers and editors whether a poem is or is not by Donne or Jonson, but their 
contemporaries appeared to care little. There is some evidence that this was not always the 
case with Sidney.”36 Further, Woudhuysen describes Sidney as being an “inveterate 
reviser” of his literary works, who, after the possible illicit copying of the Arcadia, sought 
to keep his work very much under his control.37  
This view of Sidney and his authorial self-consciousness and desire for authorial 
control contrasts with the conception of authorship and manuscript circulation and 
composition found in, for example, Arthur Marotti’s important work on aristocratic 
manuscript writing and circulation, John Donne, Coterie Poet. As Heather Hirschfeld 
writes of Marotti’s work, “cooperative writing practices as well as the aesthetics of scribal 
composition necessitate a rethinking of some poetry in terms of Foucault’s authorless 
discourse because the poetry was ‘subject to reader emendation … to unconscious and 
conscious revision.’” Manuscript culture, Marotti contends, “was far less author-centered 
than print culture, and not at all interested in correcting, perfecting, or fixing texts in 
authorially sanctioned forms.”38 In the hugely influential and much-debated “What Is an 
Author?,” Foucault writes: “In our civilization … [t]here was a time when the texts that we 
today call ‘literary’ … were accepted, put into circulation, and valorized without any 
                                                     
35 Ibid., 8–9.  
36 Ibid., 9. 
37 Ibid., 211. 
38 Heather Hirschfeld, “Early Modern Collaboration and Theories of Authorship,” 612. 
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question about the identity of their author…. A reversal occurred in the seventeenth or 
eighteenth century…. [L]iterary discourses came to be accepted only when endowed with 
the author-function.”39   
Marotti’s work is part of a larger reevaluation of the author in early modern literary 
studies, although the critical erasure of the author was primarily directed toward the notion 
of dramatic authorship, where, ostensibly, the collaborative nature of composition along 
with the “collaborative economies of the early modern theater”40 led scholars, influenced 
by Foucault or a new materialist methodology, not just to advocate removing the author 
“from the center of dramatic history,”41 but to claim that playtexts did not “deserve” an 
author and that authorship’s importance to us is simply due to our being the “heirs of a 
romantic conception of writing.”42 But it was not only the status of dramatic authorship 
that came under interrogation: in some versions of the above claims, a larger argument 
emerged, namely, that modern ideas of individuality, and therefore of authorship or 
copyright, simply did not exist in early modern England, or that such a notion of the self 
(“interiority,” “modern subjectivity,” etc.) was only just coming into being in this period, 
                                                     
39 Michel Foucault, “What Is an Author?,” 149. 
40 David Scott Kastan, Shakespeare and the Book, 14. Regarding collaborative 
composition, Jeffrey Masten writes that “as many as half of the plays by professional 
dramatists in the period incorporated the writing at some date of more than one man”: 
Masten, Textual Intercourse: Collaboration, Authorship, and Sexualities in Renaissance 
Drama, 13. It is not entirely clear why multiple authorship negates the conception of the 
author per se; as Hirschfeld argues, collaboration can reflect “unique and individual 
contributions to a shared text”: see Hirschfeld, “Early Modern Collaboration,” 617. 
Further, as Jeffrey Knapp writes, “if half of the English Renaissance drama was co-
authored, then half must have been single-authored, which suggests that neither form of 
playwriting dominated theatrical practice”: Knapp, Shakespeare Only, 12.  
41 John D. Cox and David Scott Kastan’s introduction in A New History of Early English 
Drama, 5; quoted in Knapp, Shakespeare Only, 6.  
42 Kastan, Shakespeare and the Book, 48.  
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which still negates the author, aside from nascent conceptions of authorship beginning 
around 1600.43 The idea of the singular, isolated author gave way to the author as a 
“discursive formation embedded in particular historical conditions.”44 Much of this hinges 
on a Foucauldian, anti-humanist narrative, rejecting “autonomous” or “essential” human 
subjects, instead relying on cultural/discursive/performative constructions of self. Jonathan 
Dollimore, a leading proponent of cultural materialism, writes that “anti-humanism, like 
materialist criticism more generally, challenges the idea that ‘man’ possesses some given, 
unalterable essence which is what makes ‘him’ human.”45 Such Foucauldian and 
Althusserean anti-humanism—“the decentering of man”46—need not, of course, move us 
inevitably toward a reductive problematic: asking us to choose between complete 
autonomy or essentialism, on the one hand, and an entirely culturally determined, 
interpellated identity on the other, where people are nothing but receptacles for discourses 
of power and everything can be reduced to self-fashioning. (Jan Frans van Dijkhuizen 
refers to the latter conception as “the grimly Foucauldian view … in which individuals are 
merely the listless playthings of institutional forces.” 47) Such a framework, aside from 
                                                     
43 See Knapp, Shakespeare Only, preface; Lukas Erne, Shakespeare as Literary Dramatist, 
8, who points out that “the idea of copyright as the right of the author was very much 
present in Shakespeare’s time, though it was not anchored in the law until the eighteenth 
century” (italics in original). 
44 Hirschfeld, “Early Modern Collaboration,” 610. Hirschfeld also points out that this is 
not merely a tendency of a post-Barthes and Foucault historicism, as the New Critics, with 
their suspicion of authorial intention, didn’t always respect the priority of the author. 
45 Jonathan Dollimore, Radical Tragedy: Religion, Ideology, and Power in the Drama of 
Shakespeare and His Contemporaries, 250. 
46 Dollimore, Radical Tragedy, 249. 
47 Jan Frans van Dijkhuizen, Devil Theatre: Demonic Possession and Exorcism in English 
Renaissance Drama, 17. To be clear, this is not how Dollimore sees his position, and he 
rejects such “social determinism,” thinking this to be a misunderstanding of his work, 
specifically the term “anti-humanism,” and the work of Alan Sinfield et al. See Jonathan 
Dollimore, “The Legacy of Cultural Materialism.” See further, Hugh Grady, Shakespeare, 
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ignoring a vast swath of middle ground between “essentialism” and “interpellation,” 
doesn’t need authors because it would reduce all human agency and creativity to ideology, 
marginalizing the affective and intellectual realms of literary fiction.  
The “romantic notion” of authorship is caricatured as idealizing fantasy: “However 
seductive is a romantic notion of artistic genius, solitary and sovereign, untouched by the 
world, all artists work within a web of engagements with the world, work always and only 
within the set of imaginative, material, and institutional possibilities that are available to 
them.”48 This position seems to set up a straw man: those who advocate for a strong sense 
of the author and possessive, authorial self-consciousness—the “romantic notion”?—
hardly argue that such authors are “untouched by the world”: in fact, as can be seen from 
Sidney, his engagement with the world is a crucial lens through which to view his literary 
fiction, and in no way compromises his status as author.49 Despite the caricature of the 
“solitary and sovereign” author, a certain self-conception of authorship is inextricably 
bound with solitude, not divorced from the world but, in fact, part of a fraught interaction 
with the ethical and political entanglements of the world: a solitude, either physically or 
imaginatively, that fosters a critical self-division and intellectual distance. While, as 
Andrew Bennett argues, the author as outsider, as “uniquely separate from society,” is 
                                                     
Machiavelli, and Montaigne, esp. 5–6, where he discusses subjectivity “as something of a 
dialectical negation of power, not a mere effect of its operations … as a mental space 
critically distanced from, and not entirely defined by, the circulating ideologies and 
discourses of institutions of power.” 
48 Kastan, Companion to Shakespeare, 5. 
49 Further, as Jeffrey Knapp writes of Kastan’s claim, “these formulations have a 
tautological ring to them: after all, artists cannot work within possibilities that are not 
available to them. What’s more, our ‘connection’ to ‘social codes,’ ‘commercial 
conditions,’ and ‘preexisting modes of thought’ is so basic a part of our existence that it 
has no special relevance to artists.” Knapp, Shakespeare Only, 7. 
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“fundamental to the emergence of the ‘Romantic’ author during the eighteenth century,”50 
Sidney, through his interest in nonreligious solitariness, and despite being in many ways 
the ultimate insider, begins to articulate and represent that “uniquely separate” authorial 
space.   
 
The discourse on solitariness and isolation between Languet and Sidney begins long before 
Sidney’s much-debated rustication from court in 1579–80. The contours of Sidney’s 
biography are well known and well documented, but a brief chronology of events, 
particularly as they relate to literary composition and rustication, will be useful in drawing 
out the personal interest in solitude. Following the Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre 
(August 1572), which Sidney witnessed as part of an embassy to the French court, Sidney 
spent three years on the Continent. While Sidney was in Italy in 1574, he and Languet, 
whose correspondence began in the fall of 1573, exchanged letters concerning Sidney’s 
course of study. Kuin describes Sidney as an “all-rounder: both physically active … and 
bookish … he travels incessantly, yet is often in fragile health, pensive, and given to 
melancholy.”51 Some of the early letters reflect the bookish, melancholy, pensive Sidney: 
“I do not know,” Languet writes, “if it is advisable to concentrate on the study of 
Geometry…. You need to reflect on your condition in life, and how quickly you will have 
to be torn away from your present leisurely life of reading: that is why you need to spend 
the little time you have left concentrating entirely on the most essential things. And the 
things I call essential are those which it is shameful for those born to high rank not to know, 
                                                     
50 Andrew Bennett, The Author, 36. 
51 Kuin, ed., Correspondence, 1:xiii. 
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and which later can be both ornament and a help to you…. What is more, as by nature you 
are not very cheerful, that study will make you even more melancholy.”52 Here and 
elsewhere in the letters, Languet seeks to bring to fruition the “great expectation”53 that 
had been placed on Sidney from a very young age—expectations that stand in direct 
contradiction to a “life of reading,” to literature, and to withdrawal. 
 Languet continues to worry about Sidney’s propensity for isolating himself in 
reading and thus damaging not only his prospects, but his health: “I do, though, warn you 
to take great care of your health, and make sure not to damage it with too much study…. 
As by nature you are not particularly cheerful, you need to find companions whose honest 
company will cheer you up.”54 Sidney’s reply validates Languet’s fear that Sidney might 
be isolating himself in his studies, but denies that such isolation leads to his melancholy: 
“I freely admit that often I am more melancholy than either my age or my occupations 
warrant; but I know by experience that I am never less given to melancholy emotions than 
when I stretch the weak powers of my mind to the utmost on something arduous and 
difficult. But enough of this.”55     
In May 1575, Sidney returned to England,56 and while his most frustrating setbacks 
at court were a few years off, he immediately would have felt “the gulf between his 
European persona and the realities of his life in England.”57 In February 1577 Sidney was 
chosen by Elizabeth as a special envoy to the emperor Rudolph after the death of Rudolph’s 
                                                     
52 Ibid., 1:96 (Languet to Sidney, January 22, 1574). 
53 Sidney, Astrophil and Stella 21 (line 8), in Duncan-Jones, ed., The Major Works, 161. 
54 Kuin, ed., Correspondence, 1:97 (Languet to Sidney, January 22, 1574). 
55 Ibid., 1:106–07 (Sidney to Languet, February 4, 1574). 
56 His return is described as “precipitate” and unexplained: ibid., 1:xv. 
57 Alan Stewart, Philip Sidney: A Double Life, 139. 
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father, Maximilian I. The twenty-two-year-old Sidney seems to have executed the embassy 
brilliantly, and “this was in some ways the high point of Sidney’s career; he had made an 
excellent impression on the European political and diplomatic class, and was seen at home 
as a promising figure at Court.”58 But while the trip seems to have been a success and 
Sidney’s achievements lauded, “one person … remained unconvinced: Elizabeth,” and “it 
may have been at precisely this juncture that [Sidney’s] political fortunes started to 
droop.”59 But Elizabeth’s possible disfavor was not the sole factor working against 
Sidney’s career—Sidney worked on behalf of his father (who was in Ireland), as well as 
the Earl of Leicester and Sir Francis Walsingham, and thus Philip became the de facto 
enemy of that group’s enemies, the Earl of Sussex and the Earl of Oxford. Then, of course, 
in 1579 there was the Letter to Queen Elizabeth Touching Her Marriage to Monsieur, 
which Sidney wrote, probably at Leicester’s and Walsingham’s urging, to oppose 
Elizabeth’s potential betrothal to the Catholic Duke of Alençon, François-Hercule. While 
“there is no evidence that the Queen showed any signs of displeasure against him,”60 those 
proponents of the marriage certainly did, and 1579–83 marks the “nadir” of Sidney’s 
career.61 The attractions of solitude, as well as its abjection, would only become heightened 
in these frustrating and fruitless times. 
  Mary Sidney, Philip’s sister, became the Countess of Pembroke after marrying the 
Earl of Pembroke on April 21, 1577; with her marriage came several new homes, including 
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Wilton in Wiltshire. Philip “quickly took advantage of these new residential possibilities…. 
In Wilton, Philip found an ideal rural retreat, to which he would return time and again over 
the next few years.”62 In December 1577, we find Sidney at Wilton where on December 
16 he writes the Earl of Sussex requesting an excused absence from court due to “occasions 
bothe of helthe and otherwise.”63 Once again, an editorial divide between the 
personal/literary and the public/political can be seen in the glossing of Sidney’s request. 
For Katherine Duncan-Jones, Sidney’s time away from court has a distinctly literary, 
withdrawn characteristic to it: in contrasting Sidney to some of his contemporary writers—
Gascoigne, Spenser, Lyly—who published to acquire or reinforce patronage, Duncan-
Jones writes, “Sidney did not need these things in quite the same way. He had plenty of 
‘business,’ as he often complains in his letters, and if writing poetry and fiction was one of 
the things that kept him frequently for longish spells away from Court … literary activity 
may even have hindered his chances of lucrative preferment.”64 In glossing Sidney’s 
request to Sussex, she writes, “both of health and otherwise. One of the ‘occasions’ 
detaining Sidney at Wilton may have been the composition of OA [Old Arcadia], probably 
begun earlier that year.”65 For Kuin, while he concedes that the reasons behind Sidney’s 
request are unclear, he speculates that perhaps Sidney was working on something in 
relation to his father’s duties in Ireland, which he wanted to have completed before his 
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return.66 Whatever the exact, ultimately unknowable reasons for Sidney’s withdrawal, in 
its context, the debates in the Arcadia about solitariness, love, and supposedly virtuous 
action can be seen in part as reflecting tensions quite personal for Sidney: the dubiousness 
of a desire for solitariness and of devoting oneself to literary fiction transforms in the 
Arcadia into the chastised solitary lover, with romantic love, and the poetic acts and 
mindset it inspires, standing in for the act of literary authorship. And, indeed, it was during 
his time at Wilton in 1577 that Sidney likely began composing the Arcadia. 
While composition of the Arcadia was begun at Wilton in 1577, it was completed 
during the time of Sidney’s rustication from court in 1579–80.67 Debates about this year 
revolve around whether Sidney’s withdrawal from court was mandated—that is, whether 
he was officially ostracized after his Letter to Queen Elizabeth Touching Her Marriage to 
Monsieur—or whether it was voluntary. The latter seems likely: a measure of prudence in 
the wake of controversy. But again, a solitary tendency is seen in Sidney before the Letter 
and his advisable, if not forced, withdrawal. On October 22, 1578, Languet writes, in a 
letter otherwise occupied with Sidney’s desire for military action in the Netherlands, “I 
find it deeply unpleasing that (as you write) you are bored with the life to which I doubt 
not you have been called by God, and that you want to flee the light of your court, and 
withdraw to places far from the society of men.”68 (Steuart Pears translates the last part of 
the sentence as “betake yourself to the privacy of secluded places.”69) The letter of Sidney’s 
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that expresses the notions to which Languet is responding does not survive. Languet, 
predictably, argues forcefully against Sidney’s desire for rustication or long travels: “So 
would you … deny your country your effort when she demands it? and that huge talent 
God has entrusted to you, would you bury it? In the commonwealth as in a human body, 
each member should serve in his own role…. The nobility … is employed for high office 
and magistracy … and it is shameful for them … not to do that which pertains to their 
duty.”70 
Whether Sidney could achieve the “high office” that Languet sees him as destined 
for, given his disadvantageous position at court, is irrelevant for Languet, who implores 
Sidney to strive for Ciceronian virtu, the word everywhere in his letters and, consequently, 
in Musidorus’s mouth in the Arcadia. Sidney himself seems to vacillate between a desire 
for impulsive action—Languet has implied that Sidney has toyed with the idea of joining 
the fight in the Netherlands before the queen has decided on the country’s course of action, 
an idea to which Languet also strenuously objects—and a desire for withdrawal. In what 
must have been a blow to Languet and his fervent hopes for Sidney as a model statesman, 
the desire for withdrawal comes to fruition in the rustication of 1579–80, a period that 
becomes a key moment in the history of English literature if not for the career of a 
statesman. 
Though the lack of surviving letters from Sidney to Languet forces us to speculate 
on Sidney’s side of this debate (which is, however, given voice in fictionalized form in the 
Arcadia), Languet and Sidney seem to engage in a disputation about the merits and 
demerits of seclusion, a debate central to post-Petrarch humanism, but which even by this 
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time had become ossified into conventional exercises, with the ideologically preferred 
outcome not really in dispute. During Sidney’s extended withdrawal from court, Languet 
writes a letter that implies that Sidney’s rustication was optional, and he implores him on 
his own behalf and that of Sidney’s friends to reconsider his solitariness in the country: 
 
But however many they are [Sidney’s friends], they wonder at your delighting in 
so long a retirement; admittedly, they can easily believe that it is made exceedingly 
pleasant for you by the company of those dearest to you, but they think you should 
consider more carefully whether hiding yourself away there so long really suits 
your station in life. They are afraid that those who are less aware of your inner 
constancy may suspect that you are bored with the difficult life by which one strives 
for virtue…. They also fear that the pleasure of a long retreat will weaken that 
passion of yours to pursue the noblest goals, and that a love of the leisure you used 
to despise will gradually steal into your soul. So they have on quite a few occasions 
asked me to write to you about that.71 
 
Kuin notes that “Languet is clearly aware of Sidney’s stay at Wilton though not, apparently, 
of his intensive writing activity while there.”72 But it seems unlikely that even if Languet 
had had knowledge of Sidney’s prolific fiction writing during this period that this would 
have made any difference in the perceived need to censure Sidney for his withdrawal and 
encourage him to return to public life. Romance and poetry were hardly pursuits that could 
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compare to statesmanship; in fact, such dubious literary activity would have required moral 
justification, and indeed did, in Sidney’s Defence, published posthumously in 1595 though 
probably composed around this time (1579).  
 Languet bemoans Sidney’s “love of … leisure,” either ignorant of or not taking 
seriously Sidney’s authorial activities; but even modern treatments of Sidney’s periods of 
withdrawal speak of “indulged idleness,”73 though it is hard to imagine such rhetoric being 
applied to Montaigne’s composition of his Essais, for example, not to mention more 
modern examples of authors working at remove from society. In his periods of withdrawal, 
Sidney composed the Arcadia, the Defence, Astrophil and Stella, and engaged in 
experiments of versification, all the while acting as an “inveterate reviser”74 of his own 
compositions: this output, ambition, and authorial commitment does not correspond with a 
life of idle leisure, even if Sidney himself was compelled to use such rhetoric to describe 
it.  
Furthermore, leisure in the late sixteenth century did not necessarily connote a lack 
of action or activity. Edmund Molyneux, Henry Sidney’s former secretary, writing in the 
third volume of Holinshed’s Chronicles in 1588, said of Sidney: 
 
Not long after his return from that journey [1577], and before his further 
employment by her Majesty, at his vacant and spare times of leisure (for he could 
endure at no time to be idle or void of action) he made his book which he named 
Arcadia, a work (though a mere fancy, toy and fiction) showing such excellency of 
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spirit, gallant invention, variety of matter, and orderly disposition, and couched in 
frame of such apt words … so delightful to the reader … as nothing could be taken 
out to amend it, or added to it that would not impair it, as few works of like subject 
hath been either of some more earnestly sought, choicely kept, nor placed in better 
place, and amongst better jewels than that was; so that a special dear friend he 
should be that could have a sight, but much more dear that could once obtain a 
copy.75 
 
For Molyneux—who, as Duncan-Jones notes, had not been on good terms with Sidney76—
leisure seems to connote free time in order to perform some useful action or task; while he 
uses the conventional language to classify the Arcadia (“mere fancy, toy and fiction”), its 
composition does not equate to idleness, and his praise for the writing is glowing (although 
Sidney would not have agreed that “nothing could be … added to it,” as he undertook a 
full-scale revision in 1583). He also emphasizes the closeness and possessiveness with 
which author Sidney attempted to keep his work. Despite Molyneux’s sentiments, written 
a year after Sidney’s death, it is no surprise that, given the correspondence with Languet 
and the opinions of Sidney’s friends and elders, his literary endeavors in this period of 
retreat would incorporate the tension between political engagement and solitary 
withdrawal, and the appeal and humiliation of solitariness. 
 Languet’s description of Sidney’s setup at Wilton is reminiscent of Petrarch’s ideal 
solitude: Languet writes that Sidney is in “the company of those dearest to you”; Petrarch 
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writes in De vita solitaria, “It will never be my view that solitude is disturbed by the 
presence of a friend, but that it is enriched…. And so in embracing solitude I do not reject 
friendship, and I do not fly from any individual unless he be of the sort whose character I 
should shun in cities also…. The whole matter then comes to this, that I would share my 
solitude like everything else with my friends, believing that Seneca spoke with true 
humanity when he said that ‘no good thing is pleasant to possess without friends to share 
it,’ and being assured that solitude is a great and sweet possession.”77 Sidney’s literary 
endeavors in retreat at Wilton further echo Petrarch’s prescription for fruitful solitude: “For 
there are some for whom the life of solitude is more grievous than death … and this will 
happen particularly with persons who have no acquaintance with literature…. And indeed 
isolation without literature is exile, prison, and torture: supply literature and it becomes 
your country, freedom, and delight…. I am not unaware that I shall be violently attacked 
at this point by those who think solitude is unfavorable to … the virtuous life.”78  
Sidney spent his year removed from court immersed in literary pursuits—
completing Arcadia, composing letters to Edward Denny and his younger brother Robert, 
and “along with his friends Edward Dyer and Fulke Greville … experimenting with trying 
to write English verse using Latin quantitative prosody.”79 The method of composition of 
the Arcadia, which Sidney reveals in the dedicatory epistle to his sister that was printed 
with the first published edition, echoes the idea of Petrarchan social solitude: “Your dear 
self can best witness the manner [of composition], being done in lose sheets of paper, most 
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of it in your presence.”80 Again, none of this is to discount Sidney’s continual harboring of 
desire for court employment and political engagement. But the desire and practice of 
solitariness and withdrawal allowed the fostering of a literary identity in opposition to the 
theater of politics, war, and professional frustrations. As Jean Starobinski writes of 
Montaigne’s solitude, if the world is a “deceptive theater,” then one “feels the need to 
create a private place for himself at a distance from the world…. To have secured the 
possibility of occupying his own private territory … of withdrawing at any moment into 
absolute solitude,” a “choice of identity in conscious opposition to the world.”81 Like 
Montaigne, Sidney was financially independent, which allowed for space and time for 
literary activity and immersion without concerns for patronage or even, in Sidney’s case, 
publication.  
 
In 1581 Sidney did return to court and was “extraordinarily active in social and political 
affairs, but … after the spring of 1582 he retired from court and spent several months in 
apparent inactivity on the borders of Wales.”82 According to Ringler’s timeline, it was 
during this summer of “inactivity” that Sidney composed many of the poems that comprise 
Astrophil and Stella.83 If Sidney was in what Stewart refers to as the “damp outpost” in 
Wales,84 and not Wilton, while composing or ordering Astrophil and Stella, the setting of 
composition does not appear to be the social/Petrarchan mode of solitariness Sidney 
seemed to value at Wilton. This period of inactivity in courtly affairs in 1582 followed 
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another series of setbacks for Sidney, and “the end of 1581 and the beginning of 1582 must 
have been a miserable time for Sidney.”85 Sidney’s uncle, the Earl of Leicester produced a 
son, ruining Sidney’s chances of advancement as he was no longer the heir to estates and 
title, meaning “that Sidney had lost not only the prospect of a fortune, but also a means of 
recovering his lost prestige.”86 Furthermore, the Duke of Alençon returned to England, 
likely aggravating and worrying Sidney. And finally, Sidney’s friend and mentor Hubert 
Languet died in September of 1581. If the issue of solitariness in Astrophil and Stella 
appears abject and debased (a poet immersed in “neurotic solitude”87), and without the 
deliberative ambivalence and possibility of Arcadia, Sidney’s biographical situation and 
geographical location seem to correlate. Whereas the year of rustication involved writing 
Arcadia for Mary and presumably with her present, as well as poetical experimentations 
with Dyer and Greville, the composition of Astrophil and Stella may have been without 
such social solitariness. However, the dejection and pain of such solitude still seems to 
have been conducive to writing. 
Furthermore, Languet’s death and the remembrance of his supportive exhortations 
to engage in the active, political life may have been a source of sadness and guilt: “When 
we lived together I had such an admiration for the keenness of your mind … for the gravity 
of your judgement and for your noble and virtue-inclined soul … all the more as I saw that 
those remarkable gifts of mind of yours were accompanied by magnificence of birth, 
physical dignity, great expectations…. You sometimes used to say that by nature you hated 
the clamour and enticements of the court, and that nothing would give you greater pleasure 
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… than to spend your life in civilized leisure with friends…. I used to worry that you were 
saying that seriously … but I thought that even if you had that in mind then, you would 
change your mind with age.”88 Sidney, of course, did eventually fully reengage in public 
life, in the fight against the Spanish that he so often discussed with Languet and from which 
Languet had dissuaded him from entering rashly before the queen had committed the 
country. He was appointed governor of Flushing by the queen and in September 1586, in a 
skirmish near Zutphen, he was shot in the left leg above the knee while attempting to rescue 
Peregrine Bertie, Lord Willoughby—infamously, he was not wearing his thigh armor and 
he died of gangrene twenty-five agonizing days later.89  
 
“I enjoy my solitariness” 
The anxiety over his interest in literary solitude is a recurring theme in Sidney’s 
correspondence with his father figure and mentor Languet. The construction of an alternate 
identity emerging out of the tension between solitude and public participation is a 
constitutive element of the Old Arcadia, reprising and expanding upon his debates with 
Languet. I will focus on the disputation on solitariness between Pyrocles and Musidorus in 
book 1. The solitary fiction writer in retreat from worldly affairs but dogged by persistent 
and loving criticism from a mentor espousing Ciceronian notions of virtue becomes, in the 
fiction, the solitary lover Pyrocles and his ostensible superego Musidorus; the pursuit of 
literary fiction is represented by Pyrocles’s pursuit of amorous love. The ironies, 
contradictions, and ambiguities are legion, and Sidney’s work is ultimately unable—or 
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unwilling—to abide a Shakespearean complementarity,90 or free itself entirely from the 
language and moral assumptions of the tired and formulaic vita activa–vita contemplativa 
debates; but it demonstrates the nascent stages of a discourse of solitude that attempts to 
emerge beyond the reductionist and perfunctory debates that precede it, and forms an early 
step in the development of a Romantic conception of authorship. 
Richard Helgerson’s Elizabethan Prodigals (1976) established a historicist-
biographical framework for examining prose romances in the vein of Arcadia, finding 
oblique biographical and cultural allusions in these works, revolving around the pattern of 
a young man doing what he has been advised against and either suffering (most common) 
for this deviation or being rewarded (less common) for it. The authors of these romances, 
Helgerson argues, “had wasted their youthful time on the poetry and fiction of love just as 
their protagonists waste time on love itself”; despite generic and artistic conventions, such 
works were tapping into a felt anxiety, an attempt by the authors “to reconcile their 
humanistic education and their often rebellious tastes and aspirations.”91 The humanistic 
education is tied directly to the older generation and the paternal and quasi-paternal advice 
and advice literature that these young gentleman would have been constantly exposed to—
some of the poet-sons of this generation, such as Lodge and Gascoigne, were even 
disinherited.92 Helgerson reproduces a letter that Henry Sidney wrote to his then-twelve-
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year-old son Philip, a “letter of admonition” with “precepts … from a common stock,” 
which sound something like Polonius’s advice to Laertes in Hamlet.93 Such advice 
encompasses some of the rhetoric of active life–contemplative life debates that Montaigne 
and Sidney seek to avoid, though it is generous to even call it a debate, as by the 1570s in 
England the issue was fully settled: “Elizabethan fathers expected more of their sons than 
virtue and wisdom. Those qualities, valuable as they were, hardly merited praise if kept in 
seclusion. They were rather to be used and tested in an active life of service to the state.”94 
 Sidney, Helgerson argues, seems an unlikely figure to be included in the canon of 
prodigals, as both his contemporaries and twentieth-century criticism saw him as resolving 
the moral “antipodes that resisted the best efforts of the Elizabethan prodigals”—and the 
primary justification for this conclusion was the Defence of Poesy.95 Helgerson recasts the 
narrative of the Sidney who showed the way past the moral critics to the Sidney who 
suffered from deep moral uncertainty that included an uncertainty about literature itself: 
“In making Sidney the answer to their exculpating dream of a gentleman-poet, his 
contemporaries necessarily ignored any second thoughts that he may himself have had…. 
[But] even in the Apology … he was unable to meet the accusation that poetry ‘was more 
apt to allure men to evil than to frame any good in them.’ … What use is a defense that 
abandons the only ground likely to be attacked?... With all comic, lyric, elegiac, and heroic 
poetry that treats of love gone, what remains to be saved? Nothing of Sidney’s own original 
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composition…. As a defense of the poetry that was actually being written in the last 
decades of the sixteenth century, Sidney’s Apology fails.”96  
And so in the Arcadia, written for an intimate, not a public audience, Sidney plumbs 
those moral uncertainties, with recognizable correspondences between Sidney, Languet, 
Henry Sidney’s advice, Philip’s time at Wilton, his desire for withdrawal and the carving 
out of an authorial identity, and his obligation for political participation.97 A key term under 
which this moral ambivalence plays out is solitariness; but Sidney is not merely involved 
in a playful flouting of conventional moral precepts: he is attempting to stake out an 
intellectual argument on solitariness that transcends the didactic and moralizing debates on 
the active life–contemplative life binary, to move the terms of the debate, as Shakespeare 
does in As You Like It and Hamlet. 
 Stephano Guazzo’s The Civile Conversation (1574), influenced by Petrarch, was 
an important document for Sidney in the Arcadia. As Wendy Olmsted notes, “The Civile 
Conversation may have been particularly attractive to Sidney because the interlocutor, 
William Guazzo, has returned home from war, having served as a humanistically trained 
courtier to a prince. William’s experiences at court have soured him on society, and he 
withdraws from it to seek pleasure in solitude.”98 When Anniball, William’s 
friend/physician, urges William to embrace “society,” William retorts that court life is 
inherently “against his heart” and that he likes “solitarinesse so wel, as fishes doe the 
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water.”99 The Civile Conversation goes on to unequivocally defend the ideals of the active 
life over the life of withdrawal,100 whereas the Arcadia’s debate on the subject is more 
conflicted and ambiguous. Solitariness in The Civile Conversation is rendered 
physiologically as a disease: Anniball “insists that pleasure in studying is acquired by habit, 
not nature, and that solitude produces ‘ill humors’ that distort one’s sense of pleasure … 
even though William claims that he enjoys the ‘libertie,’ ‘pleasure,’ and ‘comfort’ that his 
‘disease’ produces…. Anniball discounts Williams feelings by arguing that pleasure in 
solitude is ‘counterfeite’ and that only one response can be ‘true.’”101 While The Civile 
Conversation reflects the dominant and pervasive evaluation of solitariness, Sidney would 
have had access to works that treat the subject differently. Contrarily to Guazzo, for 
example, in the Petrarchan casting of solitariness, Petrarch seeks to define an active leisure 
by which withdrawal is not rendered idle or inefficacious, but morally purposeful, as well 
as individually fulfilling: “The theme of solitude and the comparison between these forms 
[religious and secular solitude] recurred in Petrarch’s writings and was crucial to his 
identity as a man of letters. As a poet interested in the moral reformation of society, 
Petrarch shared with the monks their love for solitude, but rather than seeking sanctity in a 
religious order, he chose to exert a positive influence in the world through his writings.”102 
Leisure in solitariness should be work, specifically literary work, as Petrarch makes evident 
through biblical study: “Where Jerome’s translation of the Bible says, ‘Take time,’ an older 
translation said ‘Be active in your leisure.’”103 But, of course, the inevitable moral 
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entanglements arise with the question, what is the status of solitariness if its cause is not 
only study and morally enhancing writing, whether philosophy or fiction, but love, fantasy, 
or erotic writing? 
 The initial depictions of seeking solitude or privacy in both the Old and New 
Arcadias are suffused with negative connotations. In book 1 of the Old, the duke Basilius, 
driven by his “vanity” to visit the Delphic Oracle, receives a disturbing and enigmatic 
reply, upon which “he was resolved for this fatal year to retire himself with his wife and 
daughters into a solitary place.... [W]here for his pleasure he would be recreated with all 
those sports and eclogues wherein the shepherds of that country did much excel.”104 For 
the governance of Arcadia in his absence, Basilius appoints a trusted replacement, 
Philanax, who tries to dissuade Basilius from his decision, but to no avail: “But the duke, 
having used thus much dukely sophistry to deceive himself, and making his will wisdom, 
told him [Philanax] resolutely he stood upon his own determination…. Basilius, according 
to his determination, retired himself into the solitary place of the two lodges, where he was 
daily delighted with the eclogues and pastimes of shepherds” (OA 8–9). Unlike, for 
example, Duke Senior’s banishment in As You Like It, Basilius’s removal to the pastoral 
realm is voluntary, and thus can be evaluated in moral terms: his abdication and his seeking 
refuge in what is repeatedly referred to as the “solitary place” or “desert lodges,” as well 
as his reasoning behind this decision, are cast as unwise, rash, and full of self-deceit. 
However, the decision also facilitates the story’s move into the pastoral, poetic world of 
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eclogues and love-shenanigans. So seeking solitude may be vain folly in this case, but it 
also initiates the carnivalesque play and poetic escapades that follow.  
 In book 1 of the New Arcadia, when the illustriously hospitable and much-liked 
Kalander hears news of his son Clitophon’s dire predicament, he is highly distraught, “at 
which his colour changing, he retired himself into his chamber, commanding his men 
diligently to wait upon Palladius, and to excuse his absence with some necessary business 
he had presently to dispatch.”105 Kalander seeks a private place in the house as a result of 
emotional distress that leads to physical alterations; and while Kalander is careful, even in 
the midst of his despair, not to neglect the duties of hospitality by informing his servants 
to continue to wait upon his guest “diligently,” his absence discomfits Palladius. Through 
a servant whom Palladius questions, readers hear of Kalander’s behavior in his chamber, 
but we do not see him in this state. The narrative method, by not showing Kalander in 
private, maintains an oratorical or public style. Thus Sidney stylistically values the 
public/oratorical over the private/contemplative. Or, rather, there is only public discourse 
or public life in the diegesis; even in “private,” characters are depicted as though 
participating in a debate. Kalander’s isolation is not a period of contemplation and the 
narrator is not privy to the inner movements of his mind. Instead, the servant reports, 
“Which loss had stricken the old gentleman with such sorrow, as if abundance of tears did 
not seem sufficiently to witness it, he was alone retired, tearing his beard and hair and 
cursing his old age that had not made his grave to stop his ears from such advertisements” 
                                                     
105 Sidney, The Countess of Pembroke’s Arcadia, ed. Maurice Evans, 85. All citations to 
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followed by page number. 
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(NA 86). Solitude becomes the space to vent and indulge extreme emotions, inappropriate 
in a public setting because one’s “reason is darkened” (NA 86).  
The trope of solitariness in Arcadia then moves to the protagonists, the two young 
princes Pyrocles and Musidorus. The narrator describes a seeming change in Pyrocles’s 
demeanor and behavior (here using his pseudonym Daiphantus): “But such a change was 
grown in Daiphantus that … he would ever get himself alone, though almost when he was 
in company he was alone, so little attention he gave to any that spake unto him” (NA 109). 
Sidney obviously liked the formulation of a solitude so forceful that it persists even in 
company, as in Astrophil and Stella 27: “Because I oft in darke abstracted guise, / Seeme 
most alone in greatest companie, / With dearth of words, or answers quite awrie.”106 The 
description of Pyrocles’s and Astrophil’s behavior is parallel, and both, of course, suffer 
from pangs of love, the ostensible cause of their solitariness. At this point in New Arcadia, 
however, readers are as yet unaware of the cause of the change in Pyrocles’s behavior, 
though he does begin to undergo physical transformation: “Even the colour and figure of 
his face began to receive some alteration, which he shewed little to heed; but every morning 
early going abroad either to the garden or to some woods towards the desert, it seemed his 
only comfort was to be without comforter” (NA 109). Again, and crucially, readers are not 
granted access to Pyrocles in his secluded state, walking through woods or garden; nor are 
they privy to the nature of his contemplations—the discourse won’t allow such a retreat 
from the public. What readers are granted, however, is a humanist disputation on the 
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subject of solitariness, with Pyrocles representing Sidney’s epistolary and authorial self, 
and Musidorus offering a stringent version of Languet’s paternal exhortations.107  
 Musidorus resolves to leave Arcadia, “seeing the duke’s court could not be visited, 
prohibited to all men” (OA 12). In other words, Musidorus wants to be somewhere where 
he can be a useful instrument at court and in public life, and thus there is no active, virtuous 
reason to remain in Arcadia. Pyrocles resists the opportunity of return to court and the vita 
activa, leading to the intellectual and personal confrontation. Musidorus reminds his friend 
of his training in and love of virtue, fearing that his current contemplative state is a 
deviation from his destined path: “A mind well trained and long exercised in virtue, my 
sweet and worthy cousin, doth not easily change any course it once undertakes…. This 
speech I direct to you, noble friend Pyrocles, the excellency of whose mind and well chosen 
course in virtue, if I do not sufficiently know, having seen such rare demonstrations of it, 
it is my weakness, and not your unworthiness” (OA 12). From Musidorus’s point of view, 
virtue is entirely divorced from the private, solitary realm, setting up a clear and morally 
conventional contrast between virtuous (public) action and idle (private) solitude. In 
Musidorus, of course, one can hear Languet’s voice from the correspondence: “They are 
afraid that those who are less aware of your inner constancy may suspect that you are bored 
with the difficult life by which one strives for virtue…. They also fear that the pleasure of 
a long retreat will weaken that passion of yours to pursue the noblest goals.”108 Both 
Musidorus and Languet invoke their intimate knowledge of Pyrocles’s/Sidney’s past 
                                                     
107 The disputation occurs in both the Old and New Arcadias, in similar language. Below, 
I focus on the Old’s version of the debate; in the New, the disputation takes place on pages 
109–14 in Sidney, The Countess of Pembroke’s Arcadia, ed. Maurice Evans. 
108 Kuin, ed., Correspondence, 2:998 (Languet to Sidney, 24 September 1580). 
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virtuous engagement and urge its continued course. Musidorus continues by observing, “I 
have marked in you, I will not say an alteration, but a relenting, truly, and a slacking of the 
main career you had so notably begun and almost performed” (OA 12), which again echoes 
Languet’s, “I find it deeply unpleasing that (as you write) you are bored with the life to 
which I doubt not you have been called by God, and that you want to flee the light of your 
court, and withdraw to places far from the society of men.”109 
 Musidorus recommences his chastisement of Pyrocles’s solitariness in terms that 
continue to recall the epistolary exchanges between Sidney and Languet: “that whereas you 
were wont, in all the places you came, to give yourself vehemently to knowledge of those 
things which might better your mind … and lastly, to put all these things in practice … you 
now leave all these things undone: you let your mind fall asleep … and lastly, which 
seemeth strangest unto me, you haunt greatly this place, wherein … you subject yourself 
to solitariness, the sly enemy that doth most separate a man from well doing” (OA 12–13). 
Here the language describing Pyrocles’s past vehement pursuit of knowledge recalls the 
testimonies to Sidney’s scholarly/literary pursuits and curiosities, and also points out the 
Ciceronian sin of not putting that knowledge to practice, reminiscent of Sidney’s own 
paraphrasing of Languet’s Ciceronian argument: “and my mind itself … is beginning, 
through my wretched idleness, to lose strength without my noticing it. For why should our 
thoughts be aroused to various kinds of knowledge, unless we have some opportunity of 
exercising them so that some public benefit may result?”110 Knowledge and study is 
fruitless if not applicable to the business of state and public life, and solitariness is unnatural 
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and leads to sloth and idleness. (The conventional sentiment, of course, relies on a possible 
contradiction, since solitude may be a prerequisite for the creation and articulation of the 
knowledge that eventually becomes practically useful.) And like Sidney, who in his letter 
pivoted to a defense of non-utilitarian inward contemplation, Pyrocles even more 
strenuously defends his solitariness, not merely acquiescing to the Languet-Musidorus 
ethos. However, his defense is ambiguous in that he has not made the true terms of his 
behavior known to Musidorus, thus making his defense that of a hypothetical solitariness 
not necessarily connected to erotic love. Internally he admits a fault: “These words, spoken 
vehemently and proceeding from so dearly an esteemed friend as Musidorus, did so pierce 
poor Pyrocles that his blushing cheeks did witness with him he rather could not help, than 
did not know, his fault” (OA 13). 
Pyrocles first answers that he has not changed from his former state, but that 
Musidorus used to gloss over his flaws out of love, but now has improved his mind so 
much that he simply sees Pyrocles for what he is for the first time—“so that the change 
you spake of falls not out by my impairing but by your bettering.” Then Pyrocles answers: 
“I must needs say thus much … that I find not myself wholly to be condemned because I 
do not with a continual vehemency follow those knowledges which you call the bettering 
of my mind; for both the mind itself must, like other things, sometimes be unbent, or else 
it will be either weakened or broken, and these knowledges, as they are of good use, so are 
they not all the mind may stretch itself unto. Who knows whether I feed not my mind with 
higher thoughts?” (OA 13). Pyrocles’s response, specifically his invocation of “higher 
thoughts” than the merely essential to outward action and his implication that the mind 
“may stretch itself unto” other areas, clearly echoes Sidney’s response to Languet when he 
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writes, “Yet, let us see if we are not endowing our showy errors with a lovely yet painted 
face. For while the mind is thus as it were drawn out of itself, it cannot turn its keenness 
upon itself, inwardly to contemplate itself—a work with which nothing men can be 
energetically busy at can compare.”111  
Furthermore, Pyrocles claims, “I enjoy my solitariness,” and he cites it as the 
condition that opens up the higher contemplative thoughts he is eager to pursue: “my 
solitariness, perchance, is the nurse of these contemplations. Eagles, we see, fly alone; and 
they are but sheep which always herd together” (OA 13–14). Here is an unequivocal, 
eloquent, and robust defense of solitariness, linking it to critical insights and unique identity 
(the solitary eagle) versus mindless conformity (sheep). Yet immediately this defense is 
tempered by the narrator, who gives readers a lens into Pyrocles’s inner conflicts: “And 
here Pyrocles suddenly stopped, like a man unsatisfied in himself, though his wit might 
well have served to have satisfied another. And so, looking with a countenance as though 
he desired he should know his mind without hearing him speak, and yet desirous to speak 
to breathe out some part of his inward evil … he continued his speech” (OA 14). Again, 
Pyrocles is aware that he is mounting a purely rhetorical, hypothetical defense of 
solitariness, an ideal of high contemplations and intellectual self-sufficiency. In the reality 
of the diegesis, his changed, solitary behavior is the result of passion and erotic love. In 
this way, Pyrocles is a participant in a long tradition of necessary intellectual hypocrisy: 
Petrarch defends literary solitude in virtuous, moralistic terms (religious, political, 
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Pyrocles’s—“the mind itself must, like other things, sometimes be unbent, or else it will 
be either weakened or broken”—is usually linked with an earlier, 1574 letter of Sidney’s 
to Languet: “the age in which we live … resembles a bow too long bent, it must be unstrung 
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contemplative), just as Sidney defends poetry (linked via otium to solitude) in such terms 
in his Defence, and both Petrarch and Sidney produce works, the Canzoniere and Astrophil 
and Stella, respectively, that seemingly violate every moral tenet they otherwise espouse 
in their defenses. Pyrocles knows that he is withholding crucial information from 
Musidorus—information that would bolster Musidorus’s case, as it were—and that he 
contains an “inward evil,” but he is both ashamed, and intent on winning the debate and 
emerging as the superior rhetorician.  
 Musidorus, for his side of the debate, discerns that some “inward passion 
prevail[s]” in his friend, and so he alters his rhetorical strategy. Originally, “having in the 
beginning of Pyrocles’ speech which defended his solitariness framed in his mind a reply 
against it in the praise of honourable action (in showing that such kind of contemplation is 
but a glorious title to idleness; that in action a man did not only better himself but benefit 
others; that the gods would not have delivered a soul into the body which hath arms and 
legs … but that it were intended the mind should employ them … besides many other better 
arguments which the plentifulness of the matter yielded to the sharpness of his wit)” (OA 
15), he then chooses an attempt at empathy instead of argumentation. The use of 
parentheses for what could have been the crux of Musidorus’s argument provides yet 
another layer of complexity and irony: it gives the effect of rendering these debate points 
as rather tired, over-rehearsed, and commonplace arguments against solitude, points of 
advice often associated with the older generation; and so they are relegated as parenthetical, 




When Musidorus concedes that Pyrocles ably defends the solitary life, he insists 
that such an eloquent defense makes him crave Pyrocles’s company, not his own solitude. 
And he concludes by urging Pyrocles to defend solitude, but among “company” (OA 15). 
Here Musidorus unwittingly invokes the Petrarchan mode of solitude, which can occur 
among not only servants, but intimate friends. However, it is not the adoption of a social 
solitariness that Musidorus wants of his friend: he clearly desires a full-fledged return to 
court for Pyrocles and the resumption of the ceaseless pursuit of virtue—in other words, 
the fulfillment of his friend’s great expectations. It is admittedly unclear, given the events 
that occur throughout the rest of the Arcadia, where readers’ attitudes are intended to fall 
on the issue of solitariness, indeed on moral issues generally.112 Indeed, neither is it clear 
where the narrator’s opinion falls. For such debatable questions in the narrative, is it merely 
up to the stronger rhetorician to convince readers? And how does our readerly identification 
of Pyrocles with Sidney affect the debate and the moral consequences? Pyrocles argues 
under false pretenses—in fact, the end he seeks is not solitariness at all, but the fulfillment 
of erotic love—but Musidorus is unable to live up to his own moral declarations: he will 
himself soon fall victim to the disease of love, which for Olmsted is a signal that Sidney is 
thus “subject[ing] humanism to Protestant irony and critique. Excessive self-confidence 
blinds people to the difference between themselves and the ideal of virtue.”113 Additionally, 
Pyrocles himself does not change in the face of Musidorus’s critique: Blair Worden sees 
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this as Musidorus’s philosophy “explod[ing] in his face,” whereas for Olmsted, Sidney 
exaggerates both Musidorus’s and Pyrocles’s positions for a more complex exploration of 
the issues.114 For Helgerson, “the narrator manipulates readers into sharing in the guilt” of 
the characters and of Sidney himself: even though virtue “has its say more fully … than in 
any other prodigal-son story,” in Arcadia, we are convinced into “accepting, even 
welcoming, its overthrow.”115 If, at certain times, readers censure the solitariness of certain 
characters—as in the case of Basilius—at other times we condone it, as with Pyrocles, 
“until principle is irrecoverably lost in a maze of partiality.”116  
 Musidorus goes on to link Pyrocles’s solitariness with poetry: “or else you feed 
sometimes your solitariness with the conceits of the poets, whose liberal pens can as easily 
travel over mountains as molehills … especially when they put such words in the mouth of 
one of these fantastical mind-infected people that children and musicians call lovers” (OA 
15–16). The lover as poet/author connection seems to increase identification of Pyrocles 
with Sidney and thus readers’ sympathies with his point of view (especially given the 
original audience for the Old Arcadia), while also undermining Musidorus’s side of the 
debate. As Woudhuysen notes, Sidney, in his fiction, is fascinated with the material 
practices of writing, with pens, inks, paper and vellum, and letter-writing;117 he also 
demonstrates the physical space of writing. Switching back to the New Arcadia, 
immediately after the author/lover connection, the two men are interrupted, and return to 
their “lodgings,” where Pyrocles begins “writing a few words which he left sealed in a 
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letter against their return” (NA 114). Upon returning from a hunt and finding Pyrocles 
vanished, Musidorus “lighted upon the letter which Pyrocles had written before he went 
hunting, and left in his study among other of his writings” (NA 116). The retreat into the 
private room in a state of emotional and intellectual turmoil (not unlike Kalander in the 
book’s opening) is here linked to composition, in this case concerning “violence of love” 
(NA 116). It recalls Petrarch, who, in his Ascent of Mont Ventoux, writes that “amid these 
surging emotions … I came back in deep night to the little country inn from which I had 
set forth before daybreak…. Then, while the servants were busy getting a meal, I retired to 
a private room to write all this to you.”118 
As Alice T. Friedman has documented in her book House and Household in 
Elizabethan England, the sixteenth-century in England saw a number of architectural 
changes, including increased space for social activity as well as separate private space, 
small rooms such as studies or closets.119 Since, as was evident with Kalander’s seclusion, 
servants would be present in the chamber, then the closet or study, as Mark Girouard has 
written in Life in the English Country House, “was perhaps the only room in which its 
occupant could be entirely on his own.”120 Such rooms, which “appeared all over large 
houses—or indeed did not appear: they could often be secreted within massive interior 
walls,”121 had two main functions: “private devotions, and a room for private study and 
business.”122 This is not to posit a narrative of Renaissance individualism or rise of modern 
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subjectivity from the so-called Great Rebuilding, or to echo Philippe Ariès’s assertion that 
early modern England was the “birthplace of privacy” and that in the Middle Ages “nobody 
was ever left alone”; Girouard himself writes that “the idea that there was no privacy in a 
mediaeval house is based on a total misreading.”123 But even if, as for Alan Stewart, the 
closet/studiolo functions as “topos” and not “an unmediated account of household 
practice,” as less an “absolute truth” than “a powerful social myth functioning in a 
particular way,”124 its association with solitariness and privacy (however performative, 
rhetorical, or even public), and consequently its association with composition, renders its 
inclusion in the Arcadia significant as the site of Pyrocles’s withdrawal from the social-
ritualistic hunting expedition in the midst of “surging emotions.”  
Even in nature, Pyrocles creates a private space. When Musidorus, seeking out his 
friend, comes upon an Amazon woman (Zelmane) living in the woods, who is actually a 
disguised Pyrocles whom Musidorus does not yet recognize, he observes the woman: “But 
this lady walked out-right till he might see her enter into a fine close arbour. It was of trees, 
whose branches so lovingly interlaced one the other that it could resist the strongest 
violence of eyesight; but she went into it by a door she opened, which moved him … to 
follow her; and by and by he might hear her sing this song” (NA 131). The “close arbour,” 
an ersatz closet, even has a door, and also is associated with poetry, as Zelmane sings a 
song in verse, which is how Musidorus recognizes Pyrocles. Such a private, removed space 
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of composition, of potential creative and personal freedom in opposition to the world, takes 
on darker implications later in Sidney’s career, as we see in turning to Astrophil and Stella.   
 
“A mazefull solitarinesse” 
Sidney’s Astrophil and Stella was the first major erotic sonnet sequence by an Englishman, 
helping to initiate a sonnet craze of the early 1590s.125 Sidney’s sequence further 
demonstrates what Vickers has formulated as the “inherent ambivalence of otium.”126 In 
the Ciceronian model, otium applied to a good end, whether public benefit or personal 
morals, can be condoned because it is explicitly contrasted to otium otiosum, which leads 
to vice and sin. But instead of being applied to a morally edifying end, Astrophil’s poetic 
pursuit of Stella is designed to incite adulterous love. Poetry itself was degraded by some 
of Sidney’s contemporaries as a “trifle” that distracted from serious affairs127—here, again, 
we see overtones of the humanist anti-solitariness argument. So not only is poetry itself 
cast in a dubious shadow in the English Renaissance, but love poetry, not to mention love 
poetry with adulterous content, would be particularly hard to incorporate into a Ciceronian 
or even a Petrarchan mode of solitariness and withdrawal—this has led to a long tradition 
of reading Sidney’s sequence as ironic, in order to make it morally instructive. 
Complicating Astrophil’s pursuit is its much-discussed biographical relevance to Sidney 
himself, and Penelope Devereux (who became the Lady Rich on November 1, 1581). As 
Richard Helgerson writes, “What we find is … a fictional exploration of certain 
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fundamental tensions with just enough personal coloring so that its first audience might 
easily have recognized the tensions as those generated by Sidney’s own life.”128 But who 
would have constituted this first audience? 
 In Sonnet 34, when Astrophil engages in a debate with his wit, there is the following 
exchange: “‘Art not asham’d to publish thy disease?’ / Nay, that may breed my fame, it is 
so rare: / ‘But will not wise men thinke thy words fond ware?’ / Then be they close, and so 
none shall displease” (lines 5–8).129 Ringler glosses “close” as “kept private, not allowed 
to circulate,”130 which seems to be exactly what Sidney did. Woudhuysen convincingly 
demonstrates that Astrophil and Stella was kept very private by the standards of manuscript 
circulation, and may not even qualify to be incorporated into the phrase “manuscript 
publication.”131 Sidney had his personal papers of the sequence copied by a secretary or 
scribe; he then read this fair copy and made alterations and corrections in his own hand, 
which implies authorial control. Three copies were made from the corrected fair copy (none 
of which survive), but the first, made for Sidney’s sister, was perhaps not until 1588, two 
years after Sidney’s death.132 The sequence was kept within a tight and limited circle of 
family and perhaps some intimate friends, such as Fulke Greville: in other words, it was 
“private and inward.”133 The material privacy and closeness of Astrophil and Stella 
correlates to its personal privacy and “inward torment,” which relates profoundly to the 
abject, melancholy solitariness of the lover (Astrophil), and the solitariness of the 
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aggrieved and grieving courtier (Sidney) unable to seize the liberating, exciting, resistant 
potential of solitude that Pyrocles taps into. 
 Sonnet 1, written in twelve-syllable lines, indicating a familiarity with French 
sonneteers,134 is a highly intertextual sonnet, very much about composition, and hinting at 
the torment of solitariness. The first line, “Loving in truth, and faine in verse my love to 
show,” carries a blatant and much-discussed pun on faine/feigne, which links poetry and 
lying and “destabilizes Astrophil’s claim that he loves in truth, since the phrase … hints 
that the act of writing poetry per se involves some degree of falsification.”135 The poem 
echoes Petrarch’s opening Rime Sparse in calling for “pity,” though Petrarch requests pity 
of his readers, Astrophil desires it from Stella. Of course, the “grace” Astrophil hopes to 
win via “pity” is adulterous love. Sidney also echoes Du Bellay’s Regrets 4, ironically in 
the lines, “Oft turning others’ leaves, to see if thence would flow / Some fresh and fruitful 
showers upon my sunne-burn’d braine” (lines 7–8).136 The “others’ leaves” that Astrophil 
consults to inspire his “sunne-burn’d braine,” end up impeding his poetic progress, until he 
announces what is ostensibly a call for authenticity: “Biting my trewand pen, beating my 
self for spite, / ‘Foole,’ said my Muse to me, ‘looke in thy heart and write’” (lines 13–
14).137 Astrophil has reversed the proper poetic method: begin with “invention,” then move 
to words; Astrophil “first sought words (elocutio) rather than matter, and tried to find words 
through imitation of others rather than by the proper processes of invention.”138 The 
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masochistic ending to Sonnet 1 also demonstrates the tortured and extreme emotions 
fostered by love, and the solitary space in which the act of writing takes place. 
 There are numerous sonnets in the sequence that involve interactions and debates 
with a disapproving friend, many of which emphasize the public/private or 
political/solitary split that so informs Sidney’s work and correspondence. Some of these 
sonnets, such as 14, in which Astrophil tries to prevent his pursuit for Stella from being 
labeled “sin,” mirror the debate between Musidorus and Pyrocles on love. Sonnet 21 
explicitly addresses the political expectations that Sidney had generated only a few years 
prior, remembering that “when Sidney wrote the sonnets (or gathered them into a 
sequence), he was, and he was known as a politically, economically and socially 
disappointed young man”139: 
   
 My wits, quicke in vaine thoughts, in vertue lame: 
 That Plato I read for nought, but if he tame 
 Such coltish gyres, that to my birth I owe 
 Nobler desires, least else that friendly foe, 
 Great expectation, weare a traine of shame. 
 For since mad March great promise made of me, 
 If now the May of my yeares much decline 
 What can be hoped my harvest time will be? (lines 4–11). 
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Astrophil’s friend, sounding like Musidorus to Pyrocles or Languet to Sidney, expresses 
consternation over his friend’s lack of virtuous pursuit and his ultimately unfulfilled 
political ambitions. As Duncan-Jones notes, “mad March great promise made of me” is 
probably a reference to Sidney’s travels and esteemed reputation on the Continent, and 
perhaps specifically to his visit to the Holy Roman emperor in 1577.140 The cause of 
Astrophil’s frustration is, of course, his consuming and melancholic love for Stella; for 
Sidney, as we have seen, literary pursuit and a desire for withdrawal may have contributed 
to hindering court advancement. Love and (love) poetry were both activities of moral 
dubiousness, and the link between writing in private withdrawal and being consumed by 
love emerges powerfully. As in the Arcadia, the conflicted, tortured lover is a stand-in for 
the writer of literary fictions. And both the author and the lover, of course, relate directly 
to the ambivalence of otium, which was, in the Roman tradition onward, directly connected 
to love-poetry: “One group … flaunted their otium, took it, indeed, as a defining 
characteristic of the state in which they found themselves, being in love…. Otium is at 
times the condition of paralysis in which love has plunged them, at other times the vacancy 
which love will fill.”141 Even Petrarch, the champion of the contemplative life, scolds 
himself in his mock-dialogue with Augustine for the mistakes he made as a result of loving 
Laura. He confesses to having not, as a young man, pursued the difficult path to virtue, 
opting for “sensual desires” instead; and he suffered a “melancholy love for being alone, 
avoiding all our fellow-men,” as Augustine implores him to “avoid solitude.”142 
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 The changes in Astrophil’s demeanor invite queries and surmises from others, as in 
Sonnet 23: “The curious wits, seeing dull pensivenesse / Bewray it selfe in my long setled 
eyes, / Whence those same fumes of melancholy rise, / With idle paines, and missing ayme, 
do guesse” (lines 1–4). Astrophil is clearly obsessed with something, but he has become 
indecipherable, as the guesses of others are far off the mark. When he writes, “Some that 
know how my spring I did addresse, / Deeme that my Muse some fruit of knowledge plies” 
(lines 5–6), we can hear an echo of Sidney’s purported studiousness (which we saw in the 
Languet correspondence) during his European travels.143 Those observing Astrophil either 
assume scholarly pursuits or political engagement (lines 7–8) when clearly Astrophil 
neglects thinking about the state business with which he should be occupied. In Sonnet 30, 
Astrophil opens with seven questions asked of him by “busie wits” (line 12) regarding 
international affairs, ultimately confessing, “I, cumbred with good maners, answer do, / 
But know not how, for still I think of you” (lines 13–14). The questions, which would have 
been topical in the summer of 1582, again reinforcing that as the time of Sidney’s 
composition, do not interest Astrophil.144 Instead, as Sidney advocates in the letter quoted 
above, Astrophil turns inward.145    
 On the two distinct forms of otium, Petrarch writes: “One is busy, which even in 
very rest is doing somewhat, and busie about honest affayres, and this is very sweete: The 
other is slouthful and idle, and geven onely to sluggyhnes, than which there is nothyng 
more loathsome, or more lyke to the grave.”146 Astrophil at times is presented as extremely 
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inactive, seemingly prone to the harshly negative configuration of otium. In Sonnet 34, 
discussed above, after Astrophil has decided to keep his writing “close,” wit responds, 
“‘What idler thing, then speake and not be hard?’” (line 9). Here is the humanist charge of 
idleness and impracticality. Further charges of sloth or idleness could emerge from 
Astrophil’s sleep poems, for example 38, which demonstrates inactivity and passivity due 
to the dominance of imagination: “As soon as the apparition disappears the speaker 
reawakens, yet Astrophil’s mind is not restored … rather, he awakes to find himself 
impoverished and debilitated. The descent into inwardness, into ‘clos’d-up sense’ … leaves 
Astrophil … preferring … the rule of ‘fancie’s error’ to reason.”147 Sidney opens himself 
and his poetic alterego up for the harshest possible criticism concerning idleness and 
frivolity in the midst of the serious business of state being ignored. 
 In Sonnet 51, presumably addressed to a courtier, Astrophil finds public discourse 
“tedious and incongruous” with his consuming thoughts of Stella.148 In Sonnet 64, political 
advancement, in a series of degrading images, is rendered insignificant next to Stella: “Let 
all the earth with scorne recount my case, / But do not will me from my Love to flie” (lines 
7–8). If the vita activa requires public life and the pursuit of virtue, Astrophil, who doesn’t 
care “though some above me sit” (line 11), ironically finds his virtuous goal in Stella, and 
presumably in his verse designed to woo her: “thou my Vertue art” (line 14). Where 
Pyrocles indulges the “aristocratic fantasy” of the possibility of “seek[ing] virtue by 
pursuing honorable love with a lady,”149 for Astrophil, not only is his love adulterous, but 
all the rhetorical work to make the pursuit sound virtuous cannot escape the physical 
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reality: “So while thy beautie drawes the heart to love, / As fast thy Vertue bends that love 
to good: / ‘But ah,’ Desire still cries ‘give me some food’” (71.12–14). When Astrophil 
seems to achieve some success in his pursuit of Stella, he depicts his achievements in public 
and monarchical terms: “For Stella hath with words where faith doth shine, / Of her high 
heart giv’n me the monarchie” (69.9–10). Stella’s favor is not simply superior to the life of 
active courtiership, it amounts to making Astrophil a king.  
 Sidney defended poetry passionately in his Apology, but not the kind of verse that 
comprises his sonnet sequence; likewise Petrarch’s defense of solitude in the De vita 
solitaria does not include the solitude of the lover from his Canzoniere. Stemming from 
the anxieties raised by the seeming incompatibility between the Apology and Astrophil and 
Stella, there has been a long tradition, beginning shortly after the unauthorized publication 
of Astrophil and Stella in 1591, of demonstrating how Astrophil and Stella functions 
ironically and didactically. Thomas Moffett, who was a friend of the Sidney family, wrote 
an early biography of Sidney (1594) to be presented to Sidney’s nephew. The biography 
effaces or recasts both Sidney’s proclivity for solitariness in lieu of life at court, and his 
proclivity for poetry itself. As Peter Herman demonstrates, Moffett tweaked Sidney’s 
literary chronology in order to relegate his literary endeavors to adolescence.150 In 
Moffett’s depiction, Sidney as an adolescent becomes involved in “sportive” arts 
“unwillingly,” and 
 
He amused himself with them after the manner of youth, but within limits; 
 he was somewhat wanton … but observed a measure and felt shame. On that 
                                                     
150 Herman, Squitter-wits and Muse-haters, 18. 
100 
 
 account he first consigned his Stella … to darkness and then favored giving 
 it to the fire…. Later, when [Sidney] had begun to enter into the 
 deliberations of the commonwealth, he did not cling to his own pleasure, but 
 gave up love, poetry … and the other clogs upon the mind…. He devoted 
 himself wholly to watching over the interests of his fatherland.151 
 
In the Moffett storyline, even the adolescent Sidney felt “shame” at his poetry, and upon 
entering adulthood poured himself uninterruptedly into state service, not otium. When we 
see Astrophil refer to his poetry as “toyes,” this conventional dismissive phrase accords 
with the anti-poetic conception of the time, but seems entirely divorced from the Sidney 
who, as Woudhuysen demonstrates, revised his work avidly and kept tight authorial control 
over it.  
 Fulke Greville, who would have spent time with Sidney during his earlier periods 
of rustication, does not manipulate chronology in his biography as Moffett does, but de-
emphasizes Sidney’s literary endeavors in accordance with the ongoing creation of a public 
image of ideal courtiership: “The truth is, his end was not writing even while he wrote … 
but both his wit and understanding bent upon his heart to make himself … not in words or 
opinion, but in life and action, good and great.”152 Again, (public) action and (private) 
poetry are not compatible, and Sidney’s legacy must be one of having unequivocally placed 
greater importance on the public. The themes that Musidorus and Pyrocles argued over 
with so much ambivalence in Arcadia continue to haunt Sidney posthumously. 
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 Sidney’s longstanding desire for periods of withdrawal, Petrarchan solitariness, and 
the contemplative life of literary leisure notwithstanding, solitary space in Astrophil and 
Stella becomes abject and tormented. Sonnet 96 is addressed to Astrophil’s thoughts and 
depicts an oppressive, melancholy solitude, filled with tears and blackness: “Thought with 
good cause thou likest so well the night, / Since kind or chance gives both one liverie, / 
Both sadly blacke, both blackly darkned be” (lines 1–3). In both the nighttime and in 
Astrophil’s inner thoughts there exists “a mazefull solitarinesse” (line 9), with “mazefull” 
glossed as “frightening” or “bewildering.”153 The solitude-seeking and melancholic lover 
was certainly a trope in such poetry, as we see in Ronsard: 
 
The thickest part of a lonely wood, the steepest point of a forbidding rock, 
 the wildest spot on an isolated shore and the fearsome aspect of the most 
 silent caverns soothe my sighs and my lamentations to such a degree that it 
 is only by seeking the solitude of a most secret shade that I feel I am being 
 cured of this raging love, which is driving me mad in the most verdant 
 months of my age.154 
 
While the “grieving lover comforted by the solitude of nature is frequent in the verse of 
Petrarch and his imitators,”155 Astrophil does not seek comfort in nature, but is more often 
penned up in his chamber, sleepless, neurotic, and tormented—solitariness is not a balm 
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but a burden. In sonnet 98, Astrophil addresses his bed, and reveals his anxious, lonely 
isolation:  
  
 With sweete soft shades thou oft invitest me 
 To steale some rest, but wretch I am constrained,  
  … to turn and tosse in thee. 
 While the black horrors of the silent night,  
 Paint woe’s black face so lively to my sight, 
 That tedious leisure marks each wrinckled line (lines 5–11). 
 
The alliteration of “s” that permeates the poem calls forth the somnolence Astrophil feels 
but which he cannot remedy with sleep. “Leisure,” the literal meaning of otium, has become 
“tedious” for Astrophil. Contrast Astrophil’s “tedious leisure” to the “dignified ease” that 
Languet chastised Sidney for desiring; and Astrophil is not lured by the “privacy of 
secluded places” that Languet knew were so appealing to Sidney. If those secluded places 
are for Sidney’s poetic creation synonymous with his torment, we can perhaps detect an 
alteration in Sidney’s own feelings and thoughts toward his isolation. And if Ringler’s 
timeline is accurate, the composition of Astrophil and Stella takes place not merely in the 
midst of personal and professional turmoil for Sidney, but perhaps away from the milieu 
of shared seclusion at Wilton, and in the “damp outpost” in Wales instead. Physical, 
intellectual, and emotional interiority connotes wretchedness and failure. When Astrophil 
confronts the “envious wits” in sonnet 104, he writes, “Ah, is it not enough, that I am 
thence, / Thence, so farre thence, that scarcely any sparke / Of comfort dare come to this 
dungeon darke, / Where rigrows exile lockes up all my sense?” (lines 5–8). For Astrophil, 
103 
 
the solitariness by which the mind turns “it keen sight inward” has become a dark dungeon 
of abjection. 
 
Sidney’s periods of withdrawal and their accompanying literary activity form a prototype 
of Romantic authorship—the author as outsider, as “uniquely separate from society.”156 
This is not, however, the idealizing notion of some essential, pure, autonomous, and 
untouched self, even if that is indeed the underlying fantasy of solitude, but rather a 
conflicted and ambivalent struggle between public and private selves, a participation with 
the world and not a retreat from it. Sidney strives to create a new identity, one in opposition 
to the world, and through the literature that is a product of his alienation and voluntary and 
forced retirements to critically engage, even if ultimately unable to fully follow through on 
his critique, to move beyond his public role of would-be courtier and seeker of virtue. 
Ultimately mired in self-division and guilt and shame, the solitary author doesn’t achieve 
the fantasy of a self liberated from the state—a private, inward self that can compensate 
for the failures and frustrations of the public, professional, symbolic self—but the very 
attempt to create a world elsewhere begins to point toward the utopian impulses of 
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The are two dominant modes of solitude in the early modern period—exilic, social, pastoral 
solitude, on the one hand, and misanthropic, individualist solitude, on the other. Both are 
found in Shakespeare’s works: As You Like It representing the former, with the character 
of Jaques serving as a bridge to the latter, found most forcefully in Timon of Athens. At 
first glance these two strands of solitude seem incompatible, yet both speak to the longing, 
both spoken and implicit, to build Le Beau’s “better world.” But this utopian impulse is 
not presented as a simplisitic wish: as Hugh Grady writes, “Shakespeare’s category of the 
utopian possesses that rare quality of self-reflexivity, of an understanding of some of its 
own limits and weaknesses.”1 The moral ambivalences and contradictions of solitude 
contribute both to the liberating utopian imagination but also to its darker underside, its 
limitations and problems. 
Timon of Athens is Shakespeare’s most explicit treatment of solitude—as we’ve 
seen thus far in this dissertation, solitariness carries connotations of metaphysical isolation, 
alienation, inwardness, distinctiveness, etc. However, in Timon the subject is the seemingly 
more straightforward, hermitic notion of solitude, a withdrawal from society and people to 
pursue a life of physical aloneness that, in Timon’s case, offers a space for vicious satiric 
commentary:  
                                                     




Timon will to the woods, where he shall find 
Th’unkindest beast more kinder than mankind. 
The gods confound … 
Th’Athenians, both within and out that wall;  
And grant, as Timon grows, his hate may grow  
To the whole race of mankind, high and low (4.1.35–40).2  
 
Notice here, like Hamlet’s “A little more than kin, and less than kind” (1.2.65), the pun on 
“kind”: it emphasizes Timon’s (desired) separation/difference from the rest of mankind, 
and also echoes the breaking of the bond that differentiates man from beast, famously 
formulated by Aristotle: “He who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because 
he is sufficient in himself, must be either a beast or a god.”3 This is the bond that Coriolanus 
refers to when he responds to his mother’s pleading with him to spare his birthplace: “out, 
affection! / All bond and privilege of nature break” (5.3.24–25). 
Shakespeare’s larger conception of solitariness/solitude hasn’t come under much 
scrutiny, though what has been written about solitude in the plays frames the topic, 
appropriately, in terms of the active life–contemplative life debates that were a feature of 
elite Renaissance intellectual and political culture, Tudor-Stuart England very much 
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included. These often moralistic and didactic debates, which became a staple of humanism, 
with roots in Greek and Roman culture as well as a medieval Christian tradition, tend to 
either unequivocally endorse the vita activa,4 or, in the case of the supposedly more 
balanced or ambivalent approach, to endorse it implicitly, by arguing for a sense of 
moderation in which withdrawal never really functions as real alternative—for example, 
some theoretical period spent away from court, perhaps in solitary scholarly pursuits, could 
elevate one’s mind and abilities for the eventual return to the life of virtuous engagement 
in civil affairs. Often the position of solitude becomes entirely rhetorical, with personas on 
opposing sides of the debate undertaking “an exercise of ingenuity, where attention is 
drawn to the discovering of the arguments that can be made.”5 For an English example, 
Roger Baynes’s 1577 Praise of Solitarinesse, despite the title, “gives pro and contra 
arguments in full. The keynote is balance, as it is struck, for example, in the typically 
Senecan conclusion: ‘A wise man therefore ought chieflye to knowe, howe best to applye 
both time and place, as well unto Solitarinesse as to Societie’ (Miiiv).”6 In some instances—
particularly in the Lucianic or Menippean tradition—this approach allowed for satirical 
critiques of court life, with its tendencies toward flattery and vanity;7 but the solitary, if not 
totally condemned, almost always stands simply for contrast, as a trope whose function is 
to open up those critiques, an alternative that is meant to remain at a distance, not to be 
                                                     
4 For Richard Helgerson, by the 1570s in England this discourse cannot really even be 
called a “debate” any longer, as the side of the nonsolitary vita activa had so thoroughly 
prevailed in the common wisdom: see Elizabethan Prodigals, 22–25. Furthermore, 
“Renaissance proponents of the active life vented their scorn on those who tried to live 
outside society”: Vickers, introduction in Arbeit, Musse, Meditation (ed. Vickers), 7. 
5 Vickers, introduction in Arbeit, Musse, Meditation, 9. 
6 Judy Kronenfeld, “Shakespeare’s Jaques and Pastoral Solitude,” 467. 
7 Cathy Curtis, “The Active and Contemplative Lives in Shakespeare,” 49. 
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indulged in or pursued. This is why Montaigne, who did actually practice periods of 
withdrawal/solitude, eschews the active life–contemplative life debates—“Let us leave 
aside those long comparisons between the solitary life and the active one”—and formulates 
a solitude that doesn’t rely entirely on physical separation or withdrawal, but rather is a 
fundamental component of the self, the “room at the back of the shop”: “It is our own self 
we have to isolate and take back into possession.”8  
A good deal of terminological confusion plagues the society-versus-solitude 
debates, as they draw on a long Greek and then Latin tradition and the various vernacular 
equivalents of the Greek and Latin terms. One result of this terminological uncertainty is 
the expansion of the concept of solitude; of course, absolute solitude is, essentially, an 
impossible category, aside from certain extreme cases or excessively punitive prison 
sentences. Thus the term has to be enlarged to include bands of exiles or Petrarchan social 
solitude or Stoic psychological positioning or various modes of contemplation, study, or 
leisure; in Timon of Athens, Shakespeare demonstrates the literal impossibility of solitude, 
as Apemantus and Timon either do not or cannot successfully remove themselves from 
company, and in fact depend on the concept of the other to position themselves and, more 
fundamentally, to define themselves. Thus society-versus-solitude debates render solitude 
variously as “solitude à deux” or a separate society of individuals set against the dominant 
society; this more expansive meaning deflects criticism that the solitary is unkind, 
beastlike, or misanthropic, but also eventually puts the concept of actual 
aloneness/isolation in danger of becoming completely elided: “the terms [of the debate] 
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themselves lose solidity, or the opposed poles become bridged or even interchanged.”9 This 
is why Jaques is such a crucial figure in As You Like It, specifically his refusal to reintegrate 
at the play’s conclusion: among the communal solitariness of the forest, he remains an 
outsider. Among the celebratory reintegration into formal society, Jaques sounds the 
discordant note, seemingly intent on undertaking a more radical form of solitude than the 
performative, satrirical kind he has practiced throughout the play. 
As we will see, Shakespeare’s exploration of solitude in As You Like It and Timon 
of Athens both departs from and incorporates the terms of the active life–contemplative life 
debates, and it also reverses the standard fantasy-reality paradigm: ultimately, one does not 
indulge in the fantasy of solitude just to escape the corruption and despair of society, but 
rather in one’s embrace of solitude, a much more unsettling discovery is made—it is society 
and social life that is structured by fantasy. This reversal is especially evident in Timon, 
whereas in As You Like It this discovery hovers at the play’s fringes, and is able to be 
ignored by all but Jaques as the characters happily relinquish a life of relative freedom in 
the forest, forgoing the excitement of utopian possibilities. For Timon, this discovery of 
the fraudulence of “real” life is both liberating and yet too traumatic to be fully realized: 
these are the “short, quick probings at the very axis of reality” that Herman Melville saw 
in the “dark characters” of Shakespeare, particularly Timon.10 Timon ultimately saves 
Athens via a kind of self-sacrifice, an extreme negation of the self: it is in this sense that 
Timon can be said to be utopian, as utopia is as much about negation as affirmation. As 
Frederic Jameson writes, “The Utopian idea … keeps alive the possibility of a world 
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qualitatively distinct from this one and takes the form of a stubborn negation of all that 
is.”11 As Timon says, “And nothing brings me all things” (5.2.73). 
 
In Brian Vickers’s philological study of otium (of which solitude is an important aspect), 
he contends that Shakespeare’s take on the subject conforms to what he sees as the 
predominantly negative attitude of the period: “Many characters in Shakespeare express a 
truly Roman detestation of otium.”12 Focusing more on the connotations of idleness 
inherent in otium, though as he notes any type of solitariness was often quickly and 
moralizingly linked to that notion, he cites as an example of this “detestation” Hamlet’s 
father’s Ghost’s approval of Hamlet’s seeming virtuous enthusiasm for revenge: “I find 
thee apt; / And duller shouldst thou be than the fat weed / That roots itself in ease on Lethe 
wharf, / Wouldst thou not stir in this” (1.5.32–35).13  
For Cathy Curtis, Shakespeare’s treatment of the active life–contemplative life 
debate demonstrates more ambivalence than Vickers allows, an ambivalence she also finds 
in much of the debate outside of Shakespeare, as in More’s Utopia:14 “Such ambivalent 
attitudes persisted in England up to the Jacobean period in which Shakespeare composed 
his last plays. The educational and moral treatises of Tudor England and the practice of 
servants of the crown such as William Cecil reveal the ubiquity and importance attached 
to both sides of the argument.”15 Through a brief look at several plays that involve a person 
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13 See ibid., 141–42. 
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of political importance who retreats, at least temporarily, from a position of power, 
including King Lear, the duke-friar in Measure for Measure, Duke Senior, Prospero, and 
Hamlet, Curtis concludes that Shakespeare revels in the paradoxes of the debate over 
withdrawal and offers “a multiple and at times contradictory perspective on sensitive 
political questions which clearly preoccupied an early modern audience…. If the hazards 
and burdens of dedication to the vita activa are made evident by Shakespeare, the 
possibility of renewal is offered by the pastoral idyll and a period of contemplation from 
which new perspectives can be gained before a return to political life.”16 Again, the 
treatment of withdrawal is ultimately always about the inevitable, and morally superior, 
return, with solitude taken seriously only by what it can offer in one’s re-immersion in 
society. 
 Finally, Janette Dillon’s monograph Shakespeare and the Solitary Man has two 
objectives. First to give more nuance and flexibility to the definition of solitariness in 
Elizabethan England: “Self-love, detachment, a contemplative bent, a sense of individual 
superiority, a cultivation of distinctiveness, any anti-social or even simply asocial behavior, 
might be seen by the Elizabethans as a form of solitude.”17 Second, she posits a cultural 
narrative in which solitariness transitions from a category of pure moral dubiousness to a 
semi-rebellious position that became the focus of a cult in the 1590s and finally, in the 
seventeenth century, to an accepted, domesticated solitude that was about retirement and 
“monied leisure and moral self-satisfaction rather than a flagrant challenge to social 
values.”18 She ties this narrative of solitariness to ideas of interiority and individuality, as 
                                                     
16 Ibid., 61–63. 
17 Dillon, Shakespeare and the Solitary Man, xi. 
18 Ibid., xiv.  
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opposed to supposed medieval communal self-definitions. We should of course be wary of 
this characterization of the Renaissance inauguration of a modern self, the development of 
inwardness, or an awakening of autonomous individuality in lieu of communal, corporate 
identity; but clearly there is a renewed interest in solitariness in Elizabethan and Jacobean 
England and an attempt at refashioning and re-appropriating solitude, which in previous 
literature functions largely as a “tragic predicament,”19 and Dillon’s book helpfully tracks 
this shift through Shakespeare’s oeuvre. Her reading of Timon of Athens, alongside 
Macbeth, continues to show a division in Shakespeare over solitude: “They present the 
solitary man as villain-hero, simultaneously noble in his isolation yet morally condemned 
for voluntarily seeking it out. The audience must condemn these men for their studied 
rejection of the social bonds which should define their humanity and yet pity them for their 
very isolation, perhaps even admire them for the defiance with which they face up to the 
solitary way they have chosen.”20 
 This chapter draws on these works on Shakespeare’s treatment of solitude, but also 
attempts to supplement the historicist contextualization of solitude by putting the question 
in dialogue with approaches to the plays that have focused on issues of ideology, 
psychoanalysis, and utopia. 
 
“To liberty, and not to banishment”: 
Solitude as Social Critique and Utopian Yearning 
                                                     
19 Peter Goodall, “Being Alone in Chaucer,” 4. 
20 Dillon, Shakespeare and the Solitary Man, 135. 
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While solitude can be linked to excessive individualism in the period, it often, 
paradoxically, stands in for a communitarian impulse, either indirectly, where a yearning 
for withdrawal based on disgust at the world contains simultaneously the desire for a 
“better world,” or directly, through representations of communities of “solitaries” trying to 
forge alternatives to court life. For Robert Sayre, the seventeenth-century theme of 
retreat/solitude is in part a “revolt against the conditions of a new social order,” a 
withdrawal, rhetorical or literal, “from a society based on competition, antagonism, self-
interest.” It is, in other words, a “search for lost community.” This desire, this search, can 
be expressed by works that focus on a solitary character, as “the theme of retreat to solitude 
is often informed with the ideology of the order it spurns; it is in many cases itself an 
expression of the new individualism.”21 This is what Sayre means by the paradox of 
“community in solitude,” which he sees as representative of the “far limits of solitude” in 
the period—a kind of implicit acknowledgment of the “solitude within society,” a variant 
of Marxist theories of alienation, that will come to dominate in nineteenth- and twentieth-
century literature.22 But the idea of community in solitude, an alternative or “lost” society, 
can be explicitly addressed, I would argue, through the trope of exile: thus “community in 
solitude” is not merely that which is contained within the individual outsider, but what 
happens when a group of outsiders or outcasts come together. Both misanthropic, 
individualist solitude and exilic social solitude can speak to a utopian longing.  
 Shakespeare’s As You Like It is a play that touches on so many of the crucial issues 
surrounding the idea of solitude and withdrawal in the period: it participates in and critiques 
                                                     
21 Sayre, Solitude in Society, 45. 
22 Ibid., 48–53. 
118 
 
the pastoral mode of solitude; it offers an exiled community as a counterpart to the social 
and political world of the court, a social experiment of sorts; it speaks to a longing for a 
“better world than this” but also confronts the harshness and realities of such attempts; and 
it also contains the solitary figure par excellence—mocked and yet elevated, a figure of 
derision and satire yet also a source of wisdom and audience affection—Jaques. For Sayre, 
a work such as As You Like It should be seen in the sociopolitical context of the 
development of a society where the “competition of each individual against all others, 
following their private interest, is the general rule” and “the impersonal and antagonistic 
relationship of exchange constitutes the basic network of bonds in the social fabric”: in 
other words, “human relations become ‘reified’” and the consequence is the realization that 
society is structured around “illusory communities” that are in fact only based on self-
interest.23 While not explicitly discussing this play (he focuses on French literature of the 
period), Sayre’s portrait here seems an accurate description of the pre-forest world in As 
You Like It.24 
When Shakespeare’s foppish courtier Le Beau advises Orlando to flee the court in 
order to escape the vengeful usurper, Duke Frederick, he ends his plea with a projection of 
a better future: “Sir, fare you well. / Hereafter, in a better world than this, / I shall desire 
more love and knowledge of you” (1.2.268–70). This is one of many striking instances in 
the play when a character expresses clear recognition of the shortcomings of the world as 
it is, and consequently yearns for a society where human interaction is not inhibited by the 
                                                     
23 Ibid., 4.  
24 See Hugh Grady’s reading of the play “as an enactment of utopian projections … 
focusing not on a realistic disclosure of injustice so much as an exploration of utopian 
alternatives to new reifications of market and state power” in Shakespeare’s Universal 
Wolf, 181–212 (quotation on 182).  
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vagaries of court power and competition. The contrast between the world of the court and 
the world of nature (in this case, the forest) is a trope of traditional pastoral, and of 
Shakespeare’s source material for As You Like It, Thomas Lodge’s Rosalynd (1590). As 
You Like It participates in the pastoral genre, though skeptically: Shakespeare complicates 
the court-forest dichotomy on both ends. He uses the discourse of exile and communal 
solitude to question the possibility of creating an alternate form of social organization freed 
from the strictures of the court/state. The trope of exile does not function only as generic 
convention or plot device, but as a phenomenon that has historical and contemporary 
implications running alongside its metaphorical and literary meanings. Shakespeare 
radically changes and enhances the material bestowed on him by Lodge and by pastoral to 
explore Le Beau’s “better world.” As You Like It both problematizes hierarchy and systems 
of social distinction, and, through the literal and symbolic meanings of exile provides a 
nonsimplistic utopian wish fulfillment for the audience. Ultimately, the play cynically 
seems to deny, or at least to defer, the transgressions it embraces as nearly all the characters 
are reinscribed into their socially mandated roles at the end. Jaques, solitary to the end, 
forms the major exception to this seeming capitulation. 
 Shakespeare does not depict life in the forest and the exile community through a 
purely idyllic lens. Rather, the difficulties of that life are made abundantly clear. And this 
is one way in which the play denies naïve utopian longings, even as it simultaneously 
indulges in utopian projections. We are shown an alternative society, but it becomes subject 
to its own contradictions and hardships. 25 The forest represents a slackening of social 
                                                     
25 Hugh Grady, Shakespeare’s Universal Wolf, 186: “In As You Like It, we watch the 
construction of such a counter-society—and then an acute analysis of its own problems and 
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hierarchies—but not an abolition. The exiled characters seem close to conceiving a new 
system of governance, but they cannot quite cast off the now useless titles and rituals of 
court life.  We hear of the carefree “golden world” that even Charles, the bloodthirsty 
wrestler, seems genuinely to long for; as Grady writes, what we hear of the banished world 
has “the aura of utopia.”26 Yet both in practical and political terms the forest is merely a 
less stratified, exploitative place, and one which is quickly and happily relinquished at the 
play’s conclusion. The incompleteness of utopian fulfillment, however, indicates a more 
serious engagement with social questions than a quasi-magical pastoral transformation 
would.     
 It is the status of exile, both compulsory and voluntary, and thus the formal severing 
of ties with the court/state, that allows the egalitarian potential of the forest of Arden to be 
tapped into. The ultimate insiders, the Duke and his lords, are turned into outsiders; and 
through their outsider status they construct a new life in the forest, even with the pleasures 
and comforts they have had to renounce. And exile itself, removal from allegiance or 
connection to a state, more than the forest and its various magical connotations, is the 
condition in As You Like It that allows for the partial, though decidedly incomplete, 
reinvention of the self and society. Jane Kingsley-Smith has demonstrated that banishment 
and exile were not merely distant memories in Elizabethan and Jacobean England, as legal 
historians had previously contended, but rather realities of statutory law and royal 
proclamation. In fact, banishment and exile were “particularly favoured by Tudor and early 
Stuart monarchs,” and were inflicted for a variety of reasons in decrees spanning from 1562 
                                                     
contradictions—as Shakespeare keeps true to the interminable textuality of Renaissance 
sceptical rhetoric even in the gates of utopia.” 
26 Ibid., 183. 
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to 1605.27 Exile developed into a method of “self-reinvention”28 for some of those whom 
it was forced upon (or who chose it in lieu of other legal punishments). It also, like 
solitariness itself, represents a loss of the social self—a notion both invigorating and 
frightening. The idea of self-alienation is hinted at in the play through Celia’s pseudonym, 
Aliena. The loss of identity that follows the loss of one’s nation allows new potential selves 
to emerge—Rosalind as Ganymede, Celia as Aliena, Jaques as a fool, Touchstone as a 
lover. But Shakespeare’s representation of exile in As You Like It, and the incomplete 
utopian society that the exiles construct in Arden, intimates that a more radical severing of 
the self as it had been constructed to the point of exile may be a sacrifice demanded to 
achieve a fuller reinvention of human society. Exile in the play serves as a dream of an 
unfettered self amid a communal solitude, but like a dream it evaporates in the end. 
 
The play’s opening lines, delivered by Orlando, reflect immediate anxiety over social status 
and raise important complications. The play begins with a fraternal and internecine conflict 
that has arisen due to primogeniture, as Orlando protests that his brother Oliver has violated 
his duties as laid out by their father: “It was upon this fashion / bequeathed me by will but 
poor a thousand crowns, / and, as thou sayst, charged my brother on his blessing / to breed 
me well—and there begins my sadness” (1.1.1–4). Louis Montrose writes of the play’s 
opening scene: “Shakespeare’s opening strategy is to plunge his characters and his 
audience into the controversy about a structural principle of Elizabethan personal, family, 
                                                     
27 Jane Kingsley-Smith, Shakespeare’s Drama of Exile, 10–11. 
28 Ibid, 15. 
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and social life.”29 As evidence that there would have been keen audience interest and 
perhaps empathy to the conflict arising from primogeniture, Montrose writes, “In the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, primogeniture was more widely and rigorously 
practiced in England—by the gentry and lesser landowners, as well as by the aristocracy—
than anywhere else in Europe.”30 Despite his ingrained assumptions, Orlando continues to 
seem aware of the arbitrariness behind these conventions, as when he says to his older 
brother, “The courtesy of / nations allows you my better … but the same tradition takes not 
away my blood” (1.1.43-5). Montrose describes the phrase “Courtesy of nations”  as 
“Orlando’s indictment” of primogeniture;31 and Orlando clearly sees such a law, which 
creates a familial hierarchy, as a product of state law, as opposed to the inherent superiority 
of one sibling over another. When it suits his needs Orlando openly recognizes the 
unnaturalness of law and power; yet in his relationship with Adam, and in his concept of 
his place in the world, he sees his “blood” as a natural entitlement of superiority. 
 The play transitions from one internecine confrontation to Charles, the Duke’s 
wrestler, giving an account of another: 
  
the old Duke is banished by his younger 
 brother, the new Duke, and three or four loving lords 
 have put themselves into voluntary exile with him, 
 whose lands and revenues enrich the new Duke. (1.1.95–98) 
                                                     
29 Louis Montrose, “ ‘The Place of a Brother’ in As You Like It: Social Process and Comic 
Form,” 33. 
30 Ibid., 31. 




With Charles’s summary to Oliver of what is “old news” to him but not to the audience, 
Shakespeare offers a mirroring of the conflict between Oliver and Orlando. In the Dukes’ 
case there has been the usurpation of primogeniture: Duke Frederick has cast off this 
“courtesy of nations” and consolidated his own position with his brother’s property and 
money. As Grady observes, “treacheries of brother against brother recapitulate and vary a 
more socially consequential familial treachery within the state.”32 Charles goes on to depict 
the current condition of Duke Senior and those in “voluntary exile” with him: 
  
They say he is already in the forest of Arden, and 
 a many merry men with him; and there they live like 
 the old Robin Hood of England. They say many young 
 gentlemen flock to him every day, and fleet the time 
 carelessly, as they did in the golden world. (1.1.109–13). 
 
The concept of “voluntary exile” is crucial: this is the rhetorical position that both Petrarch 
and Montaigne adopted in their retreats into solitude—the “choice of identity in conscious 
opposition to the world” that Starobinski discusses.33 Even Charles, who later in the scene 
will be using rhetoric of violence and competition, manages to evince a wistful longing for 
life in Arden, and the so-called “golden world.” Although Shakespeare will in part debunk 
this idyllic pastoral myth, Charles’s words form a hope for, quite simply, something better. 
                                                     
32 Grady, Shakespeare’s Universal Wolf, 182. 
33 Jean Starobinski, Montaigne in Motion, 6–9 (italics in original). 
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In Charles’s imaginary world of Robin Hood, where no one has to toil for a living,34 there 
is even a different conception of time—an alternative time that is crucial to Shakespeare’s 
comedies: “Commodified, calibrated, linear time is the spawn of early modern capitalist 
society at its most invasive and extortionate, colonizing human consciousness so 
completely as to redefine the landscape of the mind, transmuting the innermost contours of 
the self into the mentality demanded by the market.”35 Forest or exiled time is to be whiled 
away in banter, verbal games, and song. Shakespeare makes nothing unproblematic, 
though, and shows that time in the forest among the exiles must also be devoted to securing 
food and warmth for survival. But in Charles’s mythologized conception, he senses a 
freedom from bondage, a freedom from the state, and instrumental to such a reverie is 
transcending time, or at least reshaping it. Even deep within the world of the court there 
seems to be a latent desire for emancipation, for some kind of communal withdrawal in the 
forest; though Charles’s language soon hardens, the desire he expresses lingers. 
 Duke Senior’s opening address to the men in Arden both validates and tempers 
Charles’s imaginings: 
  
Now, my co-mates and brothers in exile, 
 Hath not old custom made this life more sweet 
 Than that of painted pomp? Are not these woods 
 More free from peril than the envious court? (2.1.1–4) 
 
                                                     
34 Brissenden (ed.), As You Like It, 103. 
35 Kiernan Ryan, Shakespeare, 3rd ed., 127. 
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The Duke attempts to rally Amiens and the other lords in the face of a cold winter and a 
dearth of material comforts. This is not a paradisiacal utopian vision, but still a community 
of “co-mates and brothers in exile”: the condition of exile, an absence of a state, is what 
makes the men “brothers” and equals.36 The Duke’s locution brings to mind Charles’s 
analogy of the “golden world” with the phrase “old custom,” which refers to the supposed 
practices of that earlier age.37 While eliciting the “golden world” indicates a removal from 
court excess and individualism manifested in greed and vanity, it does not refer to an entire 
elision of class distinctions. It is clear that although the exiled men are “co-mates,” Duke 
Senior remains the leader in Arden, and the lords attend him with utterances of “my lord.” 
Also, Amiens refers to Jaques as “Monsieur,” which “indicates that Jaques is a nobleman 
of higher standing than his companion lords.”38 
 Further complication over the conception of the “golden world” comes in the third 
scene of act 2, when Orlando invokes the old world to praise Adam’s loyalty: 
 
O good old man, how well in thee appears  
The constant service of the antique world,  
When service sweat for duty, not for meed! (2.3.57–59) 
 
Here the “antique world” accentuates the obedience of the indentured servant, who does 
not serve merely for his reward, but rather from a sense of duty. This, it seems, is the best 
                                                     
36 Critics often assume there are no women present among the exiled group: e.g., “Orlando 
fashions an alliance with Duke Senior in the forest when no women are present.” Peter 
Erickson, Patriarchal Structures in Shakespeare’s Drama, 15. 
37 Brissenden (ed.), As You Like It, 124. 
38 Ibid., 139. 
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compliment Adam can hope for. For Adam, the analogy of the “old world” that at other 
times in the play, as we have seen, carries egalitarian connotations, only reinforces his 
genial servility. However, as Grady writes, within the milieu of feudal relations, Adam 
enacts a form of rebellion: 
  
This rhetoric of feudal bonds should not obscure for us … that Adam has in fact, 
by throwing in his lot with Orlando, stepped outside of the customary network of 
feudal  relations; his customary bond, after all, is to the heir Oliver, not to Orlando. 
Rather than reassert the stability of the regulated feudal labour customs, he has 
violated them by asserting his own independence and becoming an outlaw with 
Orlando.39  
 
The similarity between the contradiction Orlando manifests in the opening scenes—
decrying what seems to him an arbitrary product of law as opposed to a natural hierarchy 
(primogeniture), while uncritically accepting Adam’s position as naturally inferior—and 
the exile community’s denunciation of the court life while maintaining some of its 
hierarchical logic, supports Elliot Krieger’s notion of a continuity between the court and 
forest worlds (what he refers to as the primary and second worlds): “I see the primary and 
second world not as juxtaposed alternatives but as part of the same continuous 
representation of reality—single nature’s double name. The second world develops from 
the contents of the primary world.”40 Krieger, however, relegates the utopian second world 
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40 Krieger, A Marxist Study of Shakespeare’s Comedies, 2. 
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to frivolous aristocratic fantasy that blurs and mystifies class distinctions.41 But the 
contiguity between the two worlds that he rightly detects, as opposed to a simplistic 
dichotomy, as well as the unfulfilled utopian potential, does not diminish the utopian 
experiment’s seriousness. This is not to say that it is “radical” as opposed to Krieger’s 
“conservative,” but rather that the effort to create an alternate society through a withdrawal, 
both voluntary and enforced, into communal solitude both exposes and falls victim to 
ideological contradictions and does not blur or mystify class distinctions, but rather 
magnifies their power and intractability.  
 Duke Senior’s language exemplifies the ambivalence of hierarchical distinctions in 
the exile community. It is both ripe with notions of equality and recognition that the court 
world is flawed, even despicable, yet maintains stratified distinctions that are products of 
that world. The communal withdrawal to the forest, the severing of selves from the life of 
ambition that Petrarch and Montaigne deride, does not allow the characters to immediately 
dismantle the ingrained assumptions and naturalized hierarchies that have hitherto shaped 
their existences. As Hamlet, in his solitary resistance against state corruption, realizes, one 
of the pitfalls of solitude is how tethered our selves are to the world we seek to discard, 
either by turning inward or isolating oneself or joining an exiled community. The 
characters in Arden—and, in fact, even the characters who remain in the court—express 
desire for a new life in the forest, and to a certain degree, temporarily, they achieve it—but 
it is incomplete. 
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 Fundamentally complicating the pastoral court-forest dichotomy, Shakespeare 
presents us with Corin and his predicament. Like contemporary squatters in the Midlands, 
Corin does not own the land on which he lives and works: 
   
Fair sir, I pity her, 
 And wish, for her sake more than for mine own, 
 My fortunes were more able to relieve her; 
 But I am shepherd to another man, 
 And do not shear the fleeces that I graze. 
 My master is of churlish disposition, 
 And little recks to find the way to heaven 
 By doing deeds of hospitality. (2.4.74–81) 
 
Instead of the carefree, solitary shepherd, we have an unkind, despotic landlord, and the 
shepherd who does not own the flocks he tends, and is at the mercy of his master’s “churlish 
disposition.” As seen from the example of Corin, the forest in itself is not a magical arena 
where exploitative relationships cease to exist and people are automatically granted the 
right to pursue harmonious ends. Corin’s position is emblematic of a kind of early modern 
alienation of labor. Thanks to the angry master’s prolonged absence, Ganymede and Aliena 
will buy the cottage and the shearing business and keep Corin on in his position as “feeder,” 
but with increased wage—so his relationship to his labor remains unchanged. Shakespeare 
takes the time to outline Corin’s situation in some detail, and offers more than what would 
be necessary to merely secure the plot machinations (to give Ganymede and Aliena access 
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to the cottage throughout their forest stay). This particular depiction of forest/shepherd life 
reinforces the notion that it is exile, more than something inherent in the green world, that 
enables utopian formulations. 
 Despite the transference of hierarchy from the court into exile, there is still a 
reappraisal of the dominant value system among the exiled men, often through song. At 
Jaques’s request to “warble,” Amiens and the other Lords sing: 
  
Who doth ambition shun, 
 And loves to live i’th’ sun, 
 Seeking the food he eats 
 And pleased with what he gets, 
        Come hither, come hither, come hither. 
 Here he shall see 
 No enemy 
        But winter and rough weather. (2.5.34-41) 
 
The implication of the exiles’ new ethos comes to fruition when Orlando bursts onto the 
scene in Arden. He enters upon Duke Senior, Jaques, Amiens and the other men with his 
sword drawn, prepared to rob food for himself and Adam. After a brief exchange, Orlando 
is shocked by the Duke’s invitation to, “Sit down and feed, and welcome to our table” 
(2.7.105). “Speak you so gently?” (2.7.106) he muses, and goes on to invoke the theme of 




But whate’er you are 
 That in this desert inaccessible, 
 Under the shade of melancholy boughs, 
 Lose and neglect the creeping hours of time. (2.7.109–12) 
 
Orlando associates the generosity of the exiles with a loss and “neglect” of time; “the 
creeping hours” again signifying the linear, regimented time of the court world, which in 
the forest/exiled world, in a community of “seeking the food he eats,” is not applicable. 
The Duke concedes that he and his men “have seen better days” (2.7.120), but for readers 
or spectators such a statement seems incongruous. While undoubtedly these men have seen 
more prosperous days, the utopian energy of Arden is what engages the imagination of the 
audience. 
 When the Duke, after Orlando’s exit, tells his men, “Thou seest we are not all alone 
unhappy” (2.7.136), we again see a sense of ambivalence over the exiles’ condition, the 
loss, as well as the reinvigoration, of banishment. Shakespeare greatly mitigates the exile 
community’s anger and bitterness from his source material, increasing the appeal and 
potential of exile; but he does not entirely eliminate the exile’s lament. We know the exiles 
don’t miss “mortifying temporal teleology”42 or the excesses of ambition and greed—they 
are explicit in celebrating freedom from these burdens. Just as Rosalind has found power 
and fostered love through her guise as Ganymede, the Duke and his lords have found a 
kind of liberation from the court and seem largely to comprehend the incompatibility of 
justice with their former condition: and yet both Rosalind and her father happily undo their 
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transformations at the play’s conclusion, as the reintegration is referred to as “new-fall’n 
dignity.” 
 Orlando, as we have seen, is highly concerned about and has a great deal of anxiety 
over lineage and class, and is the character who remains most embedded in economic 
concerns throughout the play, even in exile. When Oliver, now converted from his prior 
cruel self, tries to convince Orlando that he will marry Aliena, Orlando is at first hesitant: 
“Is’t possible that on so little acquaintance you / should like her?” (5.2.1–2). Oliver then 
reassures Orlando by speaking of property and revenue: 
   
It shall be to 
 your good, for my father’s house and all the revenue 
 that was old Sir Rowland’s will I estate upon you, and 
 here live and die a shepherd. (5.2.9–12) 
 
Orlando immediately replies, “You have my consent” (5.2.13), leaving little doubt as to 
his priorities. This arrangement will in fact make both marriages—Oliver to Celia, Orlando 
to Rosalind—possible, as Orlando gains the rights of primogeniture, rights that Duke 
Senior will also momentarily regain, thus making Orlando a fit husband for a Duke’s 
daughter. The relinquishing of the world of communal solitude has begun to occur, and the 
world of property and social contracts begins to regain prominence. It even seems to take 
a benign supernatural intervention to reinstate “order,” or a proper structure of authority, 
as the god Hymen appears to, “make conclusion / Of these most strange events” (5.4.121–
2). Rosalind, who in the forest world, disguised as Ganymede, “wittily asserts her 
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independence … and establishes her own household,” has possessed a “controlling power 
over affairs in the forest. But this power lapses when she relinquishes her male disguise 
and formally acknowledges her normal status as daughter and wife. In a ritual gesture of 
surrender, she assumes the passive role of mediatrix between the Duke and Orlando.”43 
When Rosalind turns to her father and says, “To you I give myself, for I am yours,” and 
then turns to Orlando, “To you I give myself, for I am yours” (5.4.105-6), we feel ourselves 
swept back to the world of the court.  
 Hymen’s appearance and the blessing of the various marriages is quickly followed 
by the first appearance of Jaques de Boys, brother to Orlando and Oliver, who comes to 
tell all of Duke Frederick’s mysterious conversion at the hands of a religious old man on 
the “skirts” of the forest, and how “All their lands restored to them again / That were with 
him exiled” (5.4.159-60). The crux of the reintegration back into a highly regimented, 
hierarchical world is Duke Senior’s final speech, which stands as a kind of unconscious 
elegy to the loss of the utopian potential that had begun to blossom when connection to the 
court had been severed by exile: 
  
And after, every of this happy number 
 That have endured shrewd days and nights with us 
 Shall share the good of our returnèd fortune 
 According to the measure of their states. 
 Meantime, forget this new-fallen dignity 
 And fall into our rustic revelry. (5.4.167–72) 
                                                     




The irony is in the Duke’s use of the word “share,” which of course had been what his men 
had genuinely been doing while in exile, only now it is conditioned with the line 
“According to the measure of their states”—in other words, “in proportion to their rank.”44 
We have moved from the unconditional sharing of food with Orlando, to a reminder of the 
reality that awaits when the forest is abandoned and the exile over. As the audience will 
feel a tinge of sadness at seeing Rosalind reduced to playing the obedient daughter and 
wife, so will we lament the end of exile and the community in solitude. In some sense, we 
as spectators or readers are like Jaques at the end: endlessly searching for answers, he is 
unwilling to return to the world of the court, but neither is he entirely convinced as to the 
efficacy of forest life. 
 Contrary to the readings of the play that seek to uncover its support for the existing 
social order, Kiernan Ryan argues that Shakespeare’s comedies, As You Like It included, 
“are indeed not concerned with ‘preserving a good already reached’ under existing social 
conditions. They are committed to envisaging forms of life liberated from whatever forbids 
the free play and shared satisfaction of justified desires.”45 In the ending of As You Like It, 
“we are being urged to regard the denouement as a frankly imaginary resolution of conflicts 
that remain unresolved outside the theatre.”46 In other words, the ending cannot magically 
elide and contain everything that has preceded it. And it certainly cannot eliminate the 
needs and desires that produce fantasies of exile and communal solitude that the play 
engages.  
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But what, finally, of Jaques? As You Like It presents readers and audiences with an 
example of genuine “community in solitude”; but it also presents a recalcitrantly solitary 
character—the character, in fact, who most perfectly embodies the ambivalences of 
solitude in early modern England. Jaques refuses to meaningfully integrate into society, 
whether the courtly one or the green world; his solitude is both condemned and elevated, 
and he embodies the fundamental paradox of the solitary. However, he is seldom actually 
alone: his solitude depends on his ability to verbally joust with others, to offer social and 
cultural critiques to an audience. In this way he exemplifies the inherent contradiction of 
the solitary, that is, “the presentation of this cult of the private, uncommunicated self 
through exaggerated public display.”47 Here we return to Alan Stewart’s notion, discussed 
in chapter 1, of early modern solitude as transactional and performative. This seeming 
hypocrisy accounts for the sense that Jaques is affected, is a “poseur,” in Harold Bloom’s 
words. As Bloom notes, Jaques, like Touchstone, is Shakespeare’s own invention, not 
found in Lodge’s story: while he is a “poseur,” a ripe target for Rosalind’s mockery, he has 
a “fine complexity,” and “Shakespeare grants his melancholic a dignified end…. Jaques 
departs with a flair…. And we wonder again whether he does not speak for a partial 
Shakespeare, perhaps the man rather than the poet-playwright.”48  
 Jaques is the melancholic solitary among the community of solitaries; if pastoral 
“portrays a way of life associated with the contemplative ideal, with retirement, privacy, 
reflectiveness,”49 then Jaques is the outsider among the outsiders. Though neither does he 
represent a Petrarchan ideal of lofty solitary contemplation—like Pyrocles, he falls short 
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of the mark, and in fact in many ways is a figure of derision and scorn. While for William 
Hazlitt, Jaques was “the only purely contemplative character in Shakespeare” whose “only 
passion is thought,” Alan Brissenden sees him entirely as a pathetic and mocked caricature 
worthy of our pity and scorn.50 Jaques as the wise truth-teller that the audience identifies 
with is a phenomenon of modern theatrical interpretations, a post-Romantic glorification 
of solitude and the outsider, perhaps. And yet his role at the play’s conclusion is crucial. 
 The mechanism that allows the celebratory reintegration into normal society, 
discussed above, is the withdrawal into contemplative solitude of the formerly evil Duke 
Frederick, as recounted by Jaques de Boys: “And to the skirts of this wild wood he came / 
Where, meeting with an old religious man, / After some question with him was converted 
/ Both from his enterprise and from the world” (5.4.154–57). This is followed by Duke 
Senior’s call for “rustic revelry” (5.4.172), which is then rejected by Jaques, who seems 
fascinated by Duke Frederick’s conversion: “To him will I. Out of these convertites / There 
is much matter to be heard and learned”; he then declares his apartness from the others: 
“So, to your pleasures; / I am for other than for dancing measures” (5.4.179–80, 87–88). 
Duke Senior implores Jaques to be part of the community—“Stay, Jaques, stay”—but to 
no avail: “To see no pastime, I. What you would have / I’ll stay to know at your abandoned 
cave” (5.4.189–91). 
 As Dillon notes, “This is the only one of Shakespeare’s plays which ends with the 
decisions of two characters, Jaques and Duke Frederick, to withdraw from the life of 
mutual participation to which the others are returning, in favour of a life of solitary 
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contemplation.”51 Furthermore, “Of these two who choose the solitary extreme at the end, 
only Duke Frederick does so in the true medieval spirit, offering penitence and devotion in 
reparation for his evil wordly life. Jaques chooses a much more sixteenth-century solitude, 
choosing in a spirit of sceptical enquiry and experiment.”52 For Judy Kronenfeld, while 
Jaques has, throughout the play, been representative of a frivolous solitude, a “fashionable 
inactive solitude,” a parody of self-obsession, his resolution at the play’s end demonstrates 
an “entirely new tone of humility…. Jaques’s … capacity for genuine insights and 
judgments, based on neither self-flattery nor self-pity, are in fact the necessary preamble 
to a more genuine seclusion; they allow us to accept his final retreat as more than a pose.”53 
While this is a slightly overly moralistic reading, Kronenfeld is certainly right that there is 
a new attitude toward solitude here hinted at by Jaques. And its effect is to cast a shadow 
over the play’s ending, to “undercut” the harmonious ending: “He questions these orderly 
solutions, and is a fragmenting and divisive influence on the ideals of love, marriage, and 
good fellowship.”54 
 Jaques position at the end is not, however, merely to diminish the good cheer. 
Rather, it is a reminder that there is something unsatisfactory in the return to the court, in 
the eliding of the utopian possibilities of the communal solitaries in exile. For Kiernan 
Ryan, there is still a powerful “utopian resonance” at the play’s conclusion, precisely 
because of this dramatized gap between what the audience knows could be and what will 
be: “For the persons of the play, the denouement may signify a  reinstatement of the status 
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quo ante, the just restitution of lands and rights, and the reaffirmation of family bonds and 
sexual norms through nuptial celebrations; but for the audience watching those celebrations 
in the wake of what Arden has revealed, it means much more than that.”55 Jaques’s “other 
than for dancing measures,” his lingering and now more committed solitude, is what helps 
sustain the utopian energy and social critique of the play beyond the seemingly festive 
reintegration to the court world. 
 
“I had rather be alone” 
“Baffling,” “curious,” “unfinished,” “abandoned,” “a mistake”: these are just some of the 
adjectives regularly applied to Timon of Athens, referring to both the content of the play 
and the process of its composition.56 The play has often been dismissed as an incomplete, 
half-formed experiment in invective and satire, heavy on allegory and characters without 
depth or subtlety. This viewpoint of the play as experimental hasn’t led to only negative 
evaluations, however—for example, Kiernan Ryan sees Timon as both a “theatrical 
thought-experiment, which accounts in part for its abstract, almost allegorical, 
diagrammatic form” and as central to Shakespeare’s artistic vision.57 The play and its 
strangeness has also provided fodder for biographical conjecture: E. K. Chambers believed 
that Shakespeare failed to finish the play due to a mental breakdown; Harold Bloom thinks 
that “it is perfectly legitimate to substitute Athens for London, and the fortyish Shakespeare 
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for the noble Athenian,” and he further speculates that the sexual revulsion expressed in 
the play is a likely indication that its author suffered from venereal disease.58  
A commonplace observation about the play, which ostensibly adds to the sense of 
it as something unfinished or marginal, is that it seems never to have been performed in 
Shakespeare’s lifetime. However, as Wells and Taylor note while discussing theories that 
the play is radically unfinished in their textual companion to the Oxford complete works, 
“These theories all place great weight upon the absence of direct evidence for 
contemporary performances of the play, and this lacuna is now often cited as evidence the 
play was never performed. But we also possess no … evidence that As You Like It, More, 
Troilus, All’s Well, or Antony were performed.”59 Timon, of course, has had its defenders, 
the most hyperbolic champion of the play being G. Wilson Knight, who in The Wheel of 
Fire claimed that “in no other play is a more forceful, a more irresistible, mastery of 
technique … employed. But then, no play is so massive, so rough-hewn into Atlantean 
shapes from the mountain rock of the poet’s mind or soul, as this of Timon…. For this play 
is Hamlet, Troilus and Cressida, Othello, King Lear, become self-conscious and universal; 
it includes and transcends them all.”60  
 The question of authorship has also long vexed Timon (at least since the nineteenth 
century): to what extent do parts of the play seem supposedly non-Shakespearean, and can 
textual inconsistencies be accounted for by the presence of multiple hands? The scholarly 
consensus is now that Timon is a coauthored play by Shakespeare and Thomas Middleton, 
with Middleton responsible for “the tawdry masque and banquet scene, spiced up with 
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witty commentary on the part of the cynic Apemantus (1.2), the scenes of attempted 
borrowing (3.1 to 3.3), the debt-collecting sequences (parts of 2.2, 3.4) and most of the 
sections involving the faithful steward, Flavius. Shakespeare took the meatiest scenes for 
himself, such as the long opening sequence … [and] he reserved most of the final two acts 
for himself: the vehement vituperation of the forest scenes as well as the elegiac and muted 
ending.”61 For Wells and Taylor, coauthorship, combined with the likelihood that the text 
(1623 Folio) was set from foul papers, accounts for inconsistencies (e.g., the conversation 
between Flavius and Ventidius that is arranged in 2.2 but never occurs) or oddities that 
have led others to see the play as unfinished or abandoned; they speculate that “Timon is 
only distinct from most other foul-paper texts in that it is of joint authorship. The 
characteristics of the underlying manuscript are those of a collaborative rough draft in 
which each author’s contributions were in his own hand. The task of imposing overall 
consistency and coherence was not taken as far as it might haven been in a prompt-book.”62 
 While theories of collaborative authorship, textual corruption/incompletion, and 
Timon’s seemingly precarious place in the Folio—replacing Troilus and Cressida when 
that play was moved from the other tragedies—have rendered Timon as somehow marginal 
to Shakespeare’s oeuvre, for Harold Goddard, “it is beyond comprehension how anyone 
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could doubt that Timon himself … is a product of Shakespeare’s imagination.”63 Rather, 
as the “emotional twin of King Lear,” the play is a “safety valve through which 
Shakespeare blew off excess thought and emotion…. He seems to let himself go and to 
express through the mouth of Timon exactly what he thought and how he felt about 
humanity at some moment of mingled anger and disillusionment … with mankind.”64 
While such speculations about the emotional state of the (co)author must, of course, remain 
speculative (and are representative of a long-out-of-fashion critical idiom), Goddard’s 
crucial larger point, which speaks directly to what Melville saw in the play and its solitary 
protagonist, is that Timon is not an anomaly but “an extreme embodiment of that scorn of 
humanity of which flashes are observable in Shakespeare’s works almost from the 
beginning, that contempt which in Hamlet and the ‘dark’ Comedies and some of the 
Sonnets becomes conspicuous.”65 
 Interestingly, it is the Poet and the Painter who set the tone at the play’s opening, 
and who reveal the sickness and venality of the Athenian society depicted. Such pervasive 
political and social corruption was a pressing concern in Jacobean England, giving the play 
an immediately recognizable context for contemporary audiences.66 The Poet and Painter 
are joined at first by the Jeweller and the Merchant, perhaps more obvious representatives 
of Apemantus’s lament “Traffic’s thy god” (1.1.239), but the Poet and Painter are in no 
way outside the world of flattery, deceit, and acquisitiveness; rather, they are full 
participants, dependent on the system of patronage to which many writers were subjected 
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in Jacobean England. In one of the play’s deep ironies, the Poet is a satirist, and in his 
initial description to the Painter of what he is working on to present to the overgenerous 
Timon, he predicts exactly the trajectory that the tragedy will take. Describing Timon’s 
situation, he notes that Timon “Subdues and properties to his love and tendance / All sorts 
of hearts” (1.1.58–59): as with Polonius in Hamlet, here again is a seamless equating of 
love/affection with the transactional, material, or commercial—“properties” meaning “to 
make one’s own property,” “to take hold or possession of.”67 He goes on to describe his 
story of personified Fortune at the top of a hill calling Timon up to herself from among the 
throngs “of all deserts” (1.1.66) below; upon this ascent, the others follow Timon, visit 
him, flatter him, seem to assist him. However,  
 
When Fortune in her shift and change of mood 
Spurns down her late beloved, all his dependants, 
Which laboured after him to the mountain’s top 
Even on their knees and hands, let him fall down,  
Not one accompanying his declining foot. (1.1.85–89) 
 
While the Poet’s motives are no different or more elevated than the other characters who 
leech off of Timon, he seems to possess some insight, and it has been suggested that Timon 
might have done well to actually read the Poet’s satire. But Timon fundamentally relates 
to his society differently than the other characters: his identity is constructed entirely 
around the fantasy of bounty, the symbolic role of “noble Timon,” and thus he adopts the 
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viewpoint of the naïve, as opposed to cynical, believer: referring to a work by the Painter, 
he remarks, “these pencilled figures are / Even such as they give out” (1.1.163–64). 
 The other characters are all aware of the rules of the game they play: they flatter, 
they lavish compliments, they are rewarded; they have no illusions about genuine loyalties 
or bonds. For example, when the Poet and Painter seek out Timon, now Misanthropos, in 
act 5, they have heard he has reacquired gold and they explicitly plan to make themselves 
seem dedicated to him to receive his bounty. The entire plan revolves around seems and 
not is: they will appear to have been loyal and will be remunerated. Again, Shakespeare 
uses the language of financial transaction in reference to human bonds, with the Painter 
plotting that they should “tender our loves to him in this supposed distress of his” 
(5.1.13)—“supposed” in that they assume that Timon’s fall from wealth must have been a 
performance to test the merit of his friends, a test they seek to pass by feigning loyalty. In 
a moment reminiscent of Hamlet seeing through the pretense of his false friends 
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern—“Were you not sent for? Is it your own inclining?... Come, 
deal justly with me” (2.2.275–77)—Timon understands the motivations of his even more 
false admirers: “You’re honest men. You’ve heard that I have gold, / I am sure you have. 
Speak truth; you’re honest men” (5.1.73–74). 
With the Timon of the first half of the play, however, and his mode of heedless, 
naïve belief, we are presented with an extreme case of what in psychoanalysis would be 
called a fetishist disavowal—essentially, a denial of a reality that one consciously perceives 
and knows: “Timon pursues his reckless course in full knowledge of the consequences, yet 
hides that knowledge from his conscious thought.”68 It is not that Timon lacks knowledge, 
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or even insight from those willing to tell him the truth (whether allegorically or directly)—
not only the Poet but Apemantus explicitly and repeatedly lays out for him the 
phantasmatic nature of his belief in others: “Thou giv’st so long, Timon, I fear me thou 
wilt / give away thyself in paper shortly. What needs these feasts, / pomps, and 
vainglories?” (1.2.238–40). Timon’s steward Flavius, who, unlike Apemantus, is more 
restrained in his ability to chastise Timon, sees clearly the path that Timon’s bounty is 
taking: “’Tis pity bounty had not eyes behind” (1.2.157). When Timon begins to 
understand the direness of his situation he reproves Flavius for not having let him know 
this could happen, to which Flavius responds: “You would not hear me” (2.2.123), and 
describes the many times he demonstrated to Timon with his account books the reckless 
course he was pursuing. Timon has full knowledge, but he chooses to not know, chooses 
the “spurious society” of the cosmopolitan:69 “Nay,” he replies to Apemantus’s prescient 
chiding, “an you begin to rail on society once more, I am sworn / not to give regard to you” 
(1.2.241–42). Thus, the disavowal: “I know it, but I refuse to fully assume the 
consequences of this knowledge, so that I can continue acting as if I don’t know it.”70 It is 
another of the play’s ironies that Timon’s mindset makes him solitary from the outset:71 
not only does he seem to have no family, no genuine friendships, but he is as apart, as 
distinct from the other characters as Apemantus is. But in his solitariness and largesse, he 
is the god, not beast, of Aristotle’s formulation, quoted above: “[Timon’s friends] set him 
apart, god-like and singular as the phoenix to which one senator compares him.”72 
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 Timon’s fetish, so to speak, is gold—or, more specifically, the bestowing of it 
through bounty on others. For Coppelia Kahn, the Poet’s allegory of the “sovereign lady” 
Fortune (1.1.64–89)—which “blends Fortune’s body with that of mother earth” and, 
through the image of Timon “bowing his head against the steepy mount,” is suggestive of 
“a baby with its head on its mother’s breast”—depicts Fortune from the infant’s 
perspective.73 But, “In the final movement, Fortuna is no longer nurturant mother but fickle 
mistress.” From this rejection by and separation from the mother, Timon is dropped into 
the world of masculine competition, alienation, and deceit: “the implicit logic of the fantasy 
in the Poet’s fable … is … because men first know the world as something separate from 
a mothering woman, she is held responsible for the outrages and terrors of the world men 
come to know.”74 Thus the deep irony when, later, it is digging in the “common mother” 
(4.3.177) that Timon finds gold. The “common [i.e., universal] mother” is also “general 
[i.e., universal] excrement” (4.3.435), thus, as Kenneth Burke explains in “Timon of Athens 
and Misanthropic Gold,” what Timon finds is “a foul form of gold … an ironically Midas-
like gold, fecal gold, gold as defined by the touch that turns everything into the idea of 
corruption everywhere.”75  
I’ll return to Burke and Timon’s invective as Misanthropos below, but first, what 
is it that Timon seeks through his excessive, even desperate, bounty? Timon’s bounty is, 
quite simply, a hyperbolic representation of desire, articulated by Lacan: “Man’s desire 
finds its meaning in the desire of the other, not so much because the other holds the key to 
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the object desired, as because the first object of desire is to be recognized by the other.”76 
By tying others to him through munificence and ostensibly asking nothing in return—but 
of course implicitly asking for praise, flattery, and the constant naming of courtly 
compliment (“Most noble Timon”; “Most honour’d Timon”; “worthy Timon,” etc.)—
Timon actually seeks the most fundamental form of recognition, to overcome the 
separation allegorized in the Poet’s depiction of Fortuna casting him off.77 This desire 
cannot be articulated in language—to do so would be to acknowledge the constitutive 
solitude of the self78—and thus “in the desperate and vain attempt to articulate desire, the 
desiring subject continually moves from one demand to another.”79 Timon’s demands are 
that others unconditionally accept his extraordinary, and extraordinarily self-destructive, 
generosity. 
When Timon’s reality is revealed to him as an elaborately constructed fantasy, he 
undergoes a seemingly radical transformation, choosing abject solitude over the now 
revealed to be false Athenian society. His renunciation, which takes the form of an 
apostrophe to the walls of Athens that asks for confusion and destruction to be sowed in 
the city, concludes with his tearing off his clothes: “Nothing I’ll bear from thee / But 
nakedness, thou detestable town” (4.1.32–33). This gesture, representative of Timon 
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shedding his symbolic identity, unmasking himself to the world, is reminiscent of Lear’s 
“thou art the thing itself. Unaccommodated man is no more but such a poor, bare, forked 
animal as thou art. Off, off, you lendings! come, unbutton here” (3.4.98–101). But whereas 
Lear acts out of an attempt at empathy toward Poor Tom, in a recognition of the sameness, 
when symbols are cast aside, between king and beggar, Timon emphasizes his singularity, 
his lack of kinship with any, even “the babe / Whose dimpled smiles from fools exhaust 
their mercy” (4.3.118–19). Timon is as extreme in his vicious isolation as he was in his 
excessive bounty. Ironically, Timon’s solitude as Misanthropos is structured around a 
series of visitations—Flavius, Apemantus, Alcibiades, Phyrnia and Timandra, the Painter 
and Poet, three unnamed thieves—indicating that he has not descended into a kind of pure 
experience of solitary self-discovery.80 Rather, Timon is as entirely dependent on the other 
for self-definition as he was as Timon the god of bounty. 
There is, however, an ethical element to Timon’s attempted solitude, an 
unwillingness to any longer participate in the charade of Athenian life.81 Shakespeare drew 
on two contradictory sources for Timon: an anonymous comedy based on Lucian’s second-
century Timon the Misanthrope, and the brief accounts of Timon in Plutarch’s Lives (in 
“Alcibiades” and “Antony”). In the former, Timon is a figure of derision, mocked for over-
the-top misanthropy, and in the epilogue forced to repent his solitary ways in exchange for 
audience applause. References to Timon in other late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-
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century literature “suggest that Timon did not come down to the Renaissance as a tragic 
figure, but instead as one to be laughed at or observed with curiosity.”82 Janette Dillon 
concurs: “For the Elizabethans, Timon was the archetypal solitary, his very name a 
synonym for solitude,” and his solitude is consistently condemned.83 However, the 
Plutarchan tradition, from which Shakespeare primarily draws, “does not portray him 
[Timon] as a figure of ridicule.”84  
Shakespeare is fashioning a tragedy out of the story of a figure that had become a 
shorthand for excessive misanthropy, a kind of didactic negative exemplum. For Kiernan 
Ryan, Shakespeare’s attraction to a non-comic Timon derives from the same critical space 
as his attraction to the character of the wise fool: “The figure of the licensed fool resonates 
so strongly with Shakespeare, because as a dramatist he claims and exercises the same right 
to expose the inhuman strangeness of the social conventions … that constricted life in his 
time,” and thus, “Timon’s utter misanthropic disenchantment with the world as it is 
constitutes the most extreme instance of the attitude that ultimately animates all 
Shakespeare’s drama.”85  
 As an example of this insight, gold, once the ultimate object of desire for its ability 
to fund Timon’s maniacal giving, is now the deeply corrupt substance he uncovers from 
the womb of the earth and which exemplifies his newfound position as outsider who sees 
the arbitrariness of something previously naturally accepted: 
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What is here? 
Gold?.... 
Thus much of this will make 
Black white, foul fair, wrong right, 
…………………………………… 
Ha, you gods! Why this, what, this, you gods? Why, this 
Will lug your priests and servants from your sides, 
Pluck stout men’s pillows from below their heads. 
This yellow slave 
Will knit and break religions, bless th’accursed, 
… place thieves, 
And give them title, knee, and approbation 
With senators on the bench. (4.3.25–38) 
 
But Timon combines the mad wisdom of Hamlet with a sometimes over-the-top frenzy that 
even exceeds Lear’s: he urges Alcibiades to make war on Athens and  
 
Let not thy sword skip one.  
Pity not honoured age for his white beard: 
He is an usurer. Strike me the counterfeit matron; 
It is her habit only that is honest, 
Herself’s a bawd.... 
Put armour on thine ears and on thine eyes 
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Whose proof nor yells of mothers, maids, nor babes, 
Nor sight of priests in holy vestments bleeding, 
Shall pierce a jot (4.3.110–126).  
 
These violent images and intimations of complete annihilation keep the audience alienated 
from Timon, but, ultimately, as much hate as Timon spews he is also “a lover of the truth, 
and through his mad generalizations about mankind that love and truth somehow manage 
to shine.”86 As evidence for this claim, Goddard cites the results of Timon’s railing against 
the thieves—they reconsider their choices: “He’s almost charmed me from my profession 
by persuading me to it” (4.3.443–44). In an updated version of Goddard’s argument, Ryan 
sees a utopian vision embedded in the play, but one articulated “through negation rather 
than affirmation,” through “Timon’s protracted howl of rage at a society shamelessly 
inured to the heartless individualism that sacrifices the shared interests of its members to 
rabid self-interest.”87    
  But Timon’s loss of his prior identity and his embrace of solitude also results in a 
narcissistic, hysterical break, in which he adopts the role of a kind of obscene superego. 
His newly constructed identity of Misanthropos relies entirely on the discourse of 
invective, which actually demonstrates that he is still caught in the desperate cycle of 
demand-desire-recognition, as before. Invective, as Burke writes in his essay on Timon, “is 
a primary ‘freedom of speech,’ rooted extralinguistically in the helpless rage of an infant 
that states its attitude by utterances wholly unbridled…. If rage is the infantile prototype of 
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invective, it is a kind of ‘freedom’ that must soon be subjected to control, once articulacy 
develops.”88 His invective, therefore, plays into the same dynamic as his earlier bounty, 
but instead of recognition as “worthy Timon,” he demands it for the new identity of 
Misanthropos. When Apemantus comes to visit Timon—both their solitudes positioned 
against the presence of another person—Timon is confronted with the mirrored other that 
he has in some sense based his new identity on: “Here is a dramatist’s perfect way of 
embodying, by a wholly realistic altercation between two contestants, such a principle of 
reflexivity as would prevail if Timon were to have fallen into fantastic quarrel with his 
mirror-image, under conditions that allow it to answer back.”89 
 The two solitaries proceed to debate the nature of their respective identities. 
Apemantus claims that Timon as Misanthropos “dost affect my manners” and that Timon’s 
new self is “a nature but infected, / A poor unmanly melancholy sprung / From change of 
fortune” (4.3.199–204). Nicholas Rowe (1674–1718) emended “infected” to “affected,” 
which many editions, including Arden 3, still use, since it “picks up on Apemantus’ original 
accusation … which the cynic then reiterates in what follows: Timon’s behaviour is an 
act—he is playing a role. F’s reading [‘infected’] suggests merely that Timon has caught 
the disease of his society.”90 This accusation of affectation, of performance, has some truth 
in it, of course, but Timon’s break from his former identity is stronger than Apemantus 
credits: he claims that if Timon had gold again he would immediately return to his prior 
life; but we know that Timon does indeed possess wealth through the gold he has dug up, 
and yet still chooses to remain the solitary, invective-spewing outsider.  
                                                     
88 Burke, Language as Symbolic Action, 120. 
89 Ibid., 116–17. 
90 Dawson and Minton, eds., Arden 3 Timon of Athens, 288, note to line 201. 
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Again, there are elements of both Timon as narcissistic performer and Timon as 
genuinely changed, uncompromising social critic. Timon and Apemantus move on from 
this debate about the nature of Timon’s transformation to an aggressive, vindictive 
misanthropy contest: 
  
Timon: Would thou wert clean enough to spit upon. 
 Ap.: A plague on thee! Thou art too bad to curse. 
 Timon: All villains that do stand by thee are pure. 
 Ap.: There is no leprosy but what thou speak’st. 
 Timon: If I name thee. I’d beat thee, but I should infect my hands. 
 Ap.: I would my tongue could rot them off. 
 Timon: Away, thou issue of a mangy dog!... 
 Ap.: Would thou wouldst burst! 
 Timon: Away, thou tedious rogue! 
 [He throws a stone at APEMANTUS] 
 I am sorry I shall lose a stone by thee. 
 Ap.: Beast! 
 Timon: Slave! 
 Ap.: Toad! 





In this mirrored debate / invective contest, the two solitaries exemplify the process of 
identity formation: “The potential for display of aggressive behavior is increased as the 
child, in his identifying with others, begins to take upon himself the desires manifested in 
the others’ behavior. In modeling oneself on another, one is also modeling one’s desires on 
those of the other, and the inevitable consequence of this is an aggressive rivalry between 
the child and the other for the object desired by the other.”91 The desired object, in this 
case, is solitude, but specifically a fantasy of solitude—autonomous, free from the need for 
others, invested with meaning—that neither character is fully able to achieve. At the same 
time, the performance of solitude, alongside all the bile and anger, serves an important 
social function: exposing social contradictions, hypocrisies, and injustices, temporarily 
lifting the collective ideological veil. 
Invective, then, functions on multiple levels: trenchant, if venomous and hysterical, 
social critique; the representation of Timon’s ultimate dependence on the other, his need 
for recognition and his desire for but inability to actually be solitary; and as a quasi-
cathartic release for the audience. If the language spoken by the solitary represents a 
“‘freedom’ that must soon be subjected to control,” this gives “full expression to a desire 
that is intrinsic to the nature of language, but that becomes variously suppressed by the 
fears and proprieties that make up our ‘second nature.’”92 By watching Timon, we can 
indulge in the violation of the suppression of desire, throwing propriety aside, and have our 
fears and unspoken (even unspeakable) intimations aired, if ultimately attenuated and made 
bearable by his ultimate erasure and the restoration of order in the figure of Alcibiades. 
                                                     
91 Lee, Jacques Lacan, 27. 
92 Burke, Language as Symbolic Action, 121.  
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 Shakespeare’s treatment of solitude in this enigmatic play is particularly dark and 
complex: in escaping ideology, in shedding symbolic and imaginary identities, the solitary 
protagonist doesn’t find the pure, unfettered fulfillment and freedom of the self, the myth 
of romantic solitude (who you “really” are); rather, the “real” of the fantasy is discovered 
and confronted, and if not returning to (false) society, the hero seems only capable of self-
annihilation:93 “So when we wish to attain in the subject what was before the serial 
articulations of speech, and what is primordial to the birth of symbols, we find it in death, 
from which his existence takes on all the meaning it has.”94 Or, “And nothing brings me 
all things” (5.2.73), as Timon says. In the process, the audience can confront and 
acknowledge their own communal anxieties and premonitions about the nature of what we 
call reality, the falseness and deceit of others and yet our dependence on the other, the 
constant ideological immersion, societies structured by arbitrary hierarchical distinctions 
and codes of behavior; but through the annihilation of these solitary characters and the 
supposed return to order in the plays’ conclusions—via Alcibiades, in this case—those 
exposed anxieties can be blurred or repackaged. As with As You Like It, what is left behind? 
A utopian aura, to use Grady’s term, here achieved via extreme negation: “Every tirade [of 
Timon’s] vindicates ex negativo the ideals of equality, mutuality and community, and the 
human potential to achieve them, that are betrayed by the organized enslavement of human 
beings to the pursuit of profit by the few to the detriment of the many.”95  
 
                                                     
93 Timon’s mysterious death and cryptic and seemingly contradictory epitaphs have been 
the subject of much editorial and critical discussion: see Ryan, Shakespeare’s Universality, 
116–19. 
94 Lacan, Écrits, 105. 
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In 1665 an anonymous book was published in Edinburgh with the title A Moral Essay, 
Preferring Solitude to Publick Employment, And all it’s Appendages; such as Fame, 
Command, Riches, Pleasures, Conversation, &c. The book was reissued in 1666 with a 
“cancel title”1 that contained the author’s name: George Mackenzie (1636/38–1691), a 
prominent Scottish lawyer and politician, who became lord advocate in 1677. Most copies 
of this edition were destroyed in the Great Fire of London, as indicated in a letter from 
Abraham Cowley—an ardent devotee of the theme of solitude/retirement—to John Evelyn, 
who authored a response to Mackenzie’s book in 1667: “Since I had the honour to receive 
from you the reply to a book written in praise of a solitary life, I have sent all about town 
in vain to get the author, having very much affection for the subject, which is one of the 
noblest controversies both modern and ancient; and you have dealt so civilly with your 
adversary, as makes him deserve to be looked after. But I could not meet with him, the 
books being all, it seems, either burnt or bought up.”2  
Mackenzie’s work, which has often been dismissed as impractical, “hedonist,”3 or 
immoral, should instead be read as an important social critique, composed by someone who 
                                                     
1 Brian Vickers, ed., Public and Private Life in the Seventeenth Century: The Mackenzie-
Evelyn Debate, facsimile edition, ix.  
2 W. Bray (ed.), Diary and Correspondence of John Evelyn, 1:196; quoted in Vickers, ed., 
Public and Private Life, x. 
3 Vickers, ed., Public and Private Life, xxii. 
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was profoundly involved in public life, confronting the deep moral ambivalences of such 
a life. The work is composed relatively early in Mackenzie’s career: he would go on to 
become Scotland’s most articulate proponent of absolute monarchy, yet his work on 
solitude reflects doubts and criticisms of the idea of sovereignty. Mackenzie posits a 
rhetorical form of solitude that has great importance in the history of the concept: in the 
genealogy of solitude, Rousseau is the immediate heir to works like Mackenzie’s.4 This 
chapter will lay out and examine Mackenzie’s argument, followed by Evelyn’s rebuttal, 
before looking closely at some details of Mackenzie’s life and political career, particularly 
from 1660 to 1666—the early years of the Scottish Restoration and the years preceding 
and coinciding with his tract on solitude. Political and social turmoil in Scotland are 
essential to understanding the impulse behind Mackenzie’s discourse of solitude. I will also 
read Mackenzie’s work alongside his involvement in the witchcraft persecutions that 
plagued Scotland in the years preceding his publication of his tract on solitude, drawing 
from Andrew Lang’s early twentieth-century biography of Mackenzie, which sets up a 
narrative of an irreconcilable private versus public Mackenzie. I will then examine the 
Mackenzie-Evelyn debate in the larger context of postwar English retirement poetry, 
exemplified by Cowley. 
The poetry and writing of rural retreat and solitude in the Restoration period has 
been described as indicative of a “Restoration attitude” of Epicurean leisure,5 and 
Mackenzie’s work has been lumped into this category, of which Cowley is the most well-
known representative, along, ironically, with Evelyn, Mackenzie’s “opponent.” Maren-
                                                     
4 Robert Sayre, Solitude in Society, 48–53. 




Sofie Røstvig has described the calm that swept over England after the Restoration: with a 
“relaxation of tension came a fondness for leisured ease.”6 However, this depiction of 
England cannot be extrapolated to Scotland: the years from 1660 to 1689 in Scotland were 
filled with deadly and intractable conflicts between royal ministers and the Covenanters.7 
It is this specifically Scottish post-Restoration environment that influences Mackenzie, not 
the supposed dignified, aristocratic ease portrayed in England. This context, along with the 
generic expectations of works on solitude, also helps to explain the seeming paradoxes of 
the debate: Mackenzie, a Royalist, writes a tract that contains much criticism of the idea of 
sovereignty; both Mackenzie and Evelyn argue the position that represents the opposite of 
their personal commitments—Mackenzie the very public, active, ambitious figure, Evelyn 
a practitioner of the gentlemanly solitude.   
Mackenzie’s work—which has received scant scholarly attention despite the fact 
that his debate with Evelyn “set the standard” in the period for discussions of solitude 
versus society8—has either been dismissed as immoral or it has been relegated to a brief 
mention as yet another example of the classically derived beatus ille tradition. This 
tradition, so-named by Røstvig, was “originally created by Horace and Virgil on the basis 
of partly Stoic and partly Epicurean ideas,” and “came to attract many European poets of 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.”9 However, as with the other authors examined 
                                                     
6 Ibid., 229. 
7 The Covenanters were originally formed in 1637, when “it was reported to the King that 
his religious reforms ‘will not settle here without much blood.’… Representatives of the 
nobility, the lairds, the burghs and the kirk formed themselves into a committee known as 
the Tables and produced a National Covenant that bound its signatories to resist 
innovations in religion.” See Mark Kishlansky, A Monarchy Transformed, 138. 
8 Irene Beesemyer, “Crusoe the Isolato,” 87. 
9 Røstvig, The Happy Man, 7. 
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in this dissertation—Montaigne, Sidney, Shakespeare—what makes Mackenzie’s work 
interesting is in how it deviates from and complicates the various traditions (e.g., active-
life–contemplative-life debates, beatus ille, country life vs. city life, Horatian retirement, 
etc). Instead of only offering quasi-philosophical maxims, Mackenzie draws on the 
retirement tradition to stage a stinging social critique, in the process of which he inverts 
the notion of virtue (key to most humanist refutations of solitude, and indeed Evelyn’s) 
from a public to a private notion. He develops a multifaceted strand of solitude that has at 
its basis not the Epicurean luxury of which he was accused, but rather an impulse that is 
both escapist and fundamentally ethical. First, there is a fantasy of solitude that serves as a 
quietistic escape from the moral quandaries of public life through a rhetoric of inwardness 
and communion with nature. Second, as a reaction to corruption, greed, factionalism, and 
competition, there is the development of the idea of “community in solitude”10: in other 
words, “one flees from the solitude of conflicting interests in society to the solitude of 
community in rural retreat.”11 This is a form of individualism, I argue, that masks a longing 
for the possibility of a genuine and humane community. Third, the classically derived 
retirement genre allows a safe or undetected space to air controversial, even radical, ideas, 
which could never be expressed in the author’s public, political life if he wanted to continue 
to have a public, political life. In this sense, a treatise on solitude is, paradoxically, a form 
of political engagement. 
 
The Debate 
                                                     
10 This is the term that Beesemyer uses when discussing Robert Sayre’s thoughts on 
Mackenzie’s text. See Bessemyer, “Crusoe the Isolato,” 89. 
11 Robert Sayre, Solitude in Society, 47 (italics in original). 
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Mackenzie’s work is dedicated to “The Right Honourable, John Earl of Crawford,” which 
refers to John Lindsay, the Seventeenth Earl of Crawford (ca. 1598–1678). Lindsay was a 
prominent Covenanter, but was deprived of his office when the Cromwell-backed 
Covenanter regime in Edinburgh came to power, due to his prior involvement with the 
Engagement, the secret 1647 negotiations between Charles I and Scottish commissioners 
for a possible new alliance. Lindsay returned to public life in 1651, opposing “the 
Cromwellian advance” and allying with Charles II. He was captured in Alyth in the same 
year, and imprisoned in the Tower of London and then Windsor Castle until the Restoration 
in 1660; he briefly returned to public life but retired in 1663 “rather than accept the revival 
of episcopacy.”12 It is this solitary retirement from a very active public life that prompts 
Mackenzie’s dedication. “That I should choose your Lordship for my Patron,” Mackenzie 
writes, “is no act of virtue … for, being the best Pattern for solitary persons, ye were the 
person who deserv’d most to be the Patron of solitude it self: especially, having oblieged 
it so far, as to prefer it to that rival against which it now disputes for precedency; and 
prefer’d it, after it’s adverse party had been your old acquaintance, and had offer’d to bribe 
you … with a purse heavy enough to have weighed down a light spirit” (6).13 By declining 
supposed riches and fame, by choosing privacy over publicity, Lindsay paradoxically 
achieves true virtue: “But, though fame should not thus gratifie you, yet virtue (who hath 
so few deserving followers now…) will recommend you to succeeding ages, both to let see 
                                                     
12 Information in this paragraph from John R. Young, Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, s.v. “Lindsay, John, seventeenth earl of Crawford.” 
13 All citations to Mackenzie’s and Evelyn’s books, which are printed together in the 




that she wants not her Trophees even in this dotage of the world … and to engage others, 
by this act of gratitude, to a dependence upon her” (8).  
The virtue is paradoxical because in the ubiquitous Ciceronian ethos (or at least as 
it was appropriated and developed in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England), virtue 
is entirely a result of public endeavor; Mackenzie attempts to transform it into the private 
realm. In this sense, we have traveled back to Musidorus’s and Pyrocles’s debate on 
solitariness and virtue in the Arcadia, where Musidorus insists that virtue is entirely 
divorced from the private, solitary realm, while Pyrocles insists that his solitariness opens 
him up to higher, loftier thoughts than public action does. We should remember that while 
there was an aura of respect for contemplation and withdrawal centered around Ficino and 
Neo-Platonic thought in the later fifteenth century (though it remained a minority view), in 
England the debates were never “conceived … in Ficinian terms, between philosophical 
mediation and the distractions of society, but in Ciceronian terms, between involvement 
for the common good and selfish opting-out to pursue individual pleasure or profit.”14 
Mackenzie, by contrast, is trying to make vulgar pleasure and personal profit the purview 
of public not private life. Lindsay, for Mackenzie, demonstrates the superior ethical choice 
of rejecting both fame and riches for a personal and private sense of morality/virtue. This 
is why, in defending public life and public virtue, Evelyn, as noted in his title (Publick 
employment and an active life prefer’d to solitude, and all its appanages, such as fame, 
command, riches, conversation, &c…), must also defend “fame” and “riches.” 
Mackenzie’s treatise is addressed to an imaginary character named Celador, and he 
tells Celador that the purpose of his book is in “paralleling greatness and solitude, as to 
                                                     
14 Vickers, ed., Public and Private Life, xvi. 
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their moral advantages” (10). This notion of “greatness,” and of what it means to be 
esteemed a great man—usually a ruler—is the central point of division between Mackenzie 
and Evelyn. “In ballancing the employements of Solitude, with these of greatness,” 
Mackenzie turns to ambition as a quality of the latter. Ambition infects minor courtiers and 
officials who desire nothing more than higher position and favor with no other motive than 
to have others beneath them. They are willing to “run over” their neighbor for preferment 
(11, 19). It also infects legendary rulers and their thirst for conquest: “Did the conquest of 
all that the Sun sees, restrain, Alexander from weeping, because he could conquer no more? 
No. For, Ambition is like hunger, which though it is once satisfied, continues no longer so, 
then it hath for a little time prey’d upon what was at first presented to it” (19–20). Later, 
Mackenzie again makes reference to Alexander, remarking that he spent his time “running 
like a mad man up and down the world, and killing every man who would not call him 
master” (116). What solitude offers in contrast to ambition, “greatness,” and the violence 
it engenders, is a “virtuous inactivity” (27):15 this is an important phrase, as “inactivity” in 
this period is almost by definition something that cannot be “virtuous.” Mackenzie places 
the two terms together, representative not of the “sloth” of which he will inevitably be 
accused, but rather of a moral abstention from acquisitive, self-interested politics. 
The critique of ambition and greed, as well as the suspicion of the hypocrisy latent 
in the constant invocation of the Ciceronian injunction to public life, are reminiscent of 
Montaigne’s opening to “On Solitude”: 
 
                                                     
15 The 1665 editions prints this as “virtuous in activity,” a telling typo that converts the 
meaning of the phrase entirely. 
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And as for that fine adage used as a cloak by greed and ambition, “That we are not 
born for ourselves alone but for the common weal,” let us venture to refer to those 
who have joined in the dance: let them bare their consciences and confess whether 
rank, office and all the bustling business of the world are not sought on the contrary 
to gain private profit from the common weal. The evil methods which men use to 
get ahead in our century clearly show that their aims cannot be worth much. 
Let us retort to ambition that she herself gives us a taste for solitude, for 
does she shun anything more than fellowship?16 
 
Montaigne, like Mackenzie, turns acquisitiveness and the relentless drive for profit into a 
product of public life, though solitaries were accused of such greed and selfishness. He 
sees ambition and the drive for greatness as “cloaks” for selfish and unsavory motives; and 
he charges that it is not the solitary but the ambitious man who ruptures fellowship and 
community. This will also be a crucial point for Mackenzie, and it points to the idea that 
the desire for solitude/withdrawal and a community within the self may actually speak to 
a desire for a lost community, a kind of utopian impulse that is deflected and then sought 
in the self.  
In contrast to the interpretation of ambition that permeates Montaigne’s and 
Mackenzie’s works stands not only Evelyn, but Cowley’s first biographer, Thomas Sprat, 
who ultimately disapproved of Cowley’s withdrawal from public life and blamed lack of 
ambition for the poet’s deteriorating health in solitude. While Cowley’s epitaph captures 
his desired self-image, “Here, Passenger, beneath this Shed, / Lies COWLEY, tho 
                                                     
16 Montaigne, “On Solitude,” Essays, ed. M. A. Screech, 266. 
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entomb’d, not dead; / Yet freed from human Toil and Strife, / … / Who in his Poverty is 
neat, / And even in Retirement, Great,” Sprat’s rendering presents the predominant 
moralized reading and reminds us what kind of censure the proponent of solitude, whether 
actual (in Cowley’s case) or more purely rhetorical (in Mackenzie’s), would face: 
 
Who can here, Sir, forbear exclaiming on the weak hopes, and frail condition of 
humane Nature? For as long as Mr. Cowley was pursuing the course of Ambition, 
in active life, which he scarce esteem’d his true life; he never wanted a constant 
health and strength of body: But as soon as ever he had found an opportunity of 
beginning indeed to live … his contentment was first broken by sickness, and at 
last his death was occasion’d by his very delight in the Country and the Fields, 
which he had long fancied above all other Pleasures.17 
 
As Vickers points out, the prevailing notion in England, as exemplified by Robert Burton’s 
warning, “Be not solitary, be not idle,”18 and derived primarily from De Officiis, was that 
solitude essentially lead to death: when Cicero’s “ideology of civic altruism was taken into 
social thinking, was interiorized, became a norm, it sometimes resulted in violent 
disapproval of what was then seen as socially deviant behavior. Cicero had condemned the 
life of solitude as being certain to lead to death.”19 
                                                     
17 Røstvig, The Happy Man, 212–13. See Thomas Sprat, “An Account of the Life and 
Writings of Mr. Abraham Cowley,” in The Works of Mr. Abraham Cowley, 7th ed., 1700. 
18 Vickers, ed., Public and Private Life, xviii. 
19 Vickers, introduction in Arbeit, Musse, Meditation, 7. 
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For Evelyn, “great men” and rich men are good, benevolent, and virtuous, and this 
view earns him praise as “a vigorous proponent of virtue” whose “sense of economic 
reality, and the benefits of the circulation of money, shows [his] superior practicality and 
grasp of the world.”20 Mackenzie sees something else in the ethics of being a great man 
and in the realm of commerce and wealth: the inherently corrupting desire to have control 
over others: “The satisfaction received in commanding others, is admir’d as one of the 
ravishing advantages of publick Employment: And the soul of man in this, seems to have 
retain’d still a false appetite of being like to it’s [sic] Maker” (68). To fuel this desire, 
human bonds and basic ethics are sacrificed: “Have ye not seen great men forc’d to 
abandon their most deserving friends, forc’d to connive at, and oft to congratulate the 
promotion of their greatest enemies? will they not be sometimes oblieg’d to put on a 
constrain’d countenance, feign an unnatural mine, and express what is diametrically 
opposit to their thoughts; all which are servitudes which greatness exacts from us” (28). 
This breakdown of bonds and community through what “greatness exacts” eventually 
“destroyes … reason” and creates “restraints” on human freedom: “So they are against 
virtue, in being opposite to what our reason would … exact of us” (28). Again, virtue here 
is divorced from the realm of greatness/politics, which for Mackenzie is about rapacious 
self-interest. It is ironic that in a tract on solitude, the active life is lamented for its lacking 
in genuine friendship and human connection. As Mackenzie writes, “albeit society were to 
be valued at the rate imagin’d, yet solitary persons injoy more the sweets of society, than 
great men do: for in all addresses to these, the addressers consider only what is fit for their 
private interest, and little else is added, besides the dropping of a flattering expression or 
                                                     
20 Vickers, ed., Public and Private Life, xxix, xxxiv. 
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two” (69). This is one of the few times, as Irene Beesemyer notes, that Mackenzie engages 
the paradox of “community in solitude,” or “that man’s soul comprises a vast world 
within,” echoing a distinctly Montaignean “back-shop solitude” of drawing into oneself to 
attain what a dishonest, corrupt, factional, war-torn society has failed to provide.21 
 What emerges from Mackenzie’s analysis of so-called great men is the sense of an 
endless cycle of futility, violence, and self-interest, with little if no sense of a common 
good. He establishes this theme using ancient examples, and then segues from that 
immediately into the recent Civil Wars in England and Scotland: 
 
Not only amongst rivals, one of two pretenders satisfie, by their fall, the rage of 
fate, but when it hath assisted the one to destroy the other, it then turns it’s fury 
against the late victor: Thus Pompey and Cesar’s blood purpul’d equally the swords 
of murderers, agreeing in nothing but their destiny. Hannibal beats the Romans; 
Scipio beats Hannibal, and the Romans banish Scipio. Bellisarius makes Gilimer 
King of the Goths ridiculous … and Fate renders Bellisarius yet more ridiculous, 
driving him to beg, with this expression, bestow but a farthing upon Bellisarius. 
And it is most observable, that during our civil wars, four most eminent persons, 
who did head contrary, as well as different parties, did all loss both their heads, and 
                                                     
21 Beesemyer, “Crusoe the Isolato,” 89. For Beesemyer, there is a direct line from 
Mackenzie to Robinson Crusoe: “It seems to me Defoe picked up on Mackenzie’s unusual 
notion of community and solitude along with the subsequent argument that man’s soul 
comprises a vast world within, and in Robinson Crusoe wove these two threads into a 
representation of community within the self, with conversations ‘among’ the selves.’” Ibid. 
For Montaigne’s advice to “set aside a room … at the back of the shop,” see Montaigne, 
“On Solitude,” 270; for the use of the phrase “back-shop solitude,” of course derived from 
Montaigne, see Beesemyer, “Crusoe the Isolato,” 95. 
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their fortunes in the quarrel; whereas it might have been expected, that at least one 
of the opposits, should have worn unfadeing lawrels (43–44). 
  
The only thing that seems assured from the machinations of great men is mutual 
destruction, and, of course, ensuing chaos for ordinary people. The dream of the “unfadeing 
lawrel” causes only anguish. 
 Mackenzie’s focus in his critique of greatness is often specifically on sovereigns, 
or even the idea of sovereignty, a fascinating paradox for someone who pragmatically 
became a staunch Royalist. If a society is founded “upon the favour of a Prince, if in a 
Monarchy; and then ye must confess them oft-times subject to all the caprices of a lofty 
humour, licenc’d by the extent of his power, to equal his power and his humour; and 
entic’d, by the instigation of enemies or rivals, to stretch his humour beyond his allowed 
power” (40). When sovereigns fall to ruin or are killed due to their abuses of power, those 
who succeed them tell themselves they will be different, that it is a matter of individual 
character and not a systemic failure: “And albeit others are not deter’d from embracing 
those honours under which their first owners have been crush’d upon the account, that they 
imagine their Predecessors ruine to have flow’d from some personal frailty or error, against 
which they are confident they can guard” (35). However, the correct conclusion, 
Mackenzie contends, is that it is the idea of greatness itself that corrupts, that encourages 
sovereigns to err, overreach, betray their duty, and thirst for even more power. 
 We might recall that in Gonzalo’s famous utopian speech in The Tempest, derived 
from Montaigne’s “Of the Caniballes,” the ideal society imagined relies on there being “No 
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sovereignty,” to which Sebastian quips, “Yet he would be king on’t.”22 This is, of course, 
a much-debated speech, but it has been argued by Kiernan Ryan and others that both the 
positing of a utopia without a sovereign as well as Gonzalo’s self-contradiction in being 
unable to truly envision a society without one, forms the central point: “The main point of 
the entire exchange is irreducible, however, to … [an] endorsement of either party at the 
expense of the other. Its main point is not that the creation of a genuine commonwealth of 
truly ‘innocent people’ … is impossible, but that the fundamental obstacle to its creation is 
sovereignty.”23 Ryan also points out that this critique of sovereignty, which morphs into a 
critique of greed, is in sync with the viewpoint of Raphael Hythloday in Thomas More’s 
Utopia, a text that participates in the tradition that Mackenzie and Evelyn are engaging. 
For Hythloday, “When I consider and weigh in my mind all these commonwealths which 
nowadays anywhere do flourish, so God help me, I can perceive nothing but a certain 
conspiracy of rich men procuring their own commodities under the name and title of 
commonwealth. They invent and devise all means and crafts, first how to keep safely 
without fear of losing that they have unjustly gathered together.”24 Hythloday’s is a 
summary with which Mackenzie—or at least the authorial figure behind A Moral Essay, 
Preferring Solitude—would no doubt agree, given his critique of sovereigns, riches, and 
greatness.  
                                                     
22 The Tempest 2.1.147–57, in The Norton Shakespeare, ed. Stephen Greenblatt et al. 
23 Kiernan Ryan, Shakespeare’s Universality, 45. 
24 Quoted in ibid., 46. For Cathy Curtis, in “The Active and Contemplative Lives in 
Shakespeare,” More’s Utopia reflects the ambivalent attitudes found in the society-versus-
solitude debates, where both sides of the argument are granted importance. For Brian 
Vickers, however, there is no ambivalence and the side of public life is the predominant 
one always: Raphael Hythlodaeus in Utopia is clearly a “negative persona,” who “retreats 
to an obviously absurd position of egoism and self-sufficiency”: introduction in Arbeit, 
Musse, Meditation, 9.  
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While for a contemporary of More’s or Shakespeare’s, the idea of a society not 
governed by a sovereign is almost impossible to conceive (as in “the latter end” of 
Gonzalo’s commonwealth forgetting “the beginning,” or even the fact that More’s Utopia 
was founded by King Utopus),25 and while in these texts and others, such as King Lear, 
“one can discern a direct subterranean link to the English Revolution and the execution of 
‘the great image of authority’ in the sovereign shape of Charles I,”26 no such mental barrier 
or foreshadowing exists for Mackenzie: he writes from the vantage point of 1665, sixteen 
years after the execution of Charles I, and five years after the Restoration. The discourse 
on solitude that Mackenzie’s work embodies is one that, couched in some of the standard 
rhetoric of retirement literature, allows a safe space to express not only unconventional, 
but radical opinions. In contrast to the muddled moral situations and shifting allegiances of 
political life, solitude is pure, uncompromised, an escape from realpolitik. This fantasy of 
escape is complemented by a fantasy of radicalism and disobedience, expressed through 
the language of social critique and satire. 
Mackenzie’s book contains a brief section on the “Motives to solitude from 
religion”: the devotional aspect of pro-solitude tracts, particularly those English examples 
that draw on Petrarch’s De vita solitaria, is a very important one, as, for example, in Samuel 
Daniel’s The Prayse of Private Life (ca. 1605).27 The devotional section in Mackenzie’s 
work, however, feels strangely perfunctory; it begins thirty-six pages into the book and 
                                                     
25 Ryan, Shakespeare’s Universality, 46. 
26 Ibid., 48. 
27 This work was for a long time thought to be by Sir John Harington, but it now seems 
more likely that Daniel was the author: see John Pitcher, “Margaret, Countess of 
Cumberland’s The Prayse of Private Life, Presented by Samuel Daniel,” in In the Prayse 
of Writing, ed. Cerasano and May, 114–44. 
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opens with a somewhat anxious explanation for why it has not come earlier: “Seeing as of 
all other things, so of our thoughts the first-born should be sacrificed to our almighty 
Maker; I therefore resolved, to begin my first discourse with these reflections…. But, since 
Orators recommend the last place in our discourse, to the strongest perswasives … I shall 
therefore in this last place … recommend to you, to consider, that God possesses more 
excellencies … than can be fully contemplated” (45). Despite the claim here, the devotional 
section is not the “last place” in the discourse—it begins on Mackenzie’s page 37 and 
continues to page 49; the treatise then continues to page 112. Clearly Mackenzie’s focus is 
elsewhere—a secular critique of greatness and supposed virtue—but a defense of solitude 
simply cannot exist without a section trumping its conduciveness to religious devotion and 
contemplation. 
The devotional section seems designed to counter the charges of hedonism that 
nonetheless were (and still are) leveled at Mackenzie. Elsewhere he takes pains to 
distinguish the kinds of pleasures he thinks should be sought in solitude. While solitude is 
more pleasurable than public life, pleasure is “an act of the fancy, and consequently of the 
soul,” and thus it is “contemplation,” and not “sensual pleasures” that “arise from exterior 
objects,” that one pursues in solitude (81–82). Mackenzie’s central point in his religious 
section involves the benefits of solitude for devotion, shifting from secular to religious 
contemplation: “solitude is the true forge of the purest devotions” (51). He invokes a quasi-
Romantic communion with nature, particularly mountaintops, and cites biblical figures, 
such as Moses on Sinai, who were called away from “the populous camp” (49). If such an 
escape into nature is not available, then the closet will serve: “God Almighty, who because 
he is the object as well as enjoyner of our devotions … hath commanded us to retire into 
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our Closets (the most solitary of all our rooms) and to make these yet more retired, hath 
ordained us to close our doors behind us when we make any religious applications to him” 
(50–51). But there is the concern, Mackenzie concedes, that God seemingly did not desire 
man to be alone. Mackenzie uses society’s corruption as a way out of this impasse: “It was 
I confess Gods own verdict of man, that it was not good for him to be alone, but this was 
when because of his congenial innocence, he needed not fear the contamination of society; 
but to demonstrat what the hazard of being in company is: even Adam could not live one 
day in it, and live innocent, for the first news we hear of him, after that Eve was associat to 
him, is, that he had forefeited that native purity” (48). While this comment participates in 
the conventional misogynistic representation of Eden, in which Eve acts as the corrupter 
of pure Adam, it also allegorically expresses the breaking down of both religious and civic 
community through corruption and internecine conflict, here uniting with the secular 
argument of the treatise. 
According to Robert Sayre (discussed especially in chapter 3 in relation to As You 
Like It), a work such as Mackenzie’s must be seen in the sociopolitical context of the 
development of a society where the “competition of each individual against all others, 
following their private interest, is the general rule” and “the impersonal and antagonistic 
relationship of exchange constitutes the basic network of bonds in the social fabric”: in 
other words, “human relations become ‘reified’” and the consequence is the realization that 
society is structured around “illusory communities” that are in fact only based on self-
interest.28 Mackenzie, of course, participates in a tradition that arises from classical 
literature; however, “an ‘influence’ … can never in itself explain its adoption at a given 
                                                     
28 Sayre, Solitude in Society, 4.  
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moment nor the specific configuration it is given. A classical motif is adopted only when 
it corresponds to the needs of a new social situation.”29 If the seventeenth-century theme 
of retreat is in part a “revolt against the conditions of a new social order,” a withdrawal, 
rhetorical or literal, “from a society based on competition, antagonism, self-interest,” then 
it can manifest itself as a “search for lost community.” However, “the theme of retreat to 
solitude is often informed with the ideology of the order it spurns; it is in many cases itself 
an expression of the new individualism…. The new community is not exterior … but the 
interior ‘crowd’ within oneself. The solitary is himself a community; he communes with 
his ideas and his readings.”30 This is what Sayre means when he says that Mackenzie 
undertakes the paradox of “community in solitude,” which he sees as representative of the 
“far limits of solitude” in the period—a kind of implicit acknowledgment of the “solitude 
within society,” a variant of Marxist theories of alienation that become prevalent in 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century literature.31  
 In Sayre’s framework, Mackenzie’s work reflects a kind of nascent awareness of 
the larger social and economic forces that made the search for community in solitude an 
important motif, and represents a symptom of a supposed bourgeois individualism. 
However, it’s important to note that Mackenzie actively uses the tradition of apologias for 
solitude as a vehicle for a social critique of the self-interest that Sayre sees as the catalyst 
for retreat or the desire for retreat. We see this, for example, in his relentless satire of 
competition: “not only do the enemies of a fallen Grandee insult over his misfortunes, but 
even these who were his former well-wishers, are (to avert the jealousie of those who 
                                                     
29 Ibid., 35. 
30 Ibid., 45. 
31 Ibid., 48–53. 
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occasioned his fall) necessitate to enveigh most bitterly against his memory” (37). While 
Sayre claims to offer a historical context for what has otherwise been treated as a 
philosophical universal—solitude/alienation as existential angst, the universal condition of 
mankind, etc.—it is important to acknowledge more specific historical contexts than the 
increased development of a rapacious, commerce-based, self-interested society, namely, 
the traumas and factionalism in the wake of the Civil Wars. 
 As part of his critique of the illusory nature of power, Mackenzie makes specific 
reference to the late protectorate: “And to convince us, that power and command conceals 
what strength and energie there is really in the Governours wit, reflect but a little upon 
those pitifull rebels, who govern’d lately this Countrey, and did seem most wise, whilst 
they were vested with power: Of which, being now again devested, their wit falls far short 
of the first cast” (64). And, aside from explicit invocations of “pitifull rebels” who were 
“vested with power,” other moments in Mackenzie’s text, particularly those that allude to 
internecine conflicts, whether within a family or a country, seem to recall recent history: 
“A private man is not oblieged to oppose his Relations, fight against his Country, give his 
own Judgement the lye; all which are but the meanest impositions that some Princes lay 
upon greatness: and why should men purchase, at so dear a rate, the liberty to serve others, 
which is all that greatness can bestow?” (71). This passage, in its pointing out the paradox 
of fighting for so-called liberty in order to be servile, also reflects another consistent thread 
throughout Mackenzie’s work: the absurdity of social customs and even hierarchies. In this 
sense, Mackenzie adopts the position of the satirical outsider dispassionately viewing a 
performance: “I know no securer box, from which to behold it, then a state of solitude … 
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in contemplating the reelings of the multitude, the excentrick motions of great men, and 
how fate recreats it self in their ruine” (90). 
 
Evelyn’s response to Mackenzie, Publick Employment and an Active Life Prefer’d to 
Solitude … In Reply to a late Ingenious Essay of a contrary Title, has been described as a 
“devastatingly skilful rejoinder rejecting Mackenzie’s showy elevation of leisure over 
business,” and as a “decisive refutation.”32 This assessment of the debate is undoubtedly 
true, insofar as it is read on an entirely literal level, and without consideration of the 
historical and political contexts of Mackenzie’s work. Evelyn engagingly distills the main 
humanist arguments for the active life, drawing from the standard sources such as Cicero 
and Plutarch, despite his disingenuous statement that “On the other side, it must be granted, 
that he [Mackenzie] has all the Topics and Discourses of almost all the Philosophers who 
ever writ” (134). Though Evelyn’s argument is more susceptible to critique than has been 
allowed (discussed further below), from a practical, literal point of view—e.g., if everyone 
were solitary who would serve as doctors? Who would provide material necessities or run 
a country? Wouldn’t endless leisure alone get boring?—he successfully undercuts 
Mackenzie’s side of the debate. One might ask, however, why does reading these texts in 
such a literal fashion seem to be the only option? Yes, it is a “debate,” but Mackenzie’s 
work was written as a stand-alone book, a literary and rhetorical exercise in defending 
solitude.  
                                                     
32 Clare Jackson, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, s.v. “Mackenzie, Sir George”; 
Vickers, ed., Public and Private Life, xxxvi. 
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In responding to Mackenzie’s criticism of hierarchy and social custom—“What can 
it advantage any man that another bows to him? It can neither cure Gout nor Gravel” (70)—
Brian Vickers uses Falstaff’s catechism on honor as a counterpart—“Can honour set a 
leg?... Or take away the grief of a wound,” etc.—writing, “the answer to Falstaff is that 
only medicine will cure a wound, or alleviate the gavel, and that neither respect nor honour 
are to be blamed for not so doing.”33 But is this really the answer to Falstaff? Is the speech 
not so famous rather because it makes a larger point, whether ultimately defensible or not, 
about blindly pursuing what society calls honor, the inherent violence of honor, the “bubble 
reputation”?  
Evelyn goes on to demonstrate the pitfalls and impracticalities of complete 
withdrawal and solitude, especially if undertaken as a common practice throughout a 
society: “The Commonwealth is an assembly regulated by active Laws, maintain’d by 
Commerce, disciplin’d by Vertue, cultivated by Arts, which would fall to universal 
confusion and solitude indeed, without continual care and publick intendency” (150). His 
main argumentative strategy is to tie solitude to sloth (e.g., “this despising of glory is the 
mother of sloth” [144]) and virtue to public activity, a standard English-humanist 
appropriation of Ciceronian precepts. And, again traditionally, a Christian justification for 
the public life complements and overlays the classical: man should imitate God, which 
does not entail that one “sit still and do nothing” (including, presumably, the tradition of 
religious contemplation), since God is “always so full of Employment, that the most 
accurate Definers of him, stile him to be Actus purus, to denote his eternal and 
incomprehensible activity…. The lives of Great Persons should resemble that of the Gods, 
                                                     
33 Vickers, ed., Public and Private Life, xxiv. 
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who delight in such actions as proceed from beneficence” (138–39). Here and elsewhere 
Evelyn betrays his reverence for and belief in (as least as espoused by the authorial persona 
of this particular work) the fundamental ethical goodness of “great men,” which, as we 
have seen, is in stark contrast to Mackenzie’s analysis of the powerful and ambitious.  
Evelyn goes on to argue that while solitaries claim to be shunning ambition and 
fame, they actually rather hypocritically desire it; their solitude is ostentatious and “lie[s] 
concealed too apparently; since it does but proclaim a desire of being observed” (142). 
There is an echo here of Timon’s critique of Apemantus’s solitude and later Apemantus’s 
critique of Timon’s solitude from Timon of Athens: solitude can be about pride, about a 
showy, affected, public display of being solitary. Evelyn also links solitude to melancholy, 
“the basest of humors” (153), and echoes Robert Burton’s Anatomy of Melancholy, in 
which isolation leads to extreme inactivity and ultimately death: “Be not solitary, be not 
idle,” Burton writes.34 Most people who withdraw into solitude, Evelyn contends, find an 
empty and unhappy life: “for little do solitary persons profit, without a mind adapted for 
it; Wise men only enjoy themselves, not the voluptuous or morose” (180); without the 
pursuit of virtue, inherently public for Evelyn, without erudite conversation, “Men must … 
come under the Category of brutes, to have no appetites besides eating and drinking; no 
passions, save the sensual” (167). 
Another important argument against solitude that Evelyn employs is the “shameful 
abdication of Princes” (159): disaster, he claims, ensues when great men or leaders 
abdicate and retire to solitude. Such withdrawal has the effect of radically destabilizing a 
country and upsetting hierarchy and order. Literary-critical opinion of early modern history 
                                                     
34 Vickers, ed., Public and Private Life, xviii. 
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has taken this sentiment to be the uncontested dominant view, and thus Evelyn appears to 
make an irrefutable point from the perspective of a contemporary reader. Support for these 
assertions often reference abdications or tendencies toward seclusion in fictional rulers, 
such as Sidney’s Basilius or Shakespeare’s Lear or Prospero, as further evidence of the 
status quo position. However, as Richard Strier has demonstrated, the issue is not as 
straightforward as the commentary leads one to believe. In his reading of King Lear in 
Resistant Structures, Strier uses a historicist argument to debunk “the assumption … that 
the division and abdication are the great mistakes from which the tragic action flows,” 
which of course “is one of the most well-entrenched assumptions in Shakespeare 
scholarship…. The ‘scholarly’ assumptions that division of a kingdom and abdication 
would necessarily have been perceived as disastrous mistakes by an early seventeenth-
century audience are among those ‘truths’ that hardly need proving anymore.” Strier 
contends that both the play’s internal logic and contemporary political thought on the 
history of Europe “does not support the normal view.”35 As part of his evidence supporting 
this claim, Strier points to the very famous and well-known example of Charles V: 
“Historically, the most famous case of a reigning monarch … abdicating his throne in order 
‘To shake all Cares and Businesse from [his] Age’ … was a spectacular success. Charles 
V, the most powerful ruler by far in sixteenth-century Europe, retired to a monastery and 
passed the kingship of Spain to his absent son … with no problem whatever.”36 And, in 
fact, Mackenzie, in his pro-solitude argument, explicitly mentions Charles V’s example 
                                                     
35 Richard Strier, Resistant Structures, 177–78. 
36 Ibid., 180. Vickers, in analyzing Evelyn’s point, makes the standard argument that “as 
with Shakespeare’s King Lear, or Sidney’s Basilius, for the ruler to opt out of society can 
only cause disaster”: Vickers, ed., Public and Private Life, xxxii. 
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(18, 49). Thus, the difference between Evelyn and Mackenzie on this matter is less a clear-
cut debate victory for Evelyn than it otherwise seems from the (few) critical assessments 
of the debate. 
 
A fascinating twist to the Mackenzie-Evelyn debate is that each author argues for the 
position that seems to contradict his actual life. Mackenzie was a busy, well-known, and 
active lawyer and politician (not yet perhaps famous in 1665, when he authored his treatise, 
but well on his way), as well as an author (his Aretina, or, The Serious Romance [1660] is 
often referred to as the first Scottish novel). Evelyn, on the other hand, was a famous 
proponent of gentlemanly solitude. Writing to Cowley in 1667, he explains that his answer 
to Mackenzie does not necessarily spring from his deepest convictions: 
  
You had reason to be astonished at the presumption, not to name it affront, that I 
who have so highly celebrated recesse, and envied it in others, should become an 
advocate for the enemie, which of all others it abhors and flees from. I conjure you 
to believe that I am still of the same mind, & that there is no person alive who dos 
more honor and breathe after the life and repose you so happily cultivate and adorne 
by your example: But as those who prays’d dirt, a flea, and the gowte, so have I 
Publiq Employment in that trifling Essay, and that in so weake a style compar’d to 
my antagonists, as by that alone it will appeare I neither was nor could be serious; 
and I hope you will believe I speake my very soul to you.37 
 
                                                     
37 Evelyn, Diary, ed. Bray, 3:349; quoted in Vickers, ed., Public and Private Life, xii–xiii. 
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Some of this is conventional modesty topos, but Evelyn’s commitment to retirement can 
also be seen in his 1659 plan for a lay monastery, a place to pursue “a sober, godly, and 
scientific life.”38 Further, in Evelyn’s diary there are testimonies to his personal taste for 
solitude and in his interest in private rooms and gardens: he writes that he has “built … a 
study, made a fishpond, Iland and some other solitudes & retirements at Wotton.”39 In “The 
Garden” (a short essay followed by a Pindaric ode), Cowley, trying to give up worldly 
ambition and live a retired, rural life, praises Evelyn for realizing the ideal: “All that I my 
self am able yet to do, is only to recommend to Mankind the search of that Felicity, which 
you instruct them how to Find and to Enjoy.”40 In his letter to Cowley, Evelyn claims that 
it is in his professions of loving solitude, not in his defense of public life, that he speaks 
his “very soul”: the debate with Mackenzie, then, belongs to the tradition of paradox.  
 But aside from the academic-debate tradition of paradox, each treatise also 
represents a fantasy of sorts. For Evelyn, his defense of public life is a fantasy that virtue 
in the end wins out, and thus powerful figures and rulers are ethical, honest, and only with 
the good of the commonwealth in mind. Consider his remembrances of Charles I:  
 
With what constancy, spirit, and resignation did our Royal Martyr unjustly suffer 
… is not certainly to be parallel’d by any thing posterity has recorded, save that 
grand Exemplar our blessed Saviour…. Tell me yet you admirers of solitude, in 
                                                     
38 Vickers, ed., Public and Private Life, xiii; see ibid., appendix (259–64), for the text of 
Evelyn’s proposal, in a letter to Robert Boyle, September 3, 1659. 
39 Quoted in Janette Dillon, Shakespeare and the Solitary Man, 23. Røstvig, The Happy 
Man, 235, contrasts Evelyn’s ideal of contented leisure and erudite conversation—“a more 
polite version of rural retirement”—to Mackenzie’s “advocacy of complete solitude.” 
40 Cowley, The Complete Works in Verse and Prose of Abraham Cowley, 2:327. 
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what corner of your Recesses dwelt there a more excellent soul?... Where was there 
a more sincere man in his actions? a more constant devote[e] to his Religion?... 
Look on him then as a King … and all that a good and a most vertuous Prince can 
be to his subjects, and you have the pourtraicture of our Charles opposed to all the 
petty Images of your solitary Gentlemen” (182–84).  
 
Furthermore, Evelyn’s fantasy is that commerce and money do not breed greed, ruthless 
competition, rampant self-interest, but a healthy, harmonious society; therefore, there is 
nothing untoward for the solitary to escape, and he indulges only his own ego and sloth 
and voluptuousness. It is, in other words, a fantasy that the status quo works, that we can 
trust in the post-Restoration powers ruling justly, just as Charles I had before his execution. 
It also represents a difference in medium between diary/letters and a published treatise—
the difference between a private and public persona.  
 
Mackenzie’s Career 
For Mackenzie, the fantasy of solitude is multifaceted. A look at his career and the deep 
ambivalences and contradictions that shape his reputation helps us to understand the appeal 
of solitude and the kind of cathartic release of social critique, particularly one focused on 
a critique of “greatness.” Much later in his career, in 1684, Mackenzie “produced what has 
subsequently been acclaimed as ‘the most powerfully argued of all seventeenth-century 
expositions of the theory of absolute monarchy’”:41 in many ways, his tract on solitude is 
                                                     
41 Clare Jackson, Restoration Scotland, 1660–1690, 25. Jackson points out that there was 
really no non-royalist, i.e., republican, tradition in Scotland: “For if the antonym of a 
‘royalist’ is assumed to be a ‘republican,’ then the absence of virtually any discrete 
183 
 
anomalous, deviant even. What is the motivation behind such unorthodox, and seemingly 
out-of-character, positions?  
After the Restoration, Mackenzie was readmitted to the Edinburgh Faculty of 
Advocates (those who are licensed to appear as advocates in Scottish courts),42 and in 1661 
occurred “the first great event of his public life,” when he served as counsel for the First 
Marquis of Argyll, who was accused of high treason.43 Mackenzie’s defense, though 
unsuccessful, has been deemed “courageous” by posterity: “Aware that an argument ‘might 
escape us which might be interpreted in itself as treason’…, Mackenzie nevertheless 
contended that, with no Act of Indemnity passed in Scotland, regarding Argyll’s former 
compliance as perfidious established a dangerous precedent, since all Scots had been 
‘forc’d to be the idle Witnesses’ of the usurpation, even by paying Cromwellian taxes.”44 
Mackenzie “had a hopeless cause to plead…. His sympathy was clearly with his client. In 
defending Argyll he pointed out to the Parliament … that the new Indemnity for Scotland 
has not yet been issued, and that, if they condemned Argyll for ‘compliance’ they made a 
dangerous precedent against themselves, for all had, at one time or another, ‘complied’ and 
been in Argyll’s situation.”45 Argyll had taken leadership of the Covenanters in the Civil 
War, and while Mackenzie passionately defended him, his politics were not aligned with 
                                                     
republican discourse effectively renders ‘royalist’ intellectual discourse synonymous with 
the intellectual culture of Restoration Scotland. Even the most savage and uncompromising 
attacks on Charles II’s regime were largely predicated on presbyterian royalist principles, 
rather than on notions of humanist republicanism.” Ibid., 6. 
42 He was originally admitted in early 1659, but after the Restoration readmittance was 
required. 
43 Andrew Lang, Sir George Mackenzie, King’s Advocate, of Rosehaugh, His Life and 
Times, 31. 
44 Clare Jackson, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, s.v., “Mackenzie, Sir George.” 
45 Lang, Sir George Mackenzie, 33, 37. 
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“covenanted Presbyterianism”46—in fact, much later he was to become the Covenanters’ 
mortal enemy. But at some personal and professional risk, Mackenzie seems to have taken 
a principled stand in an effort to move past factionalism and the continuing enmities over 
the Civil Wars. In the end, however, Argyll was executed, his head placed on a spike at the 
Old Tolbooth of Edinburgh.  
In Scotland between 1661 and 1662, more than 650 people were accused of 
witchcraft, a zealous frenzy of superstition and hysteria that resulted in scores of executions 
by burning. Witches and the rhetoric of witchcraft paranoia served Royalist interests: 
“Discussion of witchcraft and supernatural phenomena permeated all levels of late-
seventeenth century Scottish culture…. Living under a monarch whose authority was 
widely regarded as being of divine ordinance, witches represented ‘the perfect antagonists’ 
in terms of their perceived ability to exert supernatural powers to the detriment of the 
commonwealth.” As a result, “agents of Charles II’s divinely-endowed authority … were 
thus entrusted with eliminating such demonic threats.”47 Mackenzie was one of those 
charged with this task. But witchcraft paranoia didn’t just serve Royalist ends, but also 
Presbyterian/Covenanting ones: “From a radical presbyterian perspective, however, the 
language of late seventeenth century witchcraft also supplied a powerful rhetorical tool, 
since it was constructed around ‘the Scottish idiom of covenant-making and covenant-
                                                     
46 Ibid., 38. 
47 Jackson, Restoration Scotland, 189. The link between witchcraft and rebellion went back 
as early as 1627, and was greatly heightened during the English Civil Wars: “During the 
civil war itself, loyal preachers consistently harangued their audiences with dire warnings 
of the fate awaiting those who … engaged in the ‘witchcraft of rebellion.’ Showpiece 
sermons, preached before the King and his Parliament at Oxford on highly charged 
occasions … were frequently appropriated by devoted royalist minsters as a suitable 
opportunity to expatiate at length on the parallels between rebels and witches”: Peter 
Elmer, Witchcraft, Witch-Hunting, and Politics in Early Modern England, 92–93. 
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breaking.’… Scottish political theory coincided neatly with political theology to ensure 
that committed presbyterians thereby regarded the toleration of erastian prelacy as a 
‘diabolical form of covenant-breaking.’”48 Mackenzie’s deep skepticism toward these 
witchcraft accusations put him in a lonely position. 
Mackenzie, as a poorly paid justice-depute, was involved in the trials, 
demonstrating sympathy for the usually elderly and poor so-called witches, and “disturbed 
by the ways in which he believed ‘poor Innocents die in Multitudes by an unworthy 
Martyrdom, and Burning comes in fashion,’ and he therefore insisted on the strictest 
degrees of judicial rigour and impartiality.”49 Judges, he laments, “burn persons by the 
thousands as guilty of this crime,” and “the accused are usually poor ignorant creatures.”50 
However, Mackenzie and the other justice deputes in these witchcraft trials were “promised 
a share of ‘the fines and escheats’ of prisoners found guilty” in order to “stimulate [their] 
zeal.” In Lang’s sympathetic, though not uncritical, account, “This was a premium upon 
severity, but Mackenzie saved as many as he could of the unfortunate men and women 
whom he pitied; and it seems probable that he … did much to abate the frenzy for accusing 
people of sorcery.”51 
Such an offer—essentially, money in order to find people guilty—for someone in 
the “almost unpaid office of Justice Depute,” and someone with lofty political ambitions, 
represents a moral quandary: such quandaries, in fact, would become the story of 
Mackenzie’s career, and he didn’t always acquit himself with the reputation for intellectual 
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courage that he did in the witch trials. And even in these witch trials, “in a certain kind of 
cases,” he supports convictions, such as when the accused “are proved to have exercised 
‘sympathetic magic,’ … by burning or pricking puppets taken to represent persons whom 
they are proved to hold in hatred. Here we have the evil intention.” However, “tales of 
metamorphosis and other silly stories Mackenzie inclines to regard as purely impossible. 
As far as he dared, he counteracted the baneful superstitions fostered by the clergy in 
England and Scotland.”52 He left the office of justice depute in 1653, lamenting that some 
of the cases he tried “went against his conscience.”53 For Clare Jackson, while Mackenzie 
refused entirely to deny witchcraft’s existence, he was “particularly suspicious of the 
virtually assured convictions produced in trials conducted on Privy Council commission” 
and he “argued that it was only through rigorous and impartial judicial investigation into 
each case … that ignorance could be overcome. The alternative of resorting ‘to kill one 
another, because we cannot comprehend the reason of what each other do,’ he deplored as 
‘the effect of a terrible distraction.’”54 Such a position represented a strategy of trying to 
“transcend ecclesiastical controversy through abstract moral rationalism” and “espous[ing] 
an essentially non-doctrinal religiosity to escape the constraints of creedal warfare.”55 
With the backdrop of recurring religious and political sectarianism, Mackenzie, in 
1663, wrote Religio stoici (Relgion of a Stoic), which addressed “the Fanatics of All Sects 
and Sorts” and “The madcap zealots of this bigot age.” The tract argued against religious 
persecution, making the case that no theological idea is so secure that it “justifies so much 
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violence in such things. Are we not ready to condemn to-day, as fanatic, what yesterday 
was judged jure divino. And do not even those who persecuted others for their opinions, 
admire why they should be, on that score, persecuted themselves?”56 In the conflict 
between Episcopists and Presbyterians, the former associated with Charles II and state 
laws, the latter with the Covenanters, Mackenzie chooses the former, believing that “ruin 
… came from Knoxian ideas, and from clerical pretensions”: “As every private Christian 
should be tolerated by his fellow subjects to worship God inwardly according to his 
conscience, so should all conspire to that exterior uniformity of worship which the laws of 
his country enjoin.”57 In this work, Mackenzie’s future troubles with the Covenanters can 
be glimpsed: for Mackenzie, the zealousness of the Covenanters “supposes our most 
merciful God to be of the same temper with these pagan deities, who desired to have their 
altars gored with blood.”58 
In 1666, as advocate for Dundee, Mackenzie participated in prosecutions resulting 
from the Pentland Rising, a village rebellion of Covenanters against soldiers who were 
mistreating an elderly man accused of defaulting on a fine for not attending government-
mandated church services. While marching toward Edinburgh, the Covenanters clashed 
with soldiers near the Pentland Hills: many were killed, and over a hundred taken prisoner, 
most of whom were subsequently executed. Mackenzie’s “Bluidy” epithet was earned later, 
when, as a member of Scottish Parliament from Ross-shire, and having “gradually 
relinquished his role as opposition defender of popular liberties,” he undertook “vigorous 
prosecution of prominent covenanters”: “the extremist covenanter Richard Cargill 
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‘excommunicated’ Mackenzie from ‘the true Church’ for his ‘constant pleading against, 
and persecuting to death, the people of God,’ as well as for his ‘ungodly, erroneous, 
phantastic, and blasphemous tenets, printed to the world in his pamphlets and pasquils.’”59 
Mackenzie’s own religious inclination has been described as ecumenical, but with an 
increasing emphasis on outward conformity; his belief in absolute royal authority also 
increased throughout his life. His political and prosecutorial actions were undertaken, he 
claimed, with the sole goal of “civil peace.”60  
 Lang’s biography of Mackenzie is structured around the contrast of character versus 
career: it hypothesizes a privately ethical and introspective person caught up in the moral 
entanglements of public life—a “clash between Mackenzie’s bon naturel … and his 
environment.”61 The division in Mackenzie’s reputation between principled advocate and 
bloody persecutor can be seen in the remembrances of him in Walter Scott’s Tales of a 
Grandfather. At one point Scott quotes a passage from Mackenzie that illustrates “the great 
Advocate’s pity for the most pitiable class of mortals, the women accused, tortured, led to 
the stake by the parish minister, and burned among the curses of the populace for the crime 
of witchcraft.” In another passage, Davie Deans, in rejecting someone as advocate who is 
related to Mackenzie, refers to, “a man that has the blood of the Saints at his fingers’ ends? 
Didna his uncle die and gang to his place wi’ the name of Bluidy Mackenzie? and winna 
he be kenned by that name sae lang as there’s a Scot tongue to speak the word?”62 
Ultimately, Lang concludes, Mackenzie can only be described by antitheses and paradox: 
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“The man remembered as a ruthless oppressor had a heart full of pity for the poor, and 
pleaded earnestly for the practice of Christian Socialism. He who strove to compel the … 
Presbyterians to ‘make the laws of the country their creed,’ … heartily applauded the most 
eccentrically aberrant wanderers from the fold of the Church, the Quakers.”63 Mackenzie 
emerges as a man who ultimately “acted against the grain of his character,” again 
highlighting a disconnect between private morality and public action, or between the “man 
of letters”—the authorial self—and the “man of action.”64 
 
Cowley and “beatus ille” versus Mackenzie 
Treason stemming from earlier actions against Charles I, rampant witchcraft persecutions 
and gruesome executions, the resurfacing of intractable religious and monarchical conflict: 
these are the various moral and political issues that dominate Mackenzie’s career and life 
up to 1665. A dream of solitude, then, is hardly surprising. Mackenzie’s prospects of 
becoming a powerful public figure inevitably involve a mixture of moral compromises, 
opportunism, a hopeless desire for peace, principles conflicting with self-interest, ethically 
muddled or ambivalent options. Solitude, by contrast, is idealized as clear and pure, free 
from the constant machinations and shifting allegiances and battles of conscience. It is an 
escape from realpolitik into a realm of learning, the cultivation of the self, rural tranquility, 
and peace. And yet this escapist vision of solitude, while certainly part of Mackenzie’s 
treatise, is not the dominant feature of the work: the articulation of the beatus ille tradition 
takes a back seat to a sustained social critique in the vein of the solitary outsider. 
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Cowley was among the most enthusiastic proponents of the beatus ille tradition and 
of rural retirement. We can get a sense of its tone and objectives, in contrast to Mackenzie 
(despite his often being lumped into the tradition), from looking at some of Cowley’s odes 
and translations, which often praised rural simplicity and evoked a quasi-pastoral 
contentment:65 
 
With how much joy does he beneath some shade 
By aged Trees reve’rend embraces made, 
His carless head on the fresh Green recline, 
His head uncharg’d with Fear or with Design? 
By him a River constantly complains, 
The Birds above rejoice with vari’ous strains, 
And in the solemn Scene their Orgies keep 
Like Dreams mixt with the Gravity of sleep, 
Sleep which does always there for entrance wait, 
And nought within against it shuts the Gate.66 
 
                                                     
65 Røstvig argues for a rather strict separation between rural odes (Cowley’s dominant form 
was the Pindaric ode) and pastoral, in contrast, for example, to Renato Poggioli, who 
examines “the pastoral of solitude” and “the pastoral of self” through lyrics such as 
Marvell’s “The Garden.” See Poggioli, The Oaten Flute, chapters 8 and 9. Røstvig claims 
that “the rural ode is realistic, while the pastoral idealises; the one describes a real Sabine 
farm, the other an Arcadian never-never-land…. The … motif … which identifies the rural 
scene with the Golden Age, was particularly apt to cause generic confusion.” See Røstvig, 
The Happy Man, 46–47. There seems to be more generic slippage here than Røstvig allows; 
and, of course, solitude is important to both pastoral and beatus ille poems. 
66 Cowley, The Complete Works, 2:324. 
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This is part of a translation/adaption of Horace’s second epode (which beings “Beatus 
ille”); Cowley’s invention lies in the details of the scene under the tree, adding a “softness” 
and harmony to the moment.67 As Røstvig points out, Horace’s poem has a satirical bent, 
since the praise of rural bliss and simplicity is given by a usurer, and “Horace ends his 
poem by showing how the usurer’s love of money after all prevails over his theoretical 
insight into the nature of human happiness.” Cowley, by contrast, eliminates the satirical 
ending and retains only the praise of rural bliss.68  
 In Cowley’s poem on solitude, which supplements his essay “Of Solitude,” he 
formulates a similar sense of ease and contentment in nature—though not wild, untamed 
nature, but that of the “Country Houses and Retreat”: 
  
Here let me, careless and unthoughtful lying, 
      Hear the soft Winds above me flying, 
      With all their wanton Boughs dispute, 
And the more tuneful Birds to both replying, 
     Nor be myself too mute. 
 
As Silver Stream shall roll his Waters near, 
     Gilt with the sun-beams here and there; 
     On whose enamell’d Bank I’ll walk, 
And see how prettily they smile, and hear 
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      How prettily they talk.69 
 
Cowley’s “Of Solitude” goes “beyond the classical idea in insisting on complete 
retirement,”70 among the deep peace and tranquility of communion with nature. As with 
Mackenzie, there is an element of escape from politics and worldliness, but for Cowley it 
is more about escape from failure and disappointment, “and subsequent determination to 
seek happiness in obscurity.”71 As mentioned above, he dedicates his poem “The Garden” 
to Evelyn, admiring him for choosing solitude among books and gardens over “empty 
shows and senceless noys,” the goal of which solitude is “full choice of thine own 
Happiness.”72 Cowley includes “a carefully qualified statement in favour of Epicurus,” 
“the most important garden philosopher of Antiquity”:73 
  
When Epicurus to the World had taught, 
 That pleasure was the chiefest good, 
 (And was perhaps i’th’ right, if rightly understood) 
 His life he to his Doctrine brought, 
 And in a Gardens shade that Sovereign Pleasure sought. 
 Whoever a true Epicure would be, 
 May there find cheap and virtuous Luxurie.74 
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73 Røstvig, The Happy Man, 220. 




The emphasis is strictly on pleasure and contentment, though we also find the attempt to 
appropriate and redefine “virtue,” as in Mackenzie: here “virtuous Luxurie,” in Mackenzie, 
“virtuous inactivity.” Cowley’s use of the word sovereign is also interesting: while 
meaning it in the sense of “a person or thing which excels or surpasses others of the kind,”75 
it of course is redolent of supremacy, authority, and the sovereign himself—in other words, 
the “sovereign pleasure” one obtains in solitary retirement depends on separation from the 
political world of power and sovereigns. 
There are moments in Mackenzie’s treatise that gesture to the peace and tranquility 
of solitary retirement in nature, a fantasy of quietistic withdrawal away from moral 
ambivalence and ethical compromise. “If we would view the various faces of the sky but 
one day,” Mackenzie writes, “we would perceive more of variety in those, more of 
excellent colours and various motions, then in ten thousand such trifles as these [in the city 
or court]. Consider but the beauty of one tulip, and it’s several freckles; the motion of one 
Bird, and it’s several wheelings; the shapes of several worms, and their different crawlings; 
and ye will find task enough, and more variety there, then a City can afford” (87–88). Like 
Cowley, Mackenzie uses the pathetic fallacy in painting the ideal picture of solitude: “Here 
the levelling … trees, lay their heads together, to protect such as seek shelter under their 
well-cloath’d branches: and the Cristal-streams run slowly and turn many windings, as if 
by that and their quiet murmurings, they would express an unwillingness to leave so 
pleasant a field” (113). Cowley’s “Silver Stream” becomes Mackenzie’s “Cristal-streams,” 
in this bucolic life of ease and careless contemplation, where sleep comes easily, 
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untormented by self-doubt and internal conflict.  
Røstvig, in painting a portrait of “the happy Epicurean” as one strand of her “happy 
man” type, emphasizes the Epicurean aspects of Mackenzie’s text.76 For example, she 
points to Mackenzie’s take on the issue of contemplation, which “would have shocked the 
Stoic moralist”: Mackenzie writes, “Contemplation does often drive our souls into extasies, 
and is so charming, that is may be rather said to ravish then please” (82). For Røstvig, “the 
terms used (‘charming,’ ‘ravish’ ‘please’) are characteristic of the Restoration attitude. 
Contemplation, no longer a duty but a pleasure, is praised in terms usually applied to a 
mistress.”77 At the same time, for those who, like Mackenzie, “scorned both the reeling 
multitude and the scheming politicians the garden of Epicurus, or the Lucretian pinnacle, 
became the logical refuge.”78 Two points should be made here. While Røstvig’s analysis 
of the Epicurean tendency is no doubt correct, that tendency comprises a relatively 
miniscule portion of Mackenzie’s text: this is not a Lipsian discourse on gardens or an 
extended Epicurean fantasy.79 Second, Røstvig traces this strain of solitude/retirement, 
embodied by Cowley but supposedly shared by Mackenzie, to what she sees as the 
newfound calm that sweeps over England after the Restoration: “The reaction of the 
English nation in 1660 was largely caused by the feeling that a period of fear and insecurity 
was at an end. With the re-establishment of the old regime something of the order long 
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vanished again returned to the English scene…. The influence of this turning of the tides 
was necessarily profound. With the general relaxation of tension came a fondness for 
leisured ease, and the dimpled god of the bacchanalian love feast entered into the landscape 
of retirement.”80  
Whatever the validity of this interpretation of England, the Restoration in Scotland 
was anything but a return of order or a “relaxation of tension”: thus, Mackenzie’s treatise 
is a work of angst, not a work of bacchanalian ease and peace of mind. As outlined above, 
the years from 1660 to 1689 in Scotland, until the government of William of Orange, were 
defined by bitter and deadly conflicts between the ministers of Charles II and James II, on 
the one hand, and the Covenanters, on the other. As Mackenzie’s early twentieth-century 
biographer Andrew Lang writes, 
 
The struggle of the Restoration was a struggle to impose Episcopacy on one side, 
and to restore Presbytery on the other…. English visitors to Scotland during the 
Restoration, could no more understand … what the trouble was about. The 
Confession of Faith of 1560 was still the standard of the Church, the worship in the 
churches seemed identical … with that of the Presbyterian meeting-houses in 
England. English tourists asked why there were risings, murders, hangings, and 
torture, all about nothing?81 
 
Ultimately, Mackenzie’s career and legacy comes to be largely defined by this post-
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Restoration conflict, earning him the moniker “Bluidy Mackenzie,” for his treatment of the 
Covenanters. A deep irony, then, is the dedication of his 1665 treatise on solitude to a 
prominent Covenanter, John Lindsay, Seventeenth Earl of Crawford: the work on solitude 
articulates a hope of moving beyond the conflicts and moral shortcomings that would end 
up defining his legacy. 
 None of this is to offer an apologia or condemnation of Mackenzie: rather, these 
conflicts, self-divisions, and moral ambiguities all speak to his particular rendition of the 
solitude trope. A desire for escape into something uncontaminated and unambiguous is 
easily understood: it arises not from peace and tranquility after the Restoration, but rather 
from turmoil, from blood, from endless conflict. The social critique that comprises the 
majority of the treatise also has a personal element to it. Mackenzie offers an attack on the 
moral hazards of ambition as someone who harbored deep and lofty ambitions and had 
already navigated (or succumbed) to those hazards. In Lang’s words, Mackenzie was of 
“an ambitious nature,” and some wish “he had gone back to his books and his garden…. 
In the use of judicial torture he acted against the grain of his character,” which was “rather 
that of a man of letters than a man of action.”82 The book on solitude embodies this self-
division: it is written by the man letters against the man of action. The radicalism of his 
critique, safely embedded within a classically derived genre and popular topic of debate, 
expresses a disgust and disillusionment with both the forces he fought against and the 
forces he served. Solitude became a means not just to dream of escape, but to engage radical 
ideas that delegitimized contemporary society, while conjuring the seemingly unattainable 
desire for an alternative, ideal community, which is paradoxically represented by 
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